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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to explore deliberative practices in Pakistan. In 
doing so, it draws on and extends the literature produced under two 
relatively new academic fields—the fields of deliberative theory and 
comparative political philosophy—which are gaining prominence in 
the academic world. Although these two academic fields appear quite 
different but this thesis argues that they are not only complimentary but 
can also benefit each other in their further theoretical development. In 
order to show this complimentary relationship between deliberative 
theory and comparative political philosophy, this thesis explores 
deliberative practices in an authoritarian non-Western context. More 
specifically, it explores the role of deliberation in the democratization 
of Pakistan. This thesis analyzes the case of Pakistan Lawyers’ 
Movement during the military dictatorship (2007-2009) and how it 
paved the way to the process of democratization in the country. 
Although democratization of societies at large has always been at the 
core of deliberative theory, but comparative studies of democratization 
have completely missed the deliberative aspect which makes transition 
to democracy possible. Through Dryzek’s concept of deliberative 
capacity, this thesis investigates the role of Pakistan Lawyers’ 
Movement in building this capacity across different locations in the 
political system. The concept of deliberative capacity is being used in 
the larger context of systemic turn in deliberative theory. This latest 
trend helps us to study deliberation at a macro level and is not 
specifically tied to liberal institutional arrangements of states in the 
West. This thesis attempts to interpret Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement 
through the lens of deliberative theory. Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement 
throws new light on the normative aspects of deliberative theory and 
also helps us to understand the nature of deliberation in Pakistani 
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context. The case of Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement provokes reflection 
on normative principles of deliberative democracy, helps us understand 
the nature of deliberation in an authoritarian context, extends current 
scholarship on the comparative studies of democratization by spelling 
out the deliberative potential of the regime, and contributes to the 
ongoing debate on comparative political philosophy as an academic 
field in the age of globalization. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
                                                                                      “Only Connect!” 
—E. M. Forster, Howards End, 1910 
  
“It is probably true quite generally that in the history of human thinking 
the most fruitful developments frequently take place at those points 
where two different lines of thought meet. These lines may have their 
roots in quite different parts of human culture, in different times or 
different cultural environments or different religious traditions: hence 
if they actually meet, that is, if they are at least so much related to each 
other that a real interaction can take place, then one may hope that new 
and interesting developments may follow.”  
—Werner Heisenberg in Capra, 1983 
 
 
The United Nations Organization (UNO) designated 2001 to be the 
“year of dialogue among civilizations”1. This characterization captures 
our political predicament in the 21st century and also makes us realize 
the significance of pursuing inter-cultural dialogue in the current global 
                                                          
1 For details see United Nations Resolution 53/22, 4th November, 1998. Also see 
(Segesvary, 2000) and (Dallmayr, 2002). 
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age. Globalization has made our borders blurred and fluid. This 
transformation in boundaries calls for fluid thinking which is mostly 
possible through the exchange of new and innovative ideas. Through 
dialogic engagement we do not merely arrive at new ideas but can also 
connect diverse ideas which may seem unrelated. A genuine dialogue 
offers an opportunity to critically evaluate and rethink our most basic 
axioms about the nature of ‘self’ and the ‘other’. The critical moment 
in the dialogic engagement, which also depicts our global political 
condition, redefines the relationship between the ‘self’ and ‘other’. 
Indeed, an act of self-critique not only changes our self-understanding 
but it also changes our relationship to the unfamiliarr ‘other’. It means, 
an act of reinvestigating the ‘familiar’ necessarily involves the 
rethinking of the ‘alien’. The phenomenon of globalization requires us 
to indulge in meaningful communication so that we can renounce the 
‘clash of civilizations’ myth through mutual dialogue and 
understanding. Academically, the influence of globalization can be seen 
almost in all spheres of human knowledge. It has also influenced two 
relatively new academic fields in political philosophy:  
(1) Theoretical accounts on deliberation and deliberative democracy 
which also opens the possibilities of conceiving democracy beyond the 
familiar institutions of state. 
(2) Comparative political philosophy which attempts to bring non-
Western political thought into a dialogical conversation with the 
Western tradition of political theory.  
The concept of deliberation is essential to all types of political systems. 
Some thinkers claim that “as human beings we have a natural cognitive 
aptitude for deliberation” (Steiner J. , 2012, p. 247) and this “cognitive 
aptitude for deliberation is much more evenly distributed than one 
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usually assumes. Ordinary citizens have this aptitude, perhaps even 
more than professional politicians…this aptitude must be constantly 
practiced so that it does not erode” (Steiner J. , 2012, p. 248). The 
concept of deliberation has been an important feature in the history of 
Western political philosophy. Whether we study key texts in Greek 
philosophy such as Plato’s Dialogues and Aristotle’s Politics, or 
analyze the Socratic method of posing questions and Sophists’ tactics 
of wining arguments, the concept of deliberation remains central to 
political theorizing. In the same vein, if we analyze thought experiments 
in modern political philosophy, specifically key thinkers in the tradition 
of social contract theories, such as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, John Rawls and David Gauthier, they all exemplify 
diverse ways of deliberating to conceptualize political theory. It is this 
primordial nature of the concept of deliberation in political philosophy 
which lies at the core of this thesis. It draws on and extends the literature 
produced under two relatively new subfields of political philosophy—
the fields of deliberative theory and comparative political philosophy—
which are gaining prominence in the academic world. Although these 
two academic fields appear quite different but this thesis argues that 
they are not only complimentary but can also benefit each other in their 
further theoretical development. In order to show this complimentary 
relationship between deliberative theory and comparative political 
philosophy, this thesis critically elucidates deliberative practices in an 
authoritarian non-Western context. More specifically, it explores the 
role of deliberation in the democratization of Pakistan. In doing so, this 
thesis analyzes the case of Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement during the 
military dictatorship (2007-2009) and how it paved the way to the 
process of democratization in the country. Although democratization of 
societies at large has always been at the core of deliberative theory, but 
comparative studies of democratization have completely missed the 
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deliberative aspect which makes transition to democracy possible. 
Through Dryzek’s concept of deliberative capacity, this thesis 
investigates the role of Pakistan lawyers’ movement in building this 
capacity across different locations in the political system. The concept 
of deliberative capacity is being used in the larger context of systemic 
turn in deliberative theory. This latest trend helps us to study 
deliberation at a macro level and is not specifically tied to liberal 
institutional arrangements of states in the West.  
The Pakistani context throws new light on the nature of deliberative 
practices in an authoritarian non-Western context. This research also 
provides an opportunity to study both deliberative theory and 
contemporary Pakistani politics. It seeks to enrich our understanding of 
both comparative political philosophy and deliberative theory in a non-
Western context. Against Huntington’s claim that ‘we only know who 
we are…when we know whom we are against’ (Huntington, 2004), this 
research attempts to explore the possibility of inter-cultural dialogue by 
juxtaposing non-western ideas on political deliberation with recent 
Western theories of deliberative democracy.  
 
1- Rationale and Theoretical Framework 
 
Deliberative theorists argue that the notion of deliberation is central to 
the democratic political order and their analysis is limited to the 
advanced liberal democracies in the West (Sass, 2018; He, 2006). In 
their scholary work, they attempt to improve and conecptualize the 
quality of deliberation in the democratic process.  
 
13 
 
For political philosphers, the following questions acquire center stage 
in deliberative theory:   
(i)- What makes deliberation democratic?  
(ii)- What type of communication is deliberative? 
(iii)- What are the possible sites/locations of deliberation? 
(iv)- How should citizens deliberate in the political process? 
(v)- How can we make deliberation inclusive? 
(vi)- What are the conditions of deliberation? 
(vii)- What are the possible consequences of deliberation?  
(viii)- How can we use deliberation to reach a consensus in the political 
process? 
(ix)- Can we deliberate on global issues, such as climate justice and 
global justice? 
(x)- What is the value of truth in deliberation?  
 
Deliberative theorists propose different answers to these questions. In 
fact, this thesis also shows that the emergence of the various models of 
deliberative democracy are indeed different responses to these 
questions. ‘Deliberation’ means “mutual communication that involves 
weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding 
matters of common concern” (Andre Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane 
Mansbridge, and Mark Warren, 2018, p. 2) and ‘deliberative 
democracy’ is a type of democracy in which the political process of 
‘deliberation’ lies at the center. In its early formulation, the model of 
deliberative democracy was understood in contrast to standard liberal 
aggregative model of democracy. As Habermas writes: 
 
“In the liberal view, the political process of opinion- and will-formation 
in the public sphere and in parliament is determined by the competition 
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of strategically acting collectivities trying to maintain or acquire 
positions of power. Success is measured by the citizens’ approval, 
quantified as votes, of persons and programs. In their choices at the 
polls, voters give expression to their preferences. Their voting decisions 
have the same structure as the acts of choice made by participants in a 
market. They license access to the positions of power that political 
parties fight over in the same success- oriented attitude” 
(Habermas, 1994, p. 3) 
 
According to Habermas, the process of opinion and will formation 
should be a communicative act. It means, through argumentation and 
rational justification people should participate in the political process. 
Deliberative process induces reflection upon preferences and only 
better arguments, which one can plausibly justify, matter in the political 
process. The aggregative model of democracy is primarily an interest-
based model in which citizens are understood as consumers in the 
market who are merely concerned about their personal interests and 
benefits. As Young says, “interest-based conceptions of democracy 
consider democracy primarily as a process of expressing one’s 
preferences and demands, and registering them in a vote. The goal of 
democratic decision-making is to decide what leaders, rules, and 
policies will best serve the greatest number of people, where each 
person defines his or her own interests. In the process of democratic 
decision-making, individuals and interest groups determine and vote for 
policies that will best serve their own perceived interests, including in 
their calculations the knowledge that others in the polity do the same. 
Democratic decisions are the outcome of successful completion of ideas 
and coalitions for self-interested votes” (Young, 1996, pp. 120-1). 
Deliberative theorists are highly critical of this standard liberal 
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aggregative model of democracy because it rules out the ethical values 
of mutual respect and common good, thereby significantly limiting the 
scope of politics. Citizenship, deliberative theorists argue, is not an act 
of consumption and citizens are morally responsible for the choices 
they make in politics because it determines the fate of the millions of 
other people2. Citizens should be motivated by the question, “what is 
good for the country?”, rather than “what is good for their personal 
benefit?” In contrast to aggregative democracy, the deliberative model 
“conceives of democracy as a process that creates a public, citizens 
coming together to talk about collective problems, goals, ideals, and 
actions. Democratic processes are oriented around discussing this 
common good rather than competing for the promotion of the private 
good of each. Instead of reasoning from the point of view of the private 
utility maximizer, through public deliberation citizens transform their 
preferences according to public-minded ends, and reason together about 
the nature of those ends and the best means to realize them” (Young, 
1996, p. 121). This is not to say that aggregative and deliberative 
models are antithetical in nature. In the actual political process, 
especially in the Western liberal democratic setup, deliberation 
(talking) and aggregation (voting) are both essential in the practice of 
democracy. It should be noted that deliberative theory is a normative 
theory deeply rooted in the philosophical ideas of Aristotle, Rousseau, 
Kant, Mill, Dewey, Habermas, and John Rawls, therefore, it attempts 
to answer the question “how politics ought to be done?”, rather than a 
mere explanation of existing politics. The normative dimension of 
deliberative theory is important to realize the ideal nature of this theory. 
The ideals of deliberation, like almost all other democratic ideals, are 
                                                          
2 For the distinction between citizen and consumer, see (James Fishkin and Bruce 
Ackerman, 2004, pp. 173-5) and (Fishkin & Laslett, 2003).  
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aspirational in nature and they cannot be fully realized in actual political 
practices. It does not mean that deliberative democracy is a 
“counterfactual thought experiment” (Benhabib S. , 1996, p. 84), rather, 
it provides us a normative framework to critically evaluate our actual 
political practices. Deliberation is also central to normative accounts of 
political legitimacy and many theorists hold that it is also primordial for 
the functioning of democratic institutions. 
         
The early formulations of deliberative theory and research were only 
confined to advanced liberal democracies in the West. However, in 
recent developments of deliberative democrcacy, theorists have also 
started analyzing its prospects in the non-Western contexts3. 
Particularly, these theorists have analyzed various ways in which 
deliberation takes place in different socio-political contexts like East 
Asia (China and Japan) and India4. One of the goals of this new trend 
of deliberative research is to determine democratic potential of non-
democratic regimes. This goal is directly relevant to this thesis. This 
research also attempts to understand deliberative practices in an 
authoritarian Pakistani context.  
 
This increasing interest in applying the theory and practice of 
deliberative democracy to non-democratic and non-Western contexts 
consolidates its global reach. Also, this latest trend in contemporary 
political philosophy poses a question about the universality of 
deliberation as a political practice. Although, deliberation manifests 
                                                          
3 For details, see (J. Fishkin et. al., 2010); (Sass, J. and Dryzek, J.S., 2014), (Tang, B. 
and Dryzek, 2014) and (Zhou, 2012). 
4 For the East Asian context, see (He, 2006); (He & Warren, 2011); (Beibei Tang, 
Tetsuki Tamura, and Baogang He, 2018). For the Indian context, see (V. Rao and P. 
Sanyal, 2010); (Ramya Parthasarathy and Vijayendra Rao, 2018). 
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itself as a universal ideal but its actual practice and character varies 
across space and time. This variation in the practice of deliberation can 
be understood and explained in cultural terms. We can enrich our 
understanding of political deliberation by comparing various cases in 
different historical contexts. Indeed, cross-cultural dialogue and 
learning can enrich the theory of deliberative democracy, which in turn 
also contributes to our understanding of comparative political 
philosophy.  
 
Since political institutions, the medium through which deliberation is 
realized, are themselves evolved and constituted by cultures, thus, the 
relationship between culture and political deliberation cannot be 
ignored. Culture-based comparative studies not only help us to 
understand the various forms deliberation takes in divergent contexts 
but also the socio-political conditions under which it can grow and 
flourish. The culture based contextual study of deliberation raises two 
important questions:  
(1) What can be the cultural particularity of deliberative practices?     
(2) Do we need any peculiar conception of culture (for example, inter-
subjective concept of culture) to understand political deliberation in 
different historical contexts?     
There are two responses to these questions. The first response, which is 
given by thinkers like Amartya Sen, stresses on the universality of 
democracy and justice. According to Amartya Sen, democracy-as-
public-reason is some sort of a universal category. His articulation has 
some affinities with deliberative theory but he avoids the peculiar 
language used by theorists of deliberative democracy. Sen also pays 
attention to cultural differences that inform the concepts of both justice 
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and deliberation. However, Sen speaks of public reason as a singular 
category and does not recognize the role of cultural differences in 
shaping the character and significance of public reasoning in various 
contexts5. The second view regards deliberation as a peculiar political 
practice tied to the Western liberal democracies. Habermas’ concept of 
deliberative democracy is an exemplification of this view. According to 
Habermas, the practice of deliberation is the outcome and consequence 
of the process of modernization: “As societies modernize, their 
denizens become more reflexive with reference to cultural traditions 
and political power, and they exercise this capacity in communicative 
practices that are eventually institutionalized” (Sass, J. and Dryzek, J.S., 
2014, p. 5; Habermas, 1996). Therefore, deliberation is a temporal 
concept because it is idiosyncratically a modern phenomenon. 
Gambetta goes one step further and argues that the practice of 
deliberation in modern liberal democracies is merely confined to the 
‘analytical cultures’ rooted in Northern Europe (Gambetta, 1998). Lynn 
Sanders and Iris Marion Young go even further and claim that 
deliberation is intrinsically a particularistic and privileged speech 
culture “that of white, well-educated, Western males, one that 
disadvantages women and minority groups” (Sanders L. , 1997; Young, 
1996). It means, for Sanders and Young, deliberation is not a 
fundamental feature of all societies, rather, it is a practice belonging to 
particular classes of people in different countries during a small period 
of time.    
This research attempts to respond to such claims by showing the forms 
deliberation take in non-Western contexts, specifically Pakistani. The 
appearance of political deliberation in non-Western contexts can also 
                                                          
5 For details, see (Sen, Democracy and Its Global Roots, 2003); (Sen, 2009) and (Sen, 
2005). 
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be understood and articulated in relation to comparative political 
philosophy. This research seeks to demonstrate that deliberation 
flourishes in a variety of contexts. Moreover, Western liberal 
democracies could benefit by better understanding various socio-
political conditions that contribute to the growth and flourishing of 
deliberation in different historical contexts. 
If the capacity of deliberation is universal but its expressions vary in 
different contexts then there are plausible reasons to explain this 
variation in cultural terms. Contemporary deliberative theory supports 
this claim and regards political culture as one of the crucial categories 
in the functioning of democracy. Habermas says: 
“Democratic institutions of freedom disintegrate without the initiatives 
of a population accustomed to freedom. Their spontaneity cannot be 
compelled simply through law; it is regenerated from traditions 
preserved in the associations of a liberal political culture.” (Habermas, 
1996, pp. 130-1) 
 
Although, Habermas accepts the significance of culture in the practice 
of deliberation, but his model of deliberative democracy is tied to the 
Western liberal states. The aforementioned passage also highlights his 
Eurocentric presumptions about deliberative democracy. However, in 
the present context, I quote this passage to spell out the relationship 
between deliberation and culture. Similarly, Seyla Benhabib says that 
democratic institutions are not legitimized by being logically coherent 
political systems, rather they always seek a “civic culture of public 
participation [which] requires the creation of institutions and practices 
whereby the voice and perspective of others . . . can be expressed in 
their own right” (Benhabib S. , 1988). Benhabib does not go deep in to 
explicating cultural foundations of democratic process rather her 
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concerns are limited to cultural differences and the possible conflict 
they trigger in various contexts. Likewise, Simone Chambers elucidates 
the intrinsic relationship between culture and political deliberation. 
After surveying a wide variety of cases, she contends that it is through 
“a culture of publicity, modernity offers a new context of criticism and 
self-reflection. Differentiation and rationalization create a more open 
universe from which to draw criticism. The result is that criticism of 
received ideas and dominant principles is both deeper and wider in the 
modern context than in the pre-modern” (Chambers, 2000, p. 196). She 
suggests that “revitalizing publicity . . . requires encouraging a 
deliberative political culture in which citizens have a sense that their 
participation in the public sphere has meaning and significance” 
(Chambers, 2000, p. 196). It means, public sphere, which is a condition 
of political deliberation in modern liberal democracies is inseparable 
from the culture. The most prominent deliberative theorists recognize 
the importance of political culture in the democratic process.  
 
The core idea of deliberation in contemporary political philosophy 
involves the following factors: 
(1) Freedom 
(2) Equality 
(3) Rational political discussion involving both agreement and 
disagreement through argumentation 
(4) Public sphere 
 
This concept of deliberation is stemming from the tradition of 
Enlightenment, which is based upon values like autonomy, rationality 
and equality (Cooke, 2000). Such a concept of deliberation raises an 
interesting question: Are concepts of political deliberation and 
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deliberative democracy ingrained in Western Enlightenment applicable 
to non-Western societies like Pakistan that has different cultural 
assumptions? This research explores the potential of political 
deliberation in the non-Western contexts, such as Pakistan. There is a 
need to understand the intrinsic relationship between culture and 
deliberative democracy. The nature of public and political deliberation 
cannot be separated from the dynamics of specific culture where it 
actually takes place   
This thesis also argues that comparative political philosophy is also a 
result of deliberations by different thinkers such as Dallmayr, Euben, 
March, Parel, Keith etc. about the nature of political theorizing in the 
age of globalization. In fact, these deliberations6 among theorists have 
led to the emergence of a specific moniker called comparative political 
philosophy in the academia. They are critical of the Western tradition 
of political theory. They argue that the Western political theory is a kind 
of monologue because it merely relies on the canons of the Western 
tradition7. From the outset, this mode of political theorizing rules out 
hegemonic and imperialist understanding of political reality where one 
part of the world’s population tends to determine and monopolize the 
idiom of the global village. The constitution of global village requires 
shared meanings and practices. It means basic theoretical and 
methodological framework of comparative political philosophy is 
hermeneutical or dialogical. Dialogical approach towards comparative 
political philosophy mainly relies on mutual interpretation, which 
disregards the priority of one’s point of view over the other. 
                                                          
6 These deliberations are internal deliberations among political philosophers in the 
Western academia who want to expand the scope of political theory through inter-
cultural and inter-civilizational dialogues.   
7 For details, see (Dallmayr, 2004); (Dallmayr, 1999); (Dallmayr, 2002); (Euben, 
1999); (Euben, 2006); and (Parel, A. and Keith, R.C., 1992). 
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Comparatively political philosophy departs from ‘formal theory’ that 
interprets diverse phenomena in terms of universal standards derived 
from the European Enlightenment. This is an act of intellectual 
inhospitality towards other cultures, which excludes the non-Western 
other and gives rise to Huntington’s famous distinction between the 
West and the rest. Through dialogic engagement, comparative political 
philosophy attempts to debunk the Eurocentric presumptions of 
academic research in political theory.  
It is precisely in this context that this thesis attempts to understand the 
nature of deliberative practices in the non-Western context like 
Pakistan. However, I also argue that in order to spell out deliberative 
practices in the non-Western contexts, deliberative theory should be 
combined with comparative political philosophy. In this thesis, I 
attempt to bridge this gap, which is mostly ignored by both deliberative 
theorists and comparative political philosophers. The case of Pakistan 
lawyers’ movement is a concrete example through which we can 
understand the nature of deliberation in a non-Western authoritarian 
context. The role of deliberation in bringing democracy to the Pakistani 
context also contributes to the comparative studies of democratization, 
which until very recently completely ignored its significance.  This 
research provides a unique lens to study the political philosophy of 
deliberative theory and contemporary Pakistani politics. It seeks to 
enrich our understanding of contemporary political philosophy and 
deliberative democracy in a non-Western context. The ideal of 
deliberation enhances inclusiveness, responsiveness, and recognition. 
Like comparative political philosophy, it also helps us to integrate 
otherness and difference in the political process. 
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2- Research Objectives, Questions and Methodology  
This research thesis aims to: 
(i)- identify the deliberative mechanisms and understand the role of 
deliberative practices in conceiving/achieving the ‘political’ in non-
democratic contexts (Pakistan). 
(ii)- understand the nature of dialogue in comparative political 
philosophy. 
(iii)- understand the process of democratization in Pakistan through 
deliberative practices. 
(iv)- understand the role of disruptive politics and protests in shaping 
the practice of deliberation. 
(v)- explore the relationship between comparative political philosophy 
and deliberative theory. 
(vi)- explore the relationship between deliberation and local culture. 
 
The key research questions of this project are:  
(i)- What is the nature of political deliberation in the non-Western 
context of Pakistan?  
(ii)- What is the role of deliberation in comparative political 
philosophy? 
(iii)- How does deliberation open the political space for democratization 
in an authoritarian context?  
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To answer these questions the following more specific research 
questions can be distinguished: 
(i)- What is the nature of dialogue in comparative political philosophy?  
(ii)- Is deliberation a universal idea?  
(iii)- What can be the cultural particularity of deliberative democracy?   
(iv)- Do we need any peculiar conception of culture (for example, inter-
subjective concept of culture) to understand political deliberation in 
different historical contexts? 
(v)- Is deliberation instrumental in the process of democratization? 
(vi)- How can we interpret social movements in the context of 
deliberative theory? 
 
The methodology of the dissertation is qualitative in nature. In sum, the 
overall research methodology will be hermeneutics and discourse 
analysis focused on primary and secondary texts. The systemic strand 
in deliberative theory, which I will use to analyze Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement, construes deliberation as a communicative activity which 
takes place at various locations in the political system. Although this 
approach is very attractive theoretically, but it raises complex questions 
concerning the methodology to investigate deliberation in multiple 
locations. How different sites are connected in the political system 
requires us to interpret and critically analyze various discourses and 
diverse forms of communication, such as protests, rational 
conversation, rhetoric, emotions etc. I believe, the interpretive 
approach, which lies at the core of hermeneutical method, is more 
useful to understand different forms of communication and their 
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possible connections to the political system. Similarly, comparative 
political philosophy itself is a hermeneutical methodological stance that 
encourages dialogue in political theorizing.   
 
3- Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. A brief description of each 
chapter is given below: 
(i)- Introduction gives the overview of the thesis. It also describes main 
research questions, objectives and methodology of the research.  
(ii)- Chapter one deals with the nature and value of comparative 
political philosophy in the age of globalization. The process of 
globalization encapsulates our political predicament in the 21st century 
in which inter-cultural dialogue is inevitable. Comparative political 
philosophy is a subfield in political philosophy in which the notion of 
dialogue is central and it also goes beyond the Eurocentric 
presumptions of political theory, thereby, paving the way to understand 
political ideas, for example ‘political deliberation’ in this thesis, in the 
non-Western world. Similarly, recent advancements in deliberative 
theory are also influenced by the process of globalization at different 
levels. The triad of globalization, deliberative theory and comparative 
political philosophy provides us with a comprehensive theoretical 
framework to understand the nature of political theorizing in the 21st 
century. 
(iii)- Chapter two deals with the concept of political deliberation and 
major normative controversies in the philosophical literature on 
deliberative theory. In this chapter, I decouple the term deliberative 
from democracy in order to spell out the minimal definition of political 
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deliberation. This minimal account is useful to address major normative 
controversies in  deliberative theory. The six normative controversies 
discussed in this chapter are- (a) equal participation, (b) rational 
justification, (c) the principle of mutual respect, (d) consensus, (e) the 
concept of truthfulness and (f) conditions and consequences of 
deliberation. These normative controversies help us to understand the 
philosophically complex and methodologically diverse nature of 
deliberative theory. 
(iv)- Chapter three provides a detail description of the systemic strand 
in deliberative theory. The systemic strand is an attempt to reconcile 
normative controversies in deliberative theory discussed in chapter two. 
The importance of systemic turn is necessary to understand the 
historical development of deliberative theory over the last three 
decades. The systemic approach expands the reach and scope of 
deliberative theory in different ways. It also expands the prospects of 
deliberation beyond the confines of liberal democratic setup. It enables 
us to locate deliberative practices in a wide variety of contexts, such as 
authoritarian, non-Western, micro, mezzo and macro. The concept of 
deliberative system discussed in this chapter will be used to understand 
the democratic potential of authoritarian regimes. 
(v)- Chapter four introduces the case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement. 
This chapter situates lawyers’ movement in the historical context to 
evaluate the past role of judiciary in legitimizing military regimes over 
the last sixty years in Pakistan. The case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement 
and its various phases from March 2007 to March 2009 are discussed. 
This movement was instrumental in politicizing the informal public 
sphere which enabled superior judiciary to assert it deliberative 
capacity. It helps us to understand the nature of deliberation both within 
the legal community and civil society at large. 
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(vi)- Chapter five offers a critical analysis of Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement by applying deliberative theory to this case. More 
specifically, it spells out the nature of deliberation in the Pakistani 
context. Although, democratization of societies at large has always been 
at the core of deliberative theory, but, comparative studies of 
democratization have completely missed the deliberative aspect which 
makes transition to democracy possible. Through Dryzek’s concept of 
deliberative capacity, this chapter investigates the role of Pakistan 
lawyers’ movement in building this capacity across different locations 
in the political system. The concept of deliberative capacity is being 
used in the larger context of systemic turn in deliberative theory. This 
latest trend helps us to study deliberation at a macro level and is not 
specifically tied to liberal institutional arrangements of states in the 
West. This chapter also highlights the peculiarity of deliberative 
practices in Pakistan by excavating the relationship between 
institutional liberalism, local culture and deliberation. Comparative 
political philosophy and deliberative theory both supplement each 
other. These two subfields in contemporary political philosophy are 
complimentary to political theorizing in the age of globalization. 
(vii)- The last chapter describes main contributions of this thesis and a 
few recommendations for future research. The four main conclusions 
of this thesis are: (a) Reasons for internal skepticism among deliberative 
theorists (b) The nature of public sphere in the Pakistani context and its 
politicization (C) The role of deliberative capacity in the process of 
democratization in Pakistan (d) The missing link between deliberative 
theory and comparative political philosophy.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Comparative Political Philosophy 
 
This chapter deals with the academic field of comparative political 
philosophy and its significance and scope in the age of globalization. 
As an academic field, comparative political philosophy does not merely 
attempt to overcome the Eurocentric presumptions in political 
theorizing but it also highlights the significance of cross-cultural 
learning in our global age. It provides an inclusive methodological 
approach to study political practices and concepts in the non-Western 
world. Political philosophers, working in the tradition of deliberative 
theory, have not properly engaged with this new academic field. 
Similarly, most of the comparative political philosophers are ignorant 
of the recent advancements in the field of deliberative democracy. This 
chapter delineates the basic theoretical and methodological framework 
of comparative political philosophy, which is useful to study 
deliberative practices in non-Western countries like Pakistan. The 
chapter is divided into two sections. In section one, I discuss the 
theoretical foundations of comparative political philosophy. 
Specifically, I explain the role of hermeneutical phenomenology in the 
development of comparative political philosophy. In this section, I also 
discuss the theoretical frameworks of Dallmayr and Euben, two 
prominent thinkers of this new trend in political philosophy. In section 
two, I discuss the triadic relationship between globalization, 
deliberative theory and comparative political philosophy. The process 
of globalization provides the context in which one can understand the 
significance of comparative political philosophy in the further 
development of deliberative theory. Moreover, the combination of these 
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two disciplines, which is one of the goals of this thesis, helps us to 
understand deliberative practices in the non-Western world in a more 
comprehensive manner.   
 
 
1- Theoretical Foundations of Comparative Political 
Philosophy 
 
Comparative political philosophy is an emerging sub-field within 
political philosophy, which seeks to “juxtapose non-Western political 
ideas with existing Western understandings of the political” (Bashir, 
2014, p. 15). Comparative political philosophy has been well-received 
in the academic community primarily because it has allowed political 
theorists to enlarge their understanding of ‘the political’, and related 
issues, with ideas and perspectives that have not, up till recently, been 
explored. In contemporary philosophy there is an upsurge of cross-
cultural dialogues for the articulation of comparative political 
philosophy. This urge takes us beyond monologue, conventional canons 
of political philosophy, and opens up the space of cross-cultural or 
comparative political philosophy. This mode of political theorizing 
takes seriously the current process of globalization. The phenomenon 
of globalization does not merely entail growing proximity of different 
cultures but also the emergence of a global village8. The process of 
globalization more than ever compels people from different cultures 
and traditions to communicate in order to renounce the myth of the 
‘clash of civilizations’ theory and constructs a horizon for living 
together. From the outset, this mode of political theorizing rules out 
                                                          
8 The term ‘global village’ was coined by a Canadian media theorist Marshall 
McLuhan in 1960s. See (McLuhan, 2011) and (McLuhan, 2016).    
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hegemonic and imperialist understanding of political reality where one 
part of the world’s population tends to determine and monopolize the 
idiom of the global village. The constitution of global village requires 
shared meanings and practices. It means basic theoretical and 
methodological framework of comparative political philosophy is 
hermeneutical or dialogical. Dialogical approach towards comparative 
political philosophy mainly relies on mutual interpretation, which 
disregards the priority of one’s point of view over the other. 
Comparatively, political philosophy departs from ‘formal theory’ that 
interprets diverse phenomena in terms of universal standards derived 
from the European Enlightenment. This is an act of intellectual 
inhospitality towards the other cultures, which excludes the non-
Western other and gives rise to Huntington’s famous distinction 
between the West and the rest. Comparative political philosophy can be 
understood as an antidote to the idea of a “clash of civilizations”. It is a 
counter-move that helps us to develop inter-cultural dialogues and 
avoids violent conflicts through political theorizations. It’s a new mode 
of inquiry that takes the process of globalization into serious 
consideration. Indeed, one of the factors that supports this turn in 
political philosophy is the process of globalization. According to 
Dallmayr, comparative political philosophy9 is “a mode of theorizing 
that takes seriously the ongoing process of globalization, a mode which 
                                                          
9 Dallmayr uses the terms comparative political philosophy and comparative political 
theory interchangeably. The basic theoretical framework that Dallmayr uses is 
philosophical in nature. His arguments in support of comparative political 
theory/philosophy are embedded in contemporary strands of philosophy, such as 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Derrida’s deconstructionism, Husserl’s phenomenology, 
and Lyotard’s postmodernism. Dallmayr’s theoretical and methodological stances, 
both stem from contemporary philosophy. In the same vein, in this thesis, I mainly 
use the term comparative political philosophy. If, on certain occasions, I use the term 
comparative political theory, then, it is being used interchangeably with comparative 
political philosophy. For Dallmayr’s methodological stance in comparative political 
philosophy, see (Dallmayr, 2002).       
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entails, among other things, the growing proximity and interpretation 
of cultures and the emergence of what Marshall McLuhan called the 
global village” (Dallmayr, 2004, p. 249). The emergence of this new 
field challenges Eurocentrism, Western-centrism and various other 
modes of parochialism in academic research. Due to the process of 
globalization cross-cultural understanding is taking place in all fields of 
human sciences. In our global age, inter-cultural dialogue is inevitable. 
As Lyotard in his classic essay on postmodern culture writes: 
 
“Eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: one 
listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald’s food for lunch 
and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in Tokyo and ‘retro’ 
clothes in Hong Kong.” 
(Lyotard, 1989, p. 76)  
 
There is now a vast critique on the traditional canons of doing research. 
Indeed the cross-cultural turn in human sciences involves the process 
of ‘de-canonization’ or at least a rethinking of the canons in academic 
research. Disciplines like anthropology, cultural-studies, post-
colonialism and religious studies are already dealing with other cultures 
through their methodological frameworks10. Political philosophy as an 
academic discipline is also influenced by this cross-cultural turn in 
human sciences. Specifically, political thinkers are persuaded by 
contemporary philosophy. Twentieth century European and Anglo-
American philosophy attempts to bring cross-cultural orientation into 
the very domain of philosophical inquiry. It is “an opening of the West 
toward the rest” and is made possible through different philosophical 
                                                          
10For anthropology, see (Geertz, 1973); (Sahlins, 1978). For post-colonial studies, see 
(Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, 1998); (Lopez, 2001). For religious 
studies, see (Smith, 1991); (Osman Bakar and Cheng Gek Nai (eds.), 1997).  
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strands like linguistic turn (Ludwig Wittgenstein), phenomenology 
(Edmund Husserl), hermeneutics (Heidegger and Gadamer), 
pragmatism (James, Dewey and Pierce), existential phenomenology 
(Levinas and Ponty) and deconstructionism (Derrida). What is peculiar 
to all these approaches is their “dissatisfaction with modern Western 
egocentrism (stylized in Descartes’s ego cogito) and its corollary, 
Eurocentrism” (Dallmayr, 2004, p. 250)  
 
 
(i)- Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics  
 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics lies at the heart of comparative 
political philosophy and inter-cultural dialogue, which he develops on 
the basis of Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology. 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology is an important strand that 
informs much of comparative political philosophy, especially its 
dialogic perspective. Heidegger’s formulation of human existence as 
being-in-the-world (Dasein) rules out Cartesian ego as an Archimedean 
point for philosophical reflection. He breaks with the Cartesian style 
philosophy and adopts a peculiar stance that he calls ‘hermeneutical 
phenomenology’. His approach is an interpretive study of human nature 
and its relationship with the world. It is “a new ‘planetary thinking’, 
which, though nurtured by local cultural idioms, would transcend 
hostile parochialisms through dialogical engagement” (Dallmayr, 2004, 
p. 250). The extension of European industrial form of life and its 
intellectual ideas on the non-Western world is self-evident in the current 
global world. Within the arena of global world a hermeneutics of 
dialogue between the Western and non-Western world is indispensable. 
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Hermeneutics, which originated in the German philosophical tradition, 
has contributed a lot in making this dialogue meaningful.  
 
Heidegger’s famous student Gadamer, who is probably the leading 
philosopher of dialogue in 20th century philosophy, further lays out the 
implications of hermeneutical phenomenology in human sciences. 
From the outset, Gadamer stresses the dialogic nature of hermeneutics. 
The concept of understanding in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is intimately 
linked with dialogue and encounter, between text and reader, between 
self and the other, between two different cultures or life worlds. 
Gadamer largely develops his hermeneutic theory in order to bridge 
historical distance within the tradition, later in his life, he 
retrospectively evaluates his work in order to bridge cultural 
differences. Gadamer employs the notion of Gespräch11, which is one 
of the basic tenets of his philosophical hermeneutics, in order to fulfil 
this challenging task. Considering the whole intellectual journey of 
Gadamer’s philosophy, we come to realize that his philosophical 
hermeneutics does not merely deal with a theory of 
Geisteswissenschaften but it also extends to the human situation in its 
entirety in the global context. What I want to establish is that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics is not merely confined to the discussion about the 
foundations and limits of Geisteswissenschaften. It also raises the 
question about the fundamental gesture of twentieth century 
hermeneutic philosophy, that is, dialogue between different cultures 
and traditions. Prior to Gadamer, many philosophers employed the 
notion of dialogue and conversation in different contexts but Gadamer’s 
use of it radically breaks with conventional theorizations. For Gadamer, 
the moment one starts understanding something, he or she ineluctably 
                                                          
11 Gespräch can be translated as both dialogue and conversation. 
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engages in dialogue, i.e. ontologically understanding occurs only as a 
dialogical process. This dialogical unfolding of the event of 
understanding, Gadamer construes, helps us to bridge traditional and 
cultural differences. Thus, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics 
attempts to provide philosophical-hermeneutical framework for the 
possibility of a meaningful dialogue between two different traditions 
which one can also extend to a dialogical model between the Western 
and non-Western world. Possibility of verstehen (understanding) across 
historical distance is one of the basic tenets of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics. Contrary to his predecessors, Gadamer does not conceive 
of temporal distance as a yawning abyss, something to be overcome, 
but a positive ontological condition that makes verstehen possible. At 
the time when he was developing his hermeneutic theory in his book, 
Truth and Method, Gadamer did not properly pose the question about 
the possibility of understanding across different cultures and traditions. 
However, in an interview on July 1986 Gadamer regarded his 
philosophical hermeneutics to be perfectly suitable for this broader task. 
He says: 
 
“That is the essence, the soul of my hermeneutics: To understand 
someone else is to see the justice, the truth, of their position. And this 
is what transforms us. And if we then have to become part of a new 
civilization, if this is our task, then we shall need a philosophy which is 
similar to my hermeneutics, a philosophy which teaches us to see the 
justification for the other’s point of view and which thus makes us doubt 
our own.” 
(Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson (eds.), 1992) 
 
35 
 
Prior to Gadamer, hermeneutics regarded historical distance and its 
concretization in tradition as a problem to be overcome. Understanding 
of an author’s meaning is only possible if one enters the author’s world. 
Such a hermeneutics, Gadamer claims, imposes an impossible task of 
becoming like the author as the only way to comprehend the meanings 
of his or her words.   From the outset Gadamer rejects this approach on 
the basis of the model of dialogue which he develops in Truth and 
Method. In his magnum opus, Gadamer argues that in our everyday 
practices, understanding takes place without having been met with such 
requirements. Moreover, ontologically understanding is not a “matter 
of reliving the other’s experiences or of getting inside someone else as 
if one had to transpose oneself into another person” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 
383). Thus, for Gadamer, understanding is not an action of one’s 
subjectivity but how one places himself or herself within the tradition. 
The placement of oneself within a tradition gives rise to hermeneutic 
experience. Hermeneutic experience, Gadamer contends, is neither 
monological as science conceives nor dialectical like Hegel’s universal 
history. It is dialogical in the sense that present and past both are fused 
in the very constitution of it. In the fusion of past and present, which 
Gadamer calls fusion of horizons, human understanding as an 
ontological event takes place. Furthermore, Gadamer also characterizes 
dialogue as analogous to the interpretation of text because in both 
situations we come across with the hermeneutic experience regarding 
fusion of horizons. In the interpretation of texts and dialogue our 
primary concern is to reach an agreement about the matter at hand. In a 
dialogue “just as each interlocutor is trying to reach an agreement on 
the subject with his partner” (Gadamer, 1989), likewise is the case with 
an interpretation of the text where the “interpreter is trying to 
understand what the text is saying” (Gadamer, 1989). This shows that 
Gadamer conceives verstehen as a kind of Einverständnis (agreement). 
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Thus, there is no necessity to go inside the author’s mind. In Truth and 
Method, Gadamer presents a model of dialogue in the form of the “I-
Thou” relation. Gadamer contrasts three different modes of experience 
of the Thou in this model of dialogue. The relationship between “I” and 
the “Thou” is marked by openness in the third mode of this dialogical 
model. For Gadamer, such an openness is the condition of genuine 
relationship between “I” and the “Thou”: “openness to the other, then, 
involves recognizing that I myself accept some things that are against 
me, even though no one else forces me to do so” (Gadamer, 1989). This 
can be easily exemplified when Gadamer insists that the Western mind 
develop tolerance for the Soviet Union: “Always insisting on human 
rights, insisting that they must accept parliamentary democracy in order 
to industrialize fully, that reveals only our own preoccupations, which 
do not reflect their own history” (Dieter Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson 
(eds.), 1992). In the context of dialogue, Gadamer relates this account 
of openness to that of hermeneutic experience. When he appeals to the 
notion of tradition, Gadamer says that one “must allow the tradition’s 
claim to validity, not in the sense of simply acknowledging the past in 
its otherness, but in such a way that it has something to say to me. This 
too calls for a fundamental sort of openness. Someone who is open to 
tradition in this way sees that historical consciousness is not really open 
at all, but rather, when it reads its texts historically, it has always 
thoroughly smoothed them out beforehand, so the criteria of the 
historian’s own knowledge can never be called into question by 
tradition” (Gadamer, 1989). This way, Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics does not merely provide us a framework for the 
possibility of a meaningful dialogue among different traditions but also 
a systemic critique of the objectivistic methodological ideal of 
historicism. Indeed, on the basis of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of 
Dasein, Gadamer provides us an alternative to historicism. Gadamer 
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employs the figure of hermeneutic circle in order to reject the 
objectivism inherent in the historical-hermeneutical 
Geisteswissenschaften. The objective conduct of such sciences, 
Gadamer argues, presumes the destruction of our primordial relation of 
belonging (Zugehörigkeit), and this, in turn, is inevitable for our 
relation to historical as such. For Gadamer, the horizons of past and 
present are always fluid and understanding remains a dynamic process 
situated in the tradition. Moreover, the relation between past and 
present is similar to the “I-Thou” relationship that is characterized by 
genuine openness. The following passage from Truth and Method 
summarizes the significance of openness in a dialogue: 
 
“In human relations the important thing is, as we have seen, to 
experience the Thou truly as a Thou—i.e., not to overlook his claim but 
to let him really say something to us. Here is where openness belongs. 
But ultimately this openness does not exist only for the person who 
speaks; rather, anyone who listens is fundamentally open. Without such 
openness to one another there is no genuine human bond. Belonging 
together always also means being able to listen to one another. When 
two people understand each other, this does not mean that one person 
"understands" the other. Similarly, "to hear and obey someone" (auf 
jemanden hören) does not mean simply that we do blindly what the 
other desires. We call such a person slavish (hörig). Openness to the 
other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept some things 
that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.” 
(Gadamer, 2004, p. 355) 
 
The relationship between self and the other, which emerges from 
Gadamer’s concept of openness, is based on non-domination. The 
concepts of openness, self and the other have been instrumental in the 
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development of comparative political philosophy. Through its emphasis 
on non-mastery and non-domination in human relationships, 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics ultimately goes beyond the 
orientalist attitudes in political theory. The possibility of understanding 
the non-Western mind with its peculiarities lies at the heart of 
philosophical hermeneutics. Since one of the essential goals of 
comparative political philosophy is to challenge the Eurocentric 
presumptions of political theory, that’s why, Gadamer’s thought 
appears to be attractive for such an intellectual exercise.     
 
(ii)- Fred Dallmayr: The Inauguration of Comparative 
Political Philosophy as an Academic Field  
 
Dallmayr’s appropriation of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is 
an alternative to Orientalism and political theory’s parochialism. A 
number of comparative political philosophers draw on Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in order to expand the horizon of political theory by 
including the non-Western texts and voices in the academia.   
Fred Dallmayr is the first major proponent of Comparative Political 
Philosophy. Dallmayr proposes the inauguration of comparative 
political philosophy as an independent academic12 field primarily 
because globalization and technological advancement in the current age 
has made it superfluous to think from within geographically determined 
boundaries. While experts in ‘comparative politics’ already bring to 
focus diverse political regions as part of a comparative analysis, such 
an endeavour relies on the privileged position and perspective of 
                                                          
12 Fred Dallmayr is the first thinker who insists on establishing a new academic 
discipline which he calls comparative political theory or philosophy. For details, see 
(Dallmayr, 1999, p. 1).  
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Western political thought and so judges societies and ideas not on their 
own terms, but “ours”. Dallmayr is critical of the explanatory models 
used by comparative political scientists to understand different 
societies. Such empirical social sciences, Dallmayr claims, analyze 
diverse phenomena by relying on the canons of Western research, 
which ultimately marginalize the other perspectives. In this sense, 
Dallmayr maintains that comparative political philosophy serve as a 
new initiative that rather alters the position of the Western perspective 
by relegating it, in terms of metaphor, to be a fellow student to non-
Western perspectives as opposed to the universal teacher, or the global 
overseer and judge. The aim, however, for Dallmayr is not to relativize 
the universal but rather to sharpen our understanding of it in an 
inclusionary manner that broadens and enriches our overall perspective. 
Bashir states that for Dallmayr, moreover, “this learning… should take 
place while revolving around the normative status and acceptability of 
Western modernity” (Dallmayr, 1999, p. 3; Bashir, 2014, p. 17). In this 
sense, the cultural framework as founded in the Western experience of 
Enlightenment allows and enables one to partake in an inclusionary and 
dialogical enterprise such as that of comparative political philosophy.  
Dallmayr thus makes the case for comparative political philosophy in 
two ways:  
(1) There is a need to reorient political theory discourse in light of the 
major cultural and political changes that have been stimulated with the 
advance of contemporary globalization. 
(2) There is a need for political theory, while and in keeping close to 
the ‘universalist’ canon of Western political thought, to gain an insight 
into other ideas so as to sharpen our ‘universal’ understanding of the 
political. 
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According to Dallmayr, Western theories are not able to capture the 
diversity of human condition in our current global predicament. The 
process of globalization, he argues, has transformed human condition 
which one cannot fully understand in the backdrop of theories 
stemming from the Western world.        
Dallmayr is an advocate of founding comparative political philosophy 
on the dialogical model of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. It is 
from within this vantage point that, Dallmayr asserts, we can steer a 
position that avoids the extremes of both Euro-centrism as well as that 
of Euro-denial, as best exemplified in the much famed theses in Said’s 
Orientalism and Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, respectively. A 
dialogue must be found in the midpoint of these two approaches. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate Dallmayr’s interpretation of 
Gadamer. However, the following passage shows Dallmayr’s 
interpretation of Gadamer’s concept of dialogue that he uses to advance 
his case for the field of comparative political philosophy: 
“From Gadamer’s vantage point, every dialogue—between readers and 
texts or between people across distances—has to start from the 
sedimented ‘pre-judgments’ of participants, pre-judgements that are 
meant to function not as prison walls but rather as launching pads for 
excursions into unfamiliar terrain. Proceeding from this premise, his 
works develops a philosophical account of dialogue or a perspective 
that sees human encounters as necessarily dialogical.” 
(Dallmayr, 2002, p. 3)   
Gadamer seems to be particularly convenient in this regard as his 
hermeneutics sees individual biases and prejudices as sedimented “pre-
judgments”, in being historical productions and constructs, as an 
opportunity to venture into, rather than an inescapable end wall for 
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inquiry into the realm of the unknown. An engagement with the other’s 
perspective entails an experience where individuals continue to make 
and remake their pre-understandings based on the incorporation of the 
other, as an existing presence, into one’s frame of reference. Similarly, 
individuals simultaneously transport themselves into the other’s way of 
interpreting and making sense of the world. Getting to know the other 
and about the other is an enterprise of information gathering that 
enlarges one’s pool of “sedimented pre-judgements” and therefore 
one’s overall understanding of the world. In this light, and in the context 
of globalization that has made cross-cultural encounter inevitable, 
Dallmayr believes that Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers a “mode of 
dialogue that is open-ended and hospitable to multiple and expanding 
horizons.” (Dallmayr, 2002, p. 27).  
Dallmayr’s appropriation of Gadamer has also been evaluated 
critically. Bashir suggests that if we are to adopt a veritable 
hermeneutics of the Gadamerian kind then it would have radical 
implications for the project and practice of political theory as a whole 
so that it would not suffice to settle for a subfield leaving the overall 
discipline intact. Gadamer’s approach can seriously challenge many of 
the most widely held assumptions of the discipline. It follows that, says 
Bashir, “an obvious task for CPT13 scholarship is to reassess what the 
West has come to believe as its superior heritage” (Bashir, 2014, p. 19). 
Civilizations do not get uncontaminated in cross-cultural interactions, 
and especially so in relation to such a grand event as globalization, yet 
the focus for theorists such as Dallmayr has barely emphasized cross-
cultural borrowing in this actual encounter: how civilizations have 
actually negotiated their terms of self-understanding in relation to the 
other. Rather Dallmayr relies overwhelmingly on “inter-cultural 
                                                          
13 Bashir uses the short form CPT to denote comparative political theory.  
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theorizing” (Bashir, 2014, p. 20). A possible critique, or rather 
suspicion, to Dallmayr’s version of CPT from a non-Western 
perspective could be that it is concerned too much with the late 
modernity of globalization. In this sense the West is also losing its 
position of domination vis-à-vis the non-West in an increasingly 
interconnected world. A political theory perspective that seeks to 
include the other may be seen as an unavoidable inconvenience that 
results from the West’s concern for negotiating its new position in a 
world where it cannot keep its hegemony entirely. Why else would CPT 
still cling on to the superiority of the Western heritage at the very 
instance when it is seeking an authentic inter-civilizational dialogue?  
Bashir also asserts that a globalization-centric lens in relation to non-
Western systems of ideas is already a way to impose rules on the latter. 
The risk here is to see the non-Western in light of those elements that 
resemble the West the most. Moreover, by seeing what is most relevant 
to globalization disallows us from seeing the historical, socio-cultural 
and linguistic complexities that undergird non-Western perspectives: 
we end up engaging with only that aspect of non-Western thinking that 
seeks to “define itself in contradistinction to the West”. Even in practice 
through the texts and theorists, such as someone like Mahatma Gandhi 
or Ali Shariati, nominated by CPT scholars in their comparative studies 
usually turn out to be those individuals who seem to be most influenced 
by their encounters with modernity as well as the West. And yet even 
when these individuals are selected for comparative theory, only those 
aspects seem to be brought forth for analysis that are specifically 
modern in nature. Even those non-Western thinkers engaged with 
premodern ideas and contexts as well, which often remain neglected by 
CPT scholarship, if only to reshape them for modern concerns and 
conditions. It should be the concern of CPT scholarship to seek out that 
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premodern element without being misled by many of its modernist 
distortions. 
Dallmayr’s appropriation of Gadamer makes us realize that the task of 
comparative political philosophy is not merely ‘comparative’ but also 
‘hermeneutical’ in the sense that one needs to indulge in the dialogic 
engagement in order to build a horizon for living together. Dallmayr 
contends that academic research in political theory is mostly parochial 
in its method. In our global political predicament, if we want to 
understand political practices in the non-Western world, then we must 
go beyond Eurocentrism presumed in political theory. This very act of 
deparochialization or rethinking of the canons of political theory paves 
the way for comparative political philosophy as an independent 
academic field.  
 
(iii)- Roxanne Euben: Cross-Cultural Learning in 
Political Philosophy 
 
Other than Dallmayr, Roxanne Euben is perhaps the most prominent 
theorist for comparative political philosophy as well as the first to write 
a full-length manuscript for it—one that compares the works of 
influential religious fundamentalist thinkers in the Islamic world with 
Western critics of modernity14. Specifically, she focuses on the 
possibility of cross-cultural learning between the Western and Muslim 
world.  Euben’s approach towards comparative political philosophy 
relies on the fundamental assumption that the most basic and essential 
problems and concerns humanity faces as a whole do not differ 
substantially across cultural and civilizational lines. In this sense, 
                                                          
14 For Euben’s analysis of Islamic fundamentalism, see (Euben, 1999). 
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different cultures already exist in conversation with each other which 
means the job of a critical comparative theorist is to recover and reorient 
those conversations by an inclusionary practice of political theory. Such 
an approach does not assume the inherent superiority of Western 
heritage as this implies that the West is one, and by no necessity the 
best, response to the problems confronting humans as such. If we bring 
to focus variegated traditions in juxtaposition to each other, this can 
only lead to the mutual enrichment of thought in general and the 
political in particular. Indeed, according to Euben, the task of 
comparative political philosophy is to make sense of the nature and 
value of political practices in a wide variety of historical-cultural 
contexts.    
Euben seeks to challenge a strictly objectivist model, for its un-
achievability, in favour of what might be the best alternative: a rigorous 
“understanding as a reciprocal, transformative and ongoing process” 
(Bashir 2014).  Euben is informed by Clifford Geertz’s approach 
towards cultural analysis that seeks to be an “interpretative science in 
search of meaning” (Geertz, 1972, p. 5; Bashir, 2014, p. 22), and thus 
attempting to really capture the inner meanings of cultural practices 
through a thorough and non-selective method of inquiry that relies on 
the conceptual world of people under analysis as well as a constant re-
engagement and confrontation with one’s own. This would mean that 
Euben is also reliant on a dialogic model of inquiry where the 
possibilities of learning from the non-West are as open as questioning 
the Western. Her approach also suggests that political thinkers in the 
non-West be treated entirely on their own terms without restricting 
them in terms of relevance that we have set out in advance. Moreover, 
such a cultural analysis also disallows the analyst from putting aside 
those aspects of non-Western thought that may be deemed, on the basis 
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of pre-judgments, to be irrational or unworthy. In this sense a fuller 
understanding of the non-Western becomes possible. 
Euben is also interested in challenging the notion that the philosophical 
treatise should serve as the chief organizer of theoretical discourse. 
Rather she defines theory as “a practice of inquiry in which critical 
distance plays an integral role, thereby shifting the emphasis from 
‘theory’ as a body of ideas subject to domestication or in need of 
constant chastening to ‘theorizing’ as a reflective activity engaged in by 
ordinary people at particular moments in time” (Euben, 2006, p. 11). 
Euben’s critical distance could be achieved not only by engaging with 
the non-Western other as she exists today but also by engaging with the 
temporal other, such as the self of the Western past. Euben therefore 
suggests that the scope of comparative political philosophy be extended 
to studies of the Western historical ‘forgotten’ past as well. Current 
political theory is unequipped to deal with globalization—“the 
deterritorialization of politics and culture par excellence” (Euben 1999; 
2006)—with its exclusionary reliance on the Western canon that 
centralizes essentially territorial concerns such as the relationship 
between the sovereign and people or state and society. This in turn 
transforms political theory into a “presentist” and “provincial” 
enterprise. While Bashir seems to, by and large, endorse and praise 
Euben’s project concerning CPT, he is critical as to why she does not 
see why the current practice of political theory as a whole not be 
reconstructed in its light. Euben’s response is that CPT should serve as 
a reminder to political theorists regarding what their vocation truly 
entails; regardless, Bashir maintains that the true realization of such an 
endeavour necessitates that real shifts take place in the very structure of 
political theory proper—a discipline that remains tied to the western 
canon almost exclusively, and often at the cost of its others.  
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For Euben, human beings confront similar dilemmas all around the 
world and we need to develop a theory which should be sensitive to 
different cultural contexts. Comparative political philosophy is a 
systematic attempt to understand the nature and value of political 
concepts and practices in various historical contexts. No civilization has 
monopoly over the global village and we can enrich our understanding 
of political through cross-cultural learning.      
   
2- Globalization, Deliberative Theory and Comparative 
Political Philosophy 
The process of globalization is one of the major causes of the 
development of both comparative political philosophy and deliberative 
theory15. Before I explain the significance of globalization, I first briefly 
discuss three other reasons for the emergence of comparative political 
philosophy:  
 
(i)- The critique of modernity within the Western academia. In the 
second half of 20th century, there was a rise of new philosophical 
strands, such as critical theory, existentialism, Foucault’s genealogical 
methods, deconstructionism, and postcolonial studies, which 
challenged the philosophical foundations of modernity and 
enlightenment discourse. Many thinkers developed critique of 
Eurocentrism on the basis of these new strands of 20th century 
philosophy. Most notably, Edward Said’s Orientalism was a systematic 
attempt in which he exposed the Eurocentric bias in the Western 
                                                          
15 The role of globalization in the development of deliberative theory is quite recent. 
Specifically, after the systemic turn in 2000s (see chapter three of this thesis), 
deliberative theorists realized the significance of globalization in their approaches.   
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approaches to study Eastern culture (Said, 1978)16. As discussed in the 
previous section, Dallmayr’s appropriation of Gadamer is also an attack 
on the universality of modernity. The skepticism about the universality 
of modernity was instrumental in the critique of the canons of Western 
political theory. For this reason, Dallmayr is also critical of 
Habermasian discourse ethics because it presumes certain notions of 
Enlightenment rationality which is an impediment to understand the 
nature and value of political practices in the non-western world17. For 
Dallmayr, Habermas’ approach does not fully address the question of 
the ‘other’ which is unavoidable in the contemporary world.  
 
(ii)- The disenchantment with the field of comparative politics. This 
field is one of the compartments of larger empirical social sciences. 
Comparative politics is a kind of ‘formal theory’ that does not truly 
engage with political ideals originating from the non-West. However, 
when it deals with the non-Western political practices, it imposes the 
Western yardstick to study them. In her analysis of Islamic 
fundamentalism, Euben rejects the empirical stance of comparative 
politics for being biased toward the Muslim world. In her book Enemy 
in the Mirror, she argues that “that comparative politics work on the 
rise of fundamentalism is too formal; it reduces the appeal of 
fundamentalist ideas to functional, material motivations rather than 
taking those ideas seriously on their own merits or even as ideology. In 
place of the conventional comparative politics approach, she focused 
on the thought of Sayyid Qutb in order to examine the rise of real-life 
foundationalist politics at a time when political theory had become on 
the whole antifoundationalist. Euben juxtaposed Qutb’s critique of 
                                                          
16 Also see, (Spivak, 1999); (Chakrabarty, 2009); (Chatterjee, 1993). 
17 In chapter three of the thesis, I will also critically evaluate Habermas’ deliberative 
theory for being Eurocentric in its core.               
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modernity with those of Western critics—Arendt, MacIntyre, Bellah, 
and Taylor—to show that the parallels prove that Qutb’s views are not 
irrational or regressive but are an other side of modernity” (Vacano, 
2015, p. 467). That is why, the main theoretical stance in comparative 
political philosophy (specifically, that of Dallmayr and Euben) is 
hermeneutical in nature, which promotes dialogic method to deal with 
the non-Western world. 
 
(iii)- After the end of cold war, liberal ideology was conceived as the 
ultimate triumph of the Western political order. In his book End of 
History and the Last Man (Fukuyama, 1992), Fukuyama claimed that 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, liberal political order is the only game 
in town, and no other ideology could challenge it. Huntington’s Clash 
of Civilizations (Huntington, 1996) was another response to the end of 
Cold War. In this book, Huntington claimed that political ideologies 
would no longer matter in the making of the new world order. Rather, 
he contended cultural affiliations in terms of different civilizational 
blocs map the global political space. Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s 
approaches informed the early development of comparative political 
philosophy. Both Fred Dallmayr and Roxanne Euben referred these two 
books in their respective approaches towards comparative political 
philosophy. This is not to say that comparative political philosophers 
were positively influenced by Fukuyama and Huntington, rather, they 
were highly critical of these two post-Cold War thinkers. Indeed, the 
emergence of comparative political philosophy can be understood as a 
systematic response to Fukuyama-Huntington theses.  
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To some extent, these three reasons18 were also instrumental in 
expanding the scope and reach of deliberative theory. Specifically, the 
strict rational standards for the ideal of deliberation in early deliberative 
theory (Habermas, Cohen, and Rawls) were heavily criticized for being 
Eurocentric19. The institutional arrangements of liberal democratic 
setup as a pre-condition of deliberative democracy also confined 
deliberative theory to the Western world. Fourth generation deliberative 
theorists argue that one should stretch the ideal of deliberation to 
understand political practices in the non-Western world. In stretching 
the ideal of deliberation, theorists also stress on the importance of 
culture, religion, rhetoric, greeting, acts which are not strictly rational 
in nature, in the formation of deliberative practices.    
 
Now, I turn to globalization and its importance in the development of 
comparative political philosophy and deliberative theory. The 
relationship between comparative political philosophy and 
globalization can be established at methodological and justificatory 
levels. Methodologically, as discussed in the first section, the dialogic 
model lies at the heart of comparative political philosophy. Dallmayr’s 
use of dialogue is a normative stance because “it is driven by the 
motivation to enhance communication among different cultural 
traditions in political theory in light of the world’s becoming a global 
village” (Vacano, 2015, p. 469). There is a cognitive dimension in 
Dallmayr’s approach because in the practice of comparative political 
philosophy we get to learn other cultures and traditions. For Dallmayr, 
“reciprocal learning and critique” (Dallmayr, 1997, p. 423) is integral 
                                                          
18 The three reasons for the emergence of comparative political philosophy can be 
labelled as (1) Critique of Orientalism; (2) Critical of Comparative Politics; and (3) 
Fukuyama-Huntington theses. See (Vacano, 2015, p. 468).  
19 For details, see chapter two and three of the thesis. 
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to this academic field which enhances our knowledge. In the same vein, 
Roxanne Euben also insists on cross-cultural learning in the age of 
globalization. For Euben, human beings more or less face the same 
dilemmas in this global age, thus, learning from each other is 
indispensable for a shared life with common fate. As she writes: 
 
“The project of comparative political theory involves bringing non-
Western perspectives into familiar debates into the problems of living 
together, thus assuring that political theory is about human and not 
merely Western dilemmas. It is perhaps best understood as a hybrid of 
the contemporary disciplines of political theory and comparative 
politics, for it entails the attempt to ask questions about the nature and 
value of politics in a variety of cultural and historical contexts.” 
(Euben, 1999, p. 9)       
 
Despite serious moral and political disagreements, Euben claims, 
different cultures are not incommensurable and one can always find out 
the possibility of learning from each other. The dialogic method is the 
most suitable heuristic device to deal with the problems of global age. 
At the justificatory level, thinkers who talk about the possibility of 
global or transnational democracy are also interested in the project of 
comparative political philosophy. In the age of globalization, Williams 
& Warren argue, transnational democracy needs ‘global publics’ and 
comparative political philosophy is a viable discipline in this regard. In 
our current political predicament, the pursuit for the globalization of 
democracy appears to be necessary. They write: 
 
“The link between global civil society and the possibility of democratic 
agency on the part of new transnational actors is the emergence of new 
transnational and potentially global public spheres, that is, social spaces 
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of free communication through which collective opinions may 
eventually form as a result of the exchange of arguments.” 
(Melissa S. Williams and Mark E. Warren, 2014, p. 31)    
 
For Williams and Warren, the reason for opting comparative political 
philosophy for the creation of global public spheres is that the former 
takes the process of globalization as its starting point. Like Euben and 
Dallmayr, Williams and Warren also believe in the shared life with a 
common fate. By virtue of being human, we all face same issues in the 
global world that we can comprehensively address through the lens of 
comparative political philosophy. It should be noted that, for Williams 
and Warren, democracy means deliberative democracy. In the age of 
globalization, our borders are blurred and fluid. For such borders we 
need fluid thinking which is possible through genuine dialogic 
engagements. The following passage summarizes William’s and 
Warren’s stance to link comparative political philosophy with 
globalization and deliberative theory:   
 
“There is a conceptual and practical link between globalization, 
deliberative democratic theory, and the academic field of comparative 
political theory. These themes are connected by the idea that the human-
scale problems characteristic of intensive processes of globalization can 
be addressed in a democratic form only under conditions where it is 
possible for citizens around the world to form, mostly through 
discourse, shared political imaginaries: to see themselves not only as 
connected to one another but also as possessing the ethical 
responsibility and the agent-capacity to render these processes 
responsive to those whom they affect. Since the formation of imagined 
communities of shared fate is linguistically mediated, people who seek 
to assert democratic agency in response to shared problems need 
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ideational resources that resonate with locally embedded 
understandings of ethics and politics in order for mutual 
interdependence and affectedness to generate newly imagined common 
futures.” 
(Melissa S. Williams and Mark E. Warren, 2014, p. 48)   
 
So far, I have discussed the significance of globalization in the 
development of comparative political philosophy. My description 
suggests that comparative political philosophy should be seen in the 
backdrop of globalization that defines our current political predicament. 
The dialogic engagement and cross-cultural learning are indispensable 
in the age of globalization. Comparative political philosophy provides 
us an academic platform not merely to indulge in the inter-cultural 
dialogue but also to understand the nature and value of political 
practices in the non-Western world.         
 
Now, I explain the relationship between deliberative theory and 
globalization. However, I keep my description very brief in this section 
because a detailed analysis of the development of deliberative theory 
over the last three decades is provided in chapters two and three of this 
thesis.   
There are many reasons for the development of deliberative theory. 
Unlike comparative political philosophy, whose theoretical-
methodological framework stems from the vantage point of 
globalization, deliberative theory begins with the critiques of 
representative and liberal models of democracy. It is a normative ideal 
that stresses on the processes of reflection and communication in 
democracy (Habermas, 1996; Dryzek J. S., 2000; Forst, 2001). The 
philosophical foundations of deliberative democracy goes back to 
Habermas’ discourse ethics and Rawls’ public reason. The recent 
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systemic turn in deliberative theory opens up the space to study 
deliberation in a wide variety of context. In recent deliberative theory, 
the institutional arrangements of a liberal state are no longer a pre-
condition to study deliberative practices (Dryzek J. S., 2010; Dryzek J. 
S., 2011). The significance of global politics, which is an offshoot of 
the process of globalization, gives rise to new ways to think about 
democrcacy. Although, “the social ontology of nation-states, dividing 
political collective associations into homogenous enclaves of common 
origins and shared history, has been with us since the historic Treaty of 
Westphalia” (Schrag, 2009, p. 79), but due to our global predicament 
“there has been considerable discussion of the demise of the nation-
state as a model for political organization” (Schrag, 2009, p. 79). In his 
book The Postnational Constellation, Habermas discusses the 
limitations of the nation-state to host/organize global politics 
(Habermas, 2001). Of course, the possibility of electoral democracy 
appears to be utopian at the global level, but we can still imagine other 
forms of democracy. As Robert Keohane says, “the conditions for 
electoral democracy . . . do not exist on a global level”, which means, 
“rather than abandoning democracy, we should rethink our ambitions” 
(Keohane, 2006, p. 75). If we define democracy in terms of 
communication and deliberation then we can imagine the prospects of 
global democracy. The concept of ‘deliberative system’ transcends the 
horizon of the nation-state and helps us to find democratic potential in 
a wide variety of contexts, such as global governance, authoritarian 
regimes, new and old democracies. As Dryzek writes: 
         
“From a global perspective, a communicative and deliberative approach 
to democracy has a further advantage over conceptions of democracy 
for which competitive elections are the sine qua non in that it is not 
modeled on developed liberal democracies.” 
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(Dryzek J. S., 2011, p. 212) 
 
Another argument that links deliberative theory with globalization is 
the significance of culture in shaping deliberative practices. According 
to Jensen Saas, if we want to understand the true nature of deliberation 
across different traditions, we need to expand the ideal of deliberation. 
So far, studies on deliberation have merely focused on the Western 
liberal states. In the age of globalization, he claims, we should also pay 
attention to deliberative practices outside the Western liberal states. 
According to Saas, “If collective deliberation is to prevail in global 
governance, we must fashion political ideals which motivate diverse 
peoples to come together in discourse, rather than confront their 
problems, or compound them, by less desirable means” (Sass, 2018, p. 
1). It means, the prospects of global governance are only possible if 
people from diverse backgrounds engage in a dialogue. Saas insists on 
the expansion of the ideal of deliberation in our global age. Like 
Dallmayr, Euben, Williams and Warren, Saas also believes that the 
socio-political issues we face today are increasingly global in nature, 
therefore, we are obligated to investigate other cultures and traditions 
for mutual understanding. As he writes: 
  
“In a period of human history defined by political challenges which are 
transnational, and increasingly global, the need to foster political 
discourse at new scales, and involving peoples who inhabit radically 
different states and societies, is more pressing than ever. A prerequisite 
to such discourse is identifying the different kinds of ideals which might 
both motivate and regulate it.” 
(Sass, 2018, p. 2)  
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Saas also recognizes the limitations of deliberative theory to fully 
engage with the non-Western world. In order to make deliberative 
theory more inclusive in its scope, it should come into a dialogue with 
comparative political philosophy. The latter discipline, both 
methodologically and theoretically, is already oriented towards other 
cultures. The turn toward the study of other cultures is quite recent in 
the deliberative theory and it needs further development. The tirade of 
globalization, deliberative theory and comparative political philosophy 
is an important aspect of our current academic discourse. This thesis 
attempts to bridge comparative political philosophy with deliberative 
theory to explore the nature of deliberative practices in the context of 
Pakistan.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Political Deliberation and Normative 
Controversies in Deliberative Theory 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical investigation of the concepts of 
deliberation and deliberative democracy. Specifically, this chapter has 
the following objectives: 
1- To distinguish between the concepts of ‘deliberation’ and 
‘deliberative democracy’. This thesis argues that this distinction is 
necessary for three reasons:  
(a) to understand democratic capacity in autocratic contexts  
(b) to understand various deliberative mechanisms that strengthen the 
democratic project  
(c) to understand the role of empirical studies in recasting the concept 
of deliberative democracy.  
2- To give an overview of the concept of ‘deliberative democracy’ and 
discuss various challenges to its current usage. I will also elucidate how 
the theory of deliberative democracy has been revised over the last two 
decades because of empirical studies and critical analyses.  
3- To discuss the normative controversies in philosophical literature on 
deliberative democracy. These normative controversies do not merely 
draw our attention to the complex diversified political philosophy of 
deliberative democracy, but they also help us to expand the reach and 
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application of deliberative theory in the non-Western contexts. This 
latter aspect is an important development that extends the current 
scholarship on comparative political philosophy. 
The chapter is divided into two parts. In part one, I discuss the minimal 
definition of political deliberation. The minimal account limits the 
application and scope of deliberation, which is necessary to avoid the 
concept stretching of the term20. In part two, I deal with normative 
controversies in philosophical literature on deliberative theory. These 
controversies unearth the political philosophy of deliberative ideals. 
The idea of ‘deliberation’ has become a central aspect of all major 
theories of democrcacy. ‘Deliberation’ and ‘deliberative democracy’ 
are two distinct concepts. They do not mean the same thing nor are they 
always entangled in the democratic process. Depending on the political 
circumstances “it could turn out that the best decision-making 
procedures from a purely deliberative point of view are not particularly 
democratic or that the best decision-making procedures from a 
democratic point of view are not particularly deliberative” (Lafont, 
2006, p. 3). In the discipline of political theory, deliberation has become 
an appealing ideal for politics. As an ideal, it promotes debate, dialogue, 
conversation, citizens’ engagement, openness, sincerity, mutual 
respect, and persuasion in the political process. Philosophers who 
support this ideal also hold that deliberative quality deteriorates if 
political process merely moves around self-interest, closure, 
aggregation, fixed preferences and pre-political desires. As a concept, 
deliberation is a slippery phenomenon and difficult to grasp. Mostly, 
political theorists conflate deliberation with democracy which creates 
                                                          
20 For the dangers of the concept stretching of the ideal of deliberation, see (Goodin 
R. , 2018).  
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problems in conceptualizing the various dimensions of political 
deliberation21:    
“The contemporary literature, rich as though it may be, has not yet 
consolidated a comprehensive framework to address political 
deliberation. In the lack of a set of distinctions, however, it becomes 
hard to make sense of the controversies surrounding deliberation and of 
the exact targets at which objections against it are aimed” (Mendes, 
2013, p. 13). 
Despite its complex nature we can still find a minimal definition of 
political deliberation within the contemporary literature on deliberative 
democracy22. Such a minimal account would help us to understand 
basic features of political deliberation.  
 
1- The Minimal Definition of Political Deliberation 
In the theory of deliberative democracy, deliberation is understood as a 
practice of collective decision-making (Mendes, 2013, p. 14). It is an 
inclusive practice of collective reasoning in the search of a consensus 
about the common good. However, reaching a consensus about 
                                                          
21 In order to delineate the basic features of political deliberation, I navigate into the 
kaleidoscopic literature produced under the moniker of deliberative democracy. 
Normally, both concepts, deliberation and deliberative democracy are conflated. I 
decouple deliberation from deliberative democracy in order to explicate basic features 
of deliberation. For an analysis of this dichotomy in the literature on deliberative 
democracy, see (Pettit, 2003), (Chambers, 2009), and (Lafont, 2006).  
22 Within the literature on deliberative democracy many thinkers talk about the 
existence of a common denominator that can be construed as the minimal definition 
of political deliberation. For details, see (Dryzek J. S., 1994) and (Dryzek J. S., 2000); 
( Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson , 1996); (Bohman, 1998); and (Goodin R. , 
2003). 
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common good is not necessarily a logical outcome of reasoning 
together. Participants in the deliberative process are open to transform 
their preferences in the light of persuasive arguments. Actors attempt to 
convince others by the force of better arguments and are themselves 
open to change their position if good arguments are provided. 
Deliberative encounter is a kind of learning process because actors learn 
about best arguments in the common debate.  
Specifically, there are six elements in the minimal 
definition/conception of deliberation; they can also be termed as the 
basic tenets of deliberation: 
(i)- The need to make a collective decision directly related to those 
actors who are deliberating and indirectly to those who are absent in the 
process.  
(ii)- Decision is not an end in itself in the deliberative process. It is a 
provisional stance arrived on the basis of arguments and subject to 
change in further deliberative rounds.  
(iii)- In the deliberative encounter, participants are engaged in 
collective reasoning and attempt to justify their positions by the 
exchange of good arguments.  
(iv)- Participants in the deliberative process give reasons of a peculiar 
kind, one that is not merely unbiased and impartial, but also has a 
potential to be translatable to the common good. 
(v)- Actors in the deliberative process are open to transform their 
preferences in the light of better arguments which leads to an ethics of 
consensus. 
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(vi)- Deliberation involves a moral dimension of mutual respect. It is 
an inclusive practice that promotes empathy and is responsive to 
different points of views.            
In what follows, I briefly explain the above elements which lie at the 
heart of the minimal definition of deliberative democracy. This minimal 
account gives rise to a lot of normative controversies in the 
philosophical literature on deliberative democracy. After explicating 
minimal definition of deliberation, I discuss the main normative 
controversies in philosophical literature.  
First, this dissertation deals with political deliberation rather than other 
types of deliberation. The decisional element in political deliberation 
compels us to take a practical course of action. Participants need to 
select a particular course of action because of time restraint and 
limitation of resources. Political deliberation is different from other 
sorts of deliberation because it faces the constraints of time and existing 
resources, thereby compelling actors to pursue a course of action to 
arrive at a point. Other types of deliberations and inquiries are not 
subject to such an urgency, for example, science, philosophy and 
everyday small talk. That is not to say that scientists and philosophers 
do not take the decision, rather their decisions don’t pose the questions 
of coercive authority and legitimacy. Political deliberation has an 
element of temporal urgency to it. It should lead to a closure which may 
be provisional in nature. Moreover, this type of decision also influences 
its participants both directly and indirectly:     
“The effects of such a decision directly impact the lives of the 
deliberators, and possibly, depending on how the deliberative site is 
shaped, of people that are outside of it.”  
(Mendes, 2013, p. 15) 
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Second, decision is not an end in itself in the deliberative process. It is 
merely a provisional stance that includes the elements of continuity 
within it. It means that the argumentative process does not stop after the 
decision is taken. It remains contestable in light of fresh perspectives 
and further deliberative rounds may call for new collective decision-
making. Deliberative theorists argue that continuity is an important 
aspect of legitimate politics.  
Third, deliberation requires us to provide justification for the collective 
decision. Participants in the deliberative process need to provide 
reasons for their particular stance. As Habermas suggests “forceless 
force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1999, p. 332) provides 
justification of a decision in the deliberative process. It means, as a 
political practice, deliberation refers “to the ideal of public reason, to 
the requirement that legitimate decisions be ones that everyone could 
accept or at least not reasonably reject” (Bohman, 1998, pp. 401-2). In 
the process of mutual justification, actors engage in a dialogue before 
the execution of a collective decision. For Joshua Cohen, deliberative 
democracy is the institutionalization of the ideal of political 
justification. He states:  
“The deliberative conception of democracy is organized around an ideal 
of political justification. According to this ideal, justification of the 
exercise of collective political power is to proceed on the basis of a free 
public reasoning among equals. A deliberative democracy 
institutionalizes this ideal” (Cohen J. , 1996, p. 99). 
Fourth, there are various types of reasons which stem from different 
sources. In political deliberation, all types of reasons and sources are 
not acceptable. Since, decision is of collective nature, therefore, those 
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reasons which all participants could possibly embrace are acceptable. It 
means, private interests which are not translatable to the common good 
are excluded in the deliberative process. Participants should transcend 
their private interests and orient themselves to the common good. 
Actors in the deliberative process are constrained in the argumentative 
chain.  
Fifth, in the deliberative process, participants do not merely give 
reasons that are compatible with the concept of common good, but they 
try to persuade each other through dialogic engagement. Such a dialogic 
orientation does not merely improve political decision-making but it 
also produces a fair system of social cooperation without presuming any 
consensus. In the process of persuasion, participants are open to all 
points of view and are willing to revise their perspectives. The 
transformation of preferences is an autonomous act and free from 
exogenic forces. Dialogic reason is intrinsically fallible which leaves 
room for its contestation. Moreover, genuine persuasion also presumes 
an ethics of consensus and absence of coercion (Mansbridge, et al., 
2010, p. 94). This is not to say that consensus is a necessary end of 
deliberation, rather, it is an aspirational goal that regulates the 
deliberative conduct. It is an ideal that participants chase in the 
deliberative process (Cohen J. , 1997). Ethics of consensus means 
“making aim for consensus” (Ferejohn, 2000, p. 76) and it provides 
motivation to political actors in the process of deliberative engagement. 
The lack of consensus is not a failure of deliberative process. Chambers 
also argues that “consensus centered teleology” is no longer a 
controversial point in the theory of deliberative democracy (Chambers, 
2003, p. 321). Deliberation accommodates both pluralism and agonism 
in the democratic process. If deliberation produces consensus in the 
deliberative process then it should not be understood as the final 
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outcome and it can be reignited again in the political process. Thus, 
consensus remains an aspirational ideal and it is indispensable because 
of the temporal pressure to execute the decision and exhaustive nature 
of the argumentative skills of participants23.  
Sixth, political deliberation promotes an ethical attitude of mutual 
respect by considering all participants as equal. All actors deserve to be 
treated equally in the political process, which requires the moral virtue 
of respect towards their argument. It does not mean that the deliberative 
“process cannot be heated and conflictive or that it needs to appear 
amiable and convivial. Neither does it mean that all arguments should 
have equal weight. It hinges on the recognition, somehow displayed, 
that there is no hierarchy of status between participants” (Mendes, 
2013, p. 17). The element of reciprocity is essential to mutual respect 
and is an important aspect of political deliberation. According to 
Gutmann and Thompson, reciprocity involves inclusiveness, empathy, 
and responsiveness ( Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, 1996, p. 
53). In order to concretize such a political morality, all participants 
should be free and able to participate in the deliberative process and no 
one has privileged access to truth. Habermas argues that all arguments 
should be considered and good reasoning will eventually prevail in the 
political process (Habermas, 1996, pp. 305-6).  
 
 
                                                          
23 As stated in the first point, temporal urgency accompanies political deliberation 
which compels participants to take a decision. Also, in the deliberative process, when 
argumentative capacities of participants are exhausted then some points might be 
rendered irreconcilable. In this regard, Rawls talks about ‘stand-off’ in his concept of 
public reason: “A stand-off in some sense may indeed happen, not only in moral and 
political reasoning but in all forms of reasoning, including science and common 
sense” (Rawls, 1999, p. 168). 
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2- Normative Controversies in Philosophical Literature 
In political philosophy, the model of deliberative democracy was 
developed at the normative level. In the history of deliberative 
democrcacy there has always been a problem between the normative 
ideals and actual practices of deliberation (Steiner J. , 2012, pp. 1-2). 
The concept of deliberative democracy has been recast because of this 
tension. It is exactly this interplay between normative ideals and actual 
political practices that gives rise to four different generations of 
deliberative theorists. A genealogical account of four generations helps 
us to understand the historical development of deliberative 
democracy24. In this chapter, I will not provide a detailed description of 
the four generations of deliberative democracy, rather, briefly comment 
upon them along with my analysis of the normative controversies in the 
philosophical literature on deliberative democracy.  
In political philosophy, deliberative democracy is understood as a 
regulative ideal. Although we cannot attain this ideal in real world 
politics but it helps us to understand our political practices. As Jane 
Mansbridge says: 
“[The ideal of deliberative democracy] is unachievable in its full state 
but remains an ideal to which, all else equal, a practice should be judged 
as approaching more or less closely.”   
(Mansbridge, et al., 2010, p. 65) 
This approach is similar to Kant’s concept of ‘regulative principle’. In 
his book, Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines the regulative principle 
as an ideal “with which we can compare ourselves, judge ourselves and 
thereby improve ourselves, even though we can never reach the 
                                                          
24 A brief account of four generations of deliberative theorists is given in next chapter.  
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standard” (Kant, 1998, p. 552). The first generation of deliberative 
theorists were mainly concerned with this ideal and its philosophical 
justification in the actual political process. In the same vein, Habermas 
also recognizes practical limits of the ideal of deliberation and states 
that “even if actual debate deviates from the ideal procedure of 
deliberative politics, the presuppositions of rational discourse can still 
‘indirectly steer’ the course of actual debate”25. John Rawls, another 
prominent philosopher from the first generation of deliberative 
democracy thinkers, argues that the ideal of deliberation underlies the 
concept of deliberative democracy: “the definitive idea for deliberative 
democracy is the idea of deliberation itself” (Rawls, 1999, p. 138). The 
ideal of deliberation can also be understood in contrast to the ideal of 
strategic bargaining. Indeed, historically, the ideal of deliberation 
emerged as a critique of the ideal of strategic bargaining. In the ideal of 
strategic bargaining, participants have fixed preferences in the political 
process. Their political struggle is all about arriving at an outcome 
which is close to their preferences. This is not to say that political actors 
in the process of strategic bargaining are just egoistical and they merely 
look for their own interests; “they may also, for example, care for the 
well-being of future generations as personal preference” (Steiner J. , 
2012, p. 4). It’s a kind of mutually beneficial trading where political 
actors are motivated by their individual preferences.  
On the contrary, in the ideal of deliberation, preferences are not fixed 
and political actors are willing to transform their preferences in the light 
of better arguments. Participants attempt to persuade others by 
convincing arguments and are themselves open to be convinced by 
others. Through the act of mutual dialogue political actors learn about 
                                                          
25 Quoted in (Bohman, 1998, pp. 411-2). 
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better arguments. The following passage spells out the essence of the 
deliberative model:  
“Deliberation is not just any talk. In the ideal, democratic deliberation 
eschews coercive power in the process of coming to decision. Its central 
task is mutual justiﬁcation. Ideally, participants in deliberation are 
engaged, with mutual respect, as free and equal citizens in a search for 
fair terms of cooperation. These terms can include the recognition and 
pursuit of self-interest, including material self-interest, and some forms 
of negotiation, constrained by the deliberative democratic ideals of 
mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justiﬁcation, the search for 
fairness, and the absence of coercive power.”       
(Mansbridge, et al., 2010, p. 94)            
In the above definition ‘deliberation’ is also similar to the original Latin 
word ‘deliberare’26 which means to ponder, to reflect, to consider 
(Steiner J. , 2012, p. 4). This type of deliberation is not necessarily a 
collective act and can also take place in an individual’s head. Robert 
Goodin argues that individual deliberation in terms of inward reflection 
is beneficial before collective deliberation (Goodin R. E., 2000). 
Similarly, Flynn and Parkinson, using current research in social 
psychology, talk about the significance of inward deliberation in terms 
of an imagined interlocutor. They argue that participants should 
confront imagined ideal deliberators before group deliberation in order 
to better comprehend each other’s argument. Hence, the basic principle 
of deliberative democracy is that arguments should matter in the 
political debate. Deliberative theorists agree on this basic principle but 
they hold on to different theoretical frameworks for the practical 
                                                          
26 For a detailed description of the etymological origin of the term ‘deliberation’, see 
(Boniolo, 2012, p. 1).  
67 
 
implementation of this principle. They offer various normative 
justifications for their disagreements. These disagreements are 
becoming strong over the last few years and give rise to a lot of 
normative controversies in the philosophical literature on deliberation. 
In what follows, I will discuss these normative controversies in detail. 
In the next chapter, I will specifically argue how the internal 
deliberation among deliberative theorists paves the way for 
understanding deliberative practices in both authoritarian and non-
Western contexts. Such an internal deliberation among deliberative 
theorists is akin to the international deliberation already taking place in 
the academic field of political theory to understand the non-Western 
world.  
The major normative controversies in the philosophical literature on 
deliberative theory are: 
(i)- Equal Participation 
Deliberative theorists argue that ordinary citizens ought to participate 
in the political process of deliberation. Jürgen Habermas contends that 
all citizens should participate in the deliberative process if decision is 
directly or indirectly related to them27. Since, decision-making, for 
example, in health care and environment affects everyone, therefore, 
everyone should deliberate on such issues. He further argues that 
opinion formation at grass-roots level should be reflective in nature and 
actors ought to persuade each other by the help of better arguments. 
Habermas believes that such a deliberative processes among ordinary 
citizens would influence legislation, election, and administrative 
power: 
                                                          
27 “Inklusion aller Betroffenen (Inclusion of all concerned)”, For details, see (Steiner 
J. , 2012, p. 32).  
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“The flow of communication between public opinion-formation, 
institutionalized elections, and legislative decisions is meant to 
guarantee that influence and communicative power are transformed 
through legislation into administrative power.”      
(Habermas, 1996, p. 299)     
 
Habermas’ perspective of deliberative democracy distinguishes civil 
society from economic system and public administration. Civil society 
provides social basis to autonomous public spheres where ordinary 
citizens engage in political deliberation. Some political theorists 
criticize Habermas’ account for being unrealistic. They argue that it is 
impossible for all citizens to participate in the process of political 
deliberation. However, given the significance of deliberation in the 
democratic process, they talk about political participation in ‘mini-
publics’. It is a randomly selected group of ordinary citizens who 
deliberate on political issues. James Fishkin, a renowned theorist of 
deliberative democracy, proposes the concept of deliberative polling in 
order to overcome the shortcomings of citizens’ engagement at the large 
scale. Moreover, the method of “Random sampling offers a means of 
representing the diversity of viewpoints in the population at large” 
(James S. Fishkin, 2009, p. 37). For Fishkin, participation in mini-
publics will not only promote deliberation at large but it will also 
produce opinion leaders who will engage with other citizens in various 
deliberative activities. Like Habermas, other deliberative theorists also 
believe that citizens’ participation in the process of political 
deliberation should be on an equal level. Thompson holds that 
legitimacy of a decision in the deliberative process is based upon the 
equal participation of citizens: “Equal participation requires that no one 
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person or advantaged group completely dominate the reason-giving 
process, even if the deliberators are not strictly equal in power and 
prestige” (Thompson, 2008, pp. 504-505). Similarly, Mansbridge et al. 
also stress the significance of equal participation: “The deliberation 
should, ideally, be open to all those affected by the decision. The 
participants should have equal opportunity to influence the process, 
have equal resources, and be protected by basic rights” (Mansbridge, et 
al., 2010, p. 65). Participants should follow the principles of mutual 
respect and equal concern in the deliberative process. When it comes to 
real world politics we come to realize that not all citizens are able to 
and willing to participate in the process of political deliberation. Fishkin 
considers such an ideal of citizens’ equal participation impractical and 
emphasizes on the quality of participation in the deliberative process. 
Mansbridge et al. also recognize the limitations of the ideal of equal 
participation in the actual political process: “in a polity of any size, it is 
impossible to give everyone a say in the literal sense of having one’s 
individual voice heard by all other members of the polity. Even in 
extremely small polities, it is almost always counterproductive to 
design institutions in which each member has a literal equal say, and 
impossible to design institutions in which what each member says is 
taken with equal weight” (Mansbridge, et al., 2010, p. 85).  
(ii)- Rational Justification                         
In the deliberative model, participants offer arguments which they can 
justify in the political process. Justification is of two types: formal and 
substantial.  
In the formal justification, the main controversy is about the nature of 
arguments accepted in the deliberative process. Do arguments have to 
be rational in nature? Are personal stories which do not fulfil strict 
70 
 
standards of rationality/logical coherence also allowed in the 
deliberative model?  
In the normative literature, deliberative democracy “is a political 
practice of argumentation and reason giving among free and equal 
citizens, a practice in which individual and collective perspectives and 
positions are subject to change through deliberation and in which only 
those norms, rules or decisions which result from some form of reason-
based agreement among the citizens are accepted as legitimate” (Forst, 
2001, p. 346). In contrast to aggregative model of democracy, 
deliberative democracy “puts emphasis on the role of the reasons 
behind a given choice; namely, it stresses the need for and the 
importance of the offered justifications” (Boniolo, 2012, p. 4). 
Aggregative democracy does not require citizens to justify their 
choice28 in the political process. Deliberation is mainly understood as a 
rational process in which actors make a choice and justify it with 
argumentation. Habermas introduces his concept of deliberative 
democracy in contrast to the standard liberal view. He writes: 
“In the liberal view, the political process of opinion- and will-formation 
in the public sphere and in parliament is determined by the competition 
of strategically acting collectivities trying to maintain or acquire 
positions of power. Success is measured by the citizens’ approval, 
quantified as votes, of persons and programs. In their choices at the 
polls, voters give expression to their preferences. Their voting decisions 
have the same structure as the acts of choice made by participants in a 
market. They license access to the positions of power that political 
parties fight over in the same success- oriented attitude” 
                                                          
28 Normally citizens express their choices through vote. Citizens are given certain 
options and they merely vote for their respective choice.   
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(Habermas, 1994, p. 3) 
For Habermas, the justification of arguments should be rational and 
logical in the political process. Assertions should be critically assessed 
in the deliberative process through the exchange of reasons. Habermas 
understands communicative action as an argumentative process in 
which participants justify their claims through reason (Habermas, 1996, 
pp. 322-3).  Deliberation, in this sense, has a cognitive dimension to it 
because it deals “with finding the best way of regulating matters of 
public concern, whereby the best way is judged according to standards 
of rationality that have a certain objectivity” (Cooke, 2000, p. 952). 
Democracy, in the deliberative model, is mainly understood as the rule 
of reasons. Some political theorists go beyond rational argumentation 
as the only acceptable mode of justification in the deliberative process. 
They expand the classical ideal of deliberation in the light of empirical 
research produced over the last two decades. They argue that 
overemphasis on rational justification is embedded in the tradition of 
Enlightenment, which limits the scope of other forms of justification in 
the deliberative process. Contemporary deliberative theorists expand 
the classic ideal of deliberation by focusing on the process of mutual 
justification in the political process. In the deliberative encounter, actors 
advance “considerations” that can be accepted by other participants if 
found “compelling and persuasive” (Cohen J. , Procedure and substance 
in deliberative democracy, 1996, pp. 100-4). The standard of “mutual 
justifiability” is now central to the concept of deliberation. Mansbridge 
et al. argue that the criterion of mutual justifiability “opens the door to 
storytelling and the non-cognitive evocation of meanings and symbols 
that can appeal to actual or imagined shared experiences. Stories can 
establish credibility, create empathy, and trigger a sense of injustice, all 
of which contribute directly or indirectly to justiﬁcation” (Mansbridge, 
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et al., 2010, p. 67). Dryzek is also critical of the Habermasian position 
that privileges rational arguments over rhetoric, storytelling and humor 
in the process of justification. He further argues that real world politics 
mixes various forms of communication that should not be discarded in 
favor of purely rational argumentation. He writes:  
“Deliberation itself is a kind of communication. In some accounts (e.g., 
Habermas, 1996), reasoned argument is privileged, but deliberation can 
be open to a variety of forms of communication, such as rhetoric, 
testimony (the telling of stories), and humor. Real-world political 
communication generally mixes these different forms, and those that do 
not involve argument can be effective in inducing reflection.”    
(Dryzek J. S., 2009, p. 1381) 
It does not mean communication, which involves lies and threats, is also 
acceptable in the deliberative process. For Dryzek, communication 
should be intrinsically non-coercive and capable of inducing reflection 
in the deliberative process. Such reflection helps actors to transform 
their preferences in the political process which is an essential aspect of 
the deliberative model of democracy. Patrizia Nanz is also critical of 
Habermas’ insistence on rationality and argues that communication also 
involves expressing one’s socio-cultural identity that is not necessarily 
free from rhetorical features and personal stories (Nanz, 2006, pp. 35-
36).  
Now, I move to the substantive aspect of justification in the deliberative 
process. The main controversy here is about the place of self-interest in 
the process of political deliberation. In its early phase, deliberative 
democracy was defined in opposition to self-interest. The rejection of 
self-interest is an important aspect of the rejection of aggregation and 
negotiation in the democratic process. That is to say, deliberative 
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theorists are against self-interest because they think it lies at the heart 
of aggregative model of democracy. In the following passage, Young 
distinguishes between interest-based and deliberative models of 
democracy: 
“The interest-based model of democracy also presumes that people 
cannot make claims on others about justice or the public good and 
defend those claims with reasons ... By contrast, the model of 
deliberative democracy conceives of democracy as a process that 
creates a public, citizens coming together to talk about collective 
problems, goals, ideals, and actions. Democratic processes are oriented 
around discussing this common good rather than competing for the 
promotion of the private good of each. Instead of reasoning from the 
point of view of the private utility maximizer, through public 
deliberation citizens transform their preferences according to public-
minded ends, and reason together about the nature of those ends and the 
best means to realize them.”  
(Young, 1996, p. 121) 
Deliberative theorists argue that the consideration of common good lies 
at the heart of political deliberation. Habermas also insists on 
overcoming the egocentric inclinations in the democratic process 
(Habermas, 1989). In their book Deliberation Day, both Fishkin and 
Ackerman argue that the ‘good citizen’ does not look after his/her 
‘personal interest’ but what is ‘good for the country’. They argue that 
citizens in the public are different from the consumers in market and we 
should not obfuscate this distinction in the political process. When 
consumers enter in the market place they merely look after their 
personal interests and what is beneficial for them. In contrast, citizens 
are not engaged in the act of consumption when they make political 
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decisions. They have to be morally responsible for the choices they 
make in political matters because it will determine the fate of million of 
fellow citizens. Thus, citizens should search for the ‘common good’ in 
the political process (James Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman, 2004, pp. 
173-5). It does not mean private interest and common good can never 
converge. This convergence between private interest and common good 
is not preordained in political matters and the responsible citizen should 
rise above his/her personal interest and take into consideration what is 
the common good in the political decision-making process (James 
Fishkin and Bruce Ackerman, 2004, p. 175). Mansbridge et al. disagree 
with such a stance in deliberative democracy model and argue that self-
interest should be part of the deliberative process. However, they add 
that it must be ‘suitably constrained’ (Mansbridge, et al., 2010, p. 64). 
They think self-interest is not incompatible with deliberative ideals and 
it paves the way to good deliberation:  
“Including self-interest in deliberative democracy reduces the 
possibility of exploitation and obfuscation, introduces information that 
facilitates reasonable solutions and the identiﬁcation of integrative 
outcomes, and also motivates vigorous and creative deliberation. 
Including self-interest in the regulative ideal of deliberative democracy 
embraces the diversity of human objectives as well as the diversity of 
human opinions”. 
(Mansbridge, et al., 2010, pp. 72-3)       
This way, Mansbridge et al. expand the ideal of political deliberation. 
Common good should incorporate all interests that’s why participants 
should take into consideration their self-interests in the deliberative 
process. However, they also claim that some articulations of self-
interests are not compatible with the ideal of good deliberation. As 
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indicated previously, Mansbridge et al. suggest that self-interest should 
be ‘suitably constrained’ in the deliberative process. They rule out those 
forms of self-interest which are not compatible with deliberative norms 
of ‘mutual respect’, ‘equality’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘fairness’ and ‘mutual 
justiﬁcation’ (Mansbridge, et al., 2010, p. 76). 
From the perspective of critical theory, Rostbøll also accepts the 
importance of self-interest in the deliberative process. He states: “we 
need to know the interests of everybody to determine what is in the 
equal interest of all. This knowledge can be created only through actual 
deliberation, where we learn what people with different needs and 
interests actually (have learned they) want” (Rostbøl, 2008, p. 178). He 
further argues that political deliberation provokes self-reflection and 
aims at emancipation. It challenges “uncritically accepted forms of 
oppression and inequality without being paternalistic or setting up 
external standards of true and false interests. Because of its requirement 
of nondomination and its procedural nature, public deliberation cannot 
impose anything on anyone” (Rostbøl, 2008, p. 220).  
 
(iii)- The Principle of Mutual Respect 
Another controversy in the normative literature on deliberative 
democracy concerns the principle of mutual respect in the political 
process. Mutual respect is one of the criteria for good deliberation. 
Mansbridge et al. argue that actors must treat each other with mutual 
respect and genuine concern. They should be able to listen to each other 
and provide reasons for their respective stance without any force 
(Mansbridge, et al., 2010, p. 66). Fishkin holds that an atmosphere of 
mutual respect makes dialogue possible which is an essential element 
in the deliberative process: “Trust and mutual respect are usually 
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thought to be preconditions for deliberative dialogue” (James S. 
Fishkin, 2009, pp. 128, 166). For Gutmann and Thompson, the principle 
of mutual respect and reciprocity is intimately connected with the 
notion of equality. In the deliberative encounter participants interact 
with each other which requires them to respond to various claims made 
in the discussion. They consider the principle of mutual respect as a 
‘political virtue’ that fosters moral learning and it “orients the 
deliberations of citizens and public officials toward a view of the 
common good” (Thompson Dennis, Gutmann Amy, 1990, pp. 86-7). In 
the normative literature, there is a disagreement on the definition of 
mutual respect and its actual practice in the political process. Should we 
respect all arguments? Are there some arguments which are not worthy 
of respect? Habermas holds that we should consider all arguments in 
the political process and eventually good reasoning will prevail in the 
end. It is “the forceless force of the better argument” which ultimately 
paves the way to good reasoning in the deliberative process (Habermas, 
1999, p. 332). Rostbøll also claims that in the model of deliberative 
democracy truth emerges in the political process and no one has a 
privileged access to it (Rostbøl, 2008, p. 103). Italo Testa is critical of 
the principle of mutual respect and explores its limitations in the 
deliberative process. He argues that “equal respect,  understood as 
respect a priori conferred on persons, is not and should not be counted 
as a  constitutive normative ground of public discourse” (Testa, 2012, 
p. 69). He is critical of both Habermas and Apel in presuming respect 
as a necessary presupposition for entering into a dialogue. For Testa, 
the notion of respect is a complex one and it intersects with various 
problems in both political philosophy and argumentation theory. He 
also distinguishes between respect for the persons and respect for the 
argument. In some situations, he claims not only arguments but also 
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persons don’t merit respect. He gives the following example in order to 
explain his point of view: 
 
“In a political context where we listen to an expert about waste disposal 
(i.e., an information-seeking dialogue), we may later discover that the 
expert wasn’t impartial, as he had concealed having shares in a firm 
specializing in waste disposal in just the way he proposes: then a 
personal attack would be rather reasonable.” 
 
(Testa, 2012) 
That is to say, being a dynamic concept, the principle of mutual respect 
is contextually contingent in the deliberative process. It depends on the 
situation when the moral authority of the person impacts the legitimacy 
of his/her arguments. Bohman and Richardson also set limits to the 
concept of respect in political discussion. In its ideal formulation, 
civility requires that one should consider anyone’s arguments but in 
certain situations one can’t be civil to the uncivil29. In the same vein, 
Hansen argues that those arguments which go against the norms of 
equality and freedom should be banned in the deliberative process. 
Since such norms are a precondition for political deliberation, therefore, 
arguments challenging these norms should not be entertained in the 
debate. He writes:  
 
“Deliberative democracy must protect equality and basic civil liberties 
because otherwise the theory violates its own theoretical foundation as 
                                                          
29Bohman and Richardson state: ‘Just as there are thorny problems regarding 
tolerating the intolerant, there are difﬁculties about being civil to the uncivil’. For 
detail, see (James Bohman, Henry S. Richardson, 2009, p. 272).   
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an unconstrained deliberation, which would limit the opinions voiced 
during the deliberative process. Furthermore, as part of the core of 
deliberative democracy is to encourage an outcome based on mutually 
acceptable reasons between citizens, it seems to be impossible to 
question equality or e.g. freedom of expression without questioning the 
entire concept of deliberative democracy.” 
(Hansen, 2004, p. 105) 
 
The concept of mutual respect remains a controversial point in the 
philosophical literature on deliberative democracy. Can we extend 
respect to all arguments and persons? Is confrontation compatible with 
the principle of respect?   
 
 
(iv)- Consensus  
 
Habermas argues that “forceless force of the better argument” 
(Habermas, 1999, p. 332) lies at the heart of deliberative model of 
democracy. It means, political decisions should be based on good 
reasoning. Moreover, good arguments are not given a priori, rather, they 
emerge in the process of deliberation. Dryzek also believes that what 
prevails in the deliberative process is not individual authority but good 
reasons (Dryzek J. S., 1990). However, there is a controversy in the 
normative literature about the possibility of consensus among 
participants on the nature of what best arguments are. Habermas argues 
that if the discourse in political deliberation is governed by the idea of 
impartiality then consensus can be achieved. He writes: 
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“Parties can agree to a negotiated compromise for different reasons, the 
consensus brought about through argument must rest on identical 
reasons able to convince the parties in the same way. The consensus-
generating force of such reasons is displayed in the idea of impartiality 
that governs practical discourses.”  
(Habermas, 1996, p. 339)  
 
Along with Habermas, some other deliberative theorists also believe 
that consensus is possible in the deliberative process. For example, 
Cohen claims that ideal deliberation strives towards rationally 
motivated consensus (Cohen J. A., 1989, pp. 23-4). However, both 
Habermas and Cohen do not claim that consensus is the necessary 
outcome of deliberative process, rather, they express their hope that it 
should be the case. Consensus is not always based upon identical 
reasons. Pragmatically, in certain situations and political contexts, it is 
based on different reasons. Neblo argues that if participants offer 
different reasons for a specific decision or policy then it means 
deliberative process promotes both pluralism and a healthy 
environment for debate and discussion (Neblo, 2015). Goodin also 
argues that disagreement is intrinsic to the nature of life in complex 
societies (Goodin R. E., 2006, p. 254). Bohman and Richardson also 
claim that “the idea of deliberative democracy cannot solve the problem 
of pluralism by offering up the idea of RACAs (reasons all can accept) 
as a speciﬁcation of what it means for diverse people to give reasons to 
one another” (James Bohman and Henry S. Richardson, 2009, p. 253). 
In the same vein, Pellizzoni is also critical of Habermasian position 
concerning the unity of reason. According to Pellizzoni’s interpretation, 
Habermas emphasizes on the cognitive virtue in the communicative 
process to single out the best argument. For Pellizzoni, because of the 
relationship between power and communication, one can not provide a 
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universal reason to resolve deep-lying conflicts (Pellizzoni, 2001, pp. 
59, 67). Nonetheless, he believes deliberative process may result in a 
non-strategic agreement. Rostbøll makes another interesting point 
regarding the nature of consensus in political deliberation. Following 
the tradition of critical theory, he argues that sometimes one should 
break the consensus if it is embedded in ideological domination. He 
further argues that deliberative democracy should not break with its root 
in the critical theory tradition and it should always aim at emancipation 
through the critique of ideology. For Rostbøll, communication in the 
deliberative process should be free from domination and distortion. He 
states:  
 
“that deliberative democracy is not merely a call for more 
communication but a call for a particular structure of communication—
namely, one free from distortion and domination… if agreement is the 
product of ideological domination, then the aim of deliberation is to 
show that the agreement is only apparent, or that it is not the product of 
free deliberation. To see this, deliberative democrats should not forget 
their roots in critical theory and the importance of the critique of 
ideology.” 
(Rostbøl, 2008, pp. 148-9) 
   
It means, Rostbøll is not against consensus but it should not reflect mere 
conformity to dominant ideology and must be based on personal 
autonomy. Deliberative process should provoke reflection about 
uncritically accepted policies and institutions and its strength lies in its 
emancipatory potential.  
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(v)- The Concept of Truthfulness        
 
For Habermas, truthfulness is a key element in the deliberative model 
of democracy. He argues that we engage in a conversation with the 
presumption that others are truthful. For Habermas, in the deliberative 
process “each speaker may only assert what he believes himself”30. 
Deceptive behavior is detrimental to the deliberative process and it 
distorts communication. Contrary to Habermas, some deliberative 
theorists claim that intentions and motives do not matter in the 
deliberative process. They argue, what counts is the behavior itself in 
the deliberative encounter. For Warren, in democratic research, 
theorists should pay attention to deliberative institutions rather than 
deliberative intentions31. In the same vein, Thompson also suggests that 
“empirical researchers therefore should not worry, as some evidently 
do, about formulating an independent test for sincerity or truthfulness” 
(Thompson, 2008, p. 504). There are a number of deliberative theorists 
who agree with Habermas about the significance of truthfulness in the 
process of political deliberation and consider it essential to democracy. 
Bohman and Richardson also believe that sincerity and mutual respect 
are primordial aspects of the deliberative process (James Bohman and 
Henry S. Richardson, 2009, p. 270). Niemeyer also stresses on the 
significance of truthfulness in the deliberative process. He argues that 
untruthfulness opens up the door for strategic manipulation which 
impedes the process of deliberation. Mansbridge et al. also claim that 
lying is a kind of coercive power which is against the norms of 
deliberation (Mansbridge, et al., 2010, pp. 80-2). Deliberative theorists 
                                                          
30 “Jeder Sprecher darf nur behaupten, was er selbst glaubt”; quoted in ( Jürg Steiner, 
André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli and Marco R. Steenbergen , 2004, p. 20).  
31 For a detailed description of the significance of empirical research on deliberative 
institutions see (Warren, 2007). 
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offer different arguments on the nature of truthfulness in the 
deliberative process.   
 
(vi)- Conditions and Consequences of Deliberation 
 
Empirically, deliberation is a very complex phenomenon and figuring 
out its conditions is a difficult task for political philosophers. Favorable 
conditions can produce good deliberation. Habermas imposes high 
value on deliberative standards in his ideal speech situation. He also 
recognizes the impracticality of such an ideal speech in real world 
politics. However, speech acts in real situation, Habermas argues, 
should be analyzed in relation to the ideal speech situation (Habermas, 
2005). Goodin provides a systematic framework in order to investigate 
the complexity of deliberative practices in real political situations. His 
sequential account of deliberative moments helps us to understand the 
decisional process in the act of political deliberation (Goodin R. E., 
2005). Habermas argues that the presence of a shared Lebenswelt (life-
world) is conducive to political deliberation (Habermas, 1985). In 
deliberative theory, there is no agreement on the conditions that are 
conducive to good deliberation. It still remains a challenge and one can 
contribute to this debate through empirical cases that exemplify real 
political situations of deliberative encounters. As Claudia Landwehr 
writes: 
 
“Exploring the context conditions for successful and democratic 
deliberation thus remains the most important challenge for deliberative 
theory and deliberative politics.” 
(Landwehr, 2010, p. 120)                   
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In the philosophical literature, conditions that lead to good deliberation 
are conceptualized at high level abstraction, and there is a need of real 
cases to fill this lacuna. This way, the case of Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement provides an empirical example to expand the normative 
debates concerning the favorable conditions for deliberation. The 
philosophical literature shows that deliberative theorists are more 
interested in the consequences of good deliberation, rather than its 
conditions. Mostly, deliberative thinkers believe that the consequences 
of deliberation are generally good. According to Claudia Landwehr, 
deliberative “theory assumes that the exchange of reasons in 
communicative interaction forms and transforms political preferences, 
and that if the interaction is sufficiently deliberative, they are 
transformed to the better. Preferences evolving from deliberation are 
expected to be better informed and less self-interested: besides the own 
perspective, they take into account the knowledge, experiences and 
interests of others” (Landwehr, 2010, p. 101). In the same vein, 
Habermas also believes that the process of deliberation enhances the 
quality of decision. For Dryzek, deliberation improves the quality of 
political outcomes because it tends to resolve issues through dialogic 
engagement (Dryzek J. S., 2009). Deliberation improves the quality of 
political outcomes because it enhances the legitimacy of collective 
decisions. Indeed, the theory of deliberative democracy was initially 
conceived in order to secure legitimacy in the democratic project. As 
Dryzek writes: 
 
“This claim is at the heart of deliberative theory, which began as an 
account of legitimacy … Deliberative legitimacy can either substitute 
for or supplement other sources of legitimacy, such as the consistency 
of a process with constitutional rules or traditional practices.” 
(Dryzek J. S., 2009, p. 1390)         
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The main consequence of deliberation is to bring about legitimacy in 
the political process. Another important consequence of deliberative 
theory is its emphasis on social justice. For thinkers like Gambetta and 
Krause, political outcomes become fairer if social justice prevails in the 
political process32. If deliberative theory improves the quality of 
political outcomes then social justice must prevail in society. In short, 
the favorable conditions and consequences of deliberation, like other 
main notions in deliberative theory, are not fixed and they need further 
elaboration through concrete cases. There is an agreement among 
deliberative theorists that deliberation would lead to good political 
outcomes because intrinsically this process is oriented towards the 
search of common good.  
The normative controversies in philosophical literature on deliberative 
democracy help us to understand the conceptual nature of deliberative 
theory. These controversies make us realize that deliberative 
democracy is not a unified theory. The theoretical development of 
deliberative democracy over the last three decades has made it 
“internally differentiated” and “it can be quite misleading, now, to 
speak of ‘deliberative theory’ in monolithic terms” (Neblo, 2007, pp. 
530-1). These normative controversies should be taken as an 
opportunity to expand the reach and application of deliberative theory. 
The empirization33 of deliberative democracy has greatly influenced its 
normative foundations. Moreover, it has brought many “turns” 
(empirical, practical, institutional, systemic) within the theory of 
deliberative democracy over the last two decades. These turns have 
                                                          
32 For details, see (Gambetta, 1998, p. 24) and (Krause, 2010). 
33 Simon Beste uses the term ‘empirization’ of deliberative democracy in order to 
understand the influence of empirical studies in recasting the concept of deliberative 
democracy. For details, see (Beste, 2013, p. 3).  
85 
 
expanded the scope of deliberative theory and made it a global political 
project. In the next chapter, I will explain the systemic turn in 
deliberative theory, which, I argue, is a more comprehensive and 
philosophically informed approach that deals with the normative 
controversies in deliberative theory. It also paves the way to understand 
the nature of deliberative mechanisms in various historical contexts, 
including authoritarian and the non-Western.            
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Chapter Four 
 
Systemic Approach 
 
In this chapter, I explicate the systemic approach in deliberative theory. 
This approach attempts to address the normative controversies in 
philosophical literature on deliberative democracy discussed in the 
previous chapter, by expanding the reach and application of deliberative 
theory. In doing so, it also goes beyond the liberal - 
Western/Eurocentric account of deliberation found in traditional 
approaches and opens up the possibility to understand deliberative 
practices in the non-Western contexts. The chapter is divided into two 
sections. In section one, I discuss systemic approach in its historical 
context. Specifically, I explain the theoretical development of the 
concept of deliberative democracy in terms of four generations of 
deliberative theorists. In section two, I discuss how deliberative model 
in the wake of systemic turn helps us to understand various deliberative 
mechanisms in the non-Western contexts (including authoritarian).   
 
1- Systemic Approach in Deliberative Theory 
 
Systemic approach is the latest phase of deliberative theory. 
Deliberative democracy understood both as a reformist movement and 
an academic activity has gone through several phases. Theoretical 
accounts on deliberative theory differ because of the different responses 
to the following questions: 
 
(i)- What type of communication is deliberative? 
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(ii)- What are the possible sites/locations of deliberation? 
(iii)- How should citizens deliberate in the political process? 
(iv)- How can we make deliberation inclusive? 
(v)- What are the conditions of deliberation? 
(vi)- What are the possible consequences of deliberation? 
 
Four-generations34 of deliberative theorists offer different responses to 
the above questions. First-generation scholars mainly focused on the 
normative aspects of deliberative democracy (Stephen Elstub, Selen 
Ercan, and Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça, 2016, p. 141). They developed 
the normative ideal of deliberative democracy and provided its 
justification in order to combat the crises of liberal democratic project. 
They particularly emphasized on the concept of legitimacy. The notion 
of legitimacy lies at the heart of deliberative model of democracy35. The 
concept of deliberative democracy, according to first-generation 
scholars, “must be organized around an ideal of political justification 
requiring free public reasoning of equal citizens” (Jane Mansbridge et 
al. , 2012, p. 25). Manin considers legitimacy as one of the 
achievements of deliberative model of democracy. In the same vein, 
Benhabib also argues that legitimacy in complex democratic societies 
results from the unconstrained deliberation of citizens (Benhabib, 
1996).  
                                                          
34 For pedagogical reasons, the generational account of deliberative democracy is 
useful to understand its development in the last three decades in a more 
comprehensive way. It also clarifies the various turns (empirical, practical, 
institutional and systemic) deliberative democracy took since 1980s and makes us 
understand its present form. For details see; (Stephen Elstub, Selen Ercan, and Ricardo 
Fabrino Mendonça, 2016) and (Dryzek J. S., 2010, pp. 3-17).    
35 For a detailed description on the role of legitimacy in deliberative democracy, see 
(Cohen J. , 1989, pp. 17-34). 
88 
 
Although second-generation theorists acknowledged the normative side 
of deliberative democracy but they raised questions about its 
application to contemporary societies which are characterized by 
complexity, plurality, and diversity. Specifically, they criticized 
consensus and rational justification requirements of deliberative theory. 
Moreover, political theorists in this second phase also brought 
deliberative democracy close to emerging trends in contemporary 
politics such as feminism and multiculturalism (Stephen Elstub, Selen 
Ercan, and Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça, 2016, p. 141). Many theorists 
appreciated this trend because it brought deliberative democrcacy 
closer to real world political issues. For Mansbridge et al., the second 
phase “saw the proliferation of empirical studies and practical 
applications of the theory…this practical and empirical turn opened the 
door for empirical political scientists to study a variety of settings in 
which deliberative democracy might work well or badly. The empirical 
studies began to address issues such as the conditions that enable or 
constrain good deliberative processes” (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012, 
p. 25).  
Third-generation scholars of deliberative democracy focused on the 
institutional design required to conduct empirical analysis of the 
practices of deliberation. Specifically, they analyzed various 
participatory practices called ‘mini-publics’. They wanted to determine 
the potential of mini-publics in strengthening the deliberative processes 
in various political contexts. They utilized the ideal of deliberation in 
various mini-publics (deliberative polls, consensus conferences, 
citizens’ juries etc.) experiments in order to increase the participation 
of ordinary citizens in the democratic process. Although, such a micro-
level democratic innovation is celebrated by many political 
philosophers but some theorists are critical of the concept of isolated 
‘mini-publics’ and its practicality in the larger political context. The 
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concept of ‘mini-publics’ merely highlights discrete instances of 
deliberation and does not help us to understand the role of deliberation 
at the macro level.      
In its recent expansion, what we call the fourth-generation of 
deliberative scholars, the theory of deliberative democracy has started 
paying attention to various ‘sites’ other than ‘mini-publics’ in order to 
understand the nature of political deliberation. Dryzek states that “the 
question on what constitutes a ‘suitable site’ of public deliberation has 
long been at the core of scholarly debates on deliberative democracy” 
(Selen A. Ercan & John S. Dryzek, 2015, p. 241). For John Rawls, 
existing institutions, specifically ‘courts’, are the appropriate location 
for deliberation. He considers “supreme court as the exemplar of public 
reason” (Rawls, 2005 , p. 231). Habermas locates deliberation in the 
networks of a broader public sphere. Habermasian “discourse theory 
works instead with the higher-level intersubjectivity of communication 
processes that flow through both the parliamentary bodies and the 
informal networks of the public sphere. Within and outside the 
parliamentary complex, these subjectless forms of communication 
constitute arenas in which a more or less rational opinion- and will-
formation can take place” (Benhabib, 1996, p. 6). The early scholarly 
debates about the ‘suitable site’ for deliberation mainly focused on 
these two formal and informal sites. Moreover, these two sites (formal 
and informal) were treated in mutually exclusive terms (Selen A. Ercan 
& John S. Dryzek, 2015, p. 242). The fourth generation of deliberative 
theorists argue that deliberation is a complex and dynamic phenomenon 
and we should not confine it to some fixed location. They consider it as 
a form of communication that takes place in “the ebb and flow of public 
debate carried on in the media, in private conversations, in formal and 
informal settings, from pubs to parliaments and back again” (Parkinson, 
2004, p. 380). These deliberative sites broaden democratic practices. 
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The occurrence of deliberation in multiple sites is not merely a 
theoretical enrichment of the normative literature on deliberative 
democracy but it also has significant consequences for the practice of 
democracy.  
The current research on ‘deliberative systems’ widens the scope of 
deliberative democracy by explicating deliberative practices beyond 
isolated forums such as citizens’ juries, consensus conferences, 
participatory budgeting and planning cells. Political theorists construe 
‘deliberative systems’ as “as a communicative activity that occurs in 
multiple, diverse yet partly overlapping spaces, and emphasizes the 
need for interconnection between these spaces” (Stephen Elstub, Selen 
Ercan, and Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça, 2016, p. 139). This approach is 
a macro level analysis of deliberative practices. Systemic approach 
helps us to understand the relationship between various sites of 
deliberation. Moreover, it also increases our understanding of both 
deliberative and non-deliberative practices and their relationship in the 
political system as a whole (Thompson, 2008, p. 500). The systemic 
turn in deliberative theory attempts to reconcile theoretical, practical, 
and methodological insights of the first three generations of deliberative 
democracy scholars. Systemic approach offers a new perspective to 
think about the theoretical and practical issues concerning deliberative 
democracy. 
Mansbridge first coined the term ‘deliberative system’ in order to 
accommodate complexities of discursive flows in the deliberative 
process (Mansbridge, 1999, pp. 211-2). She contends that various 
networks of discursive flows lie at the heart of contemporary societies 
and they enhance the quality of public deliberation in the actual political 
process. She does not confine deliberation to face-to-face dialogue (as 
in mini-publics experiments) and extends it to a larger discursive 
process of communication in the political system (Mansbridge, 1999, 
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p. 213). The following passage explains the concept of deliberative 
system: 
 
“A system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to 
some degree interdependent parts, often with distributed functions and 
a division of labour, connected in such a way as to form a complex 
whole. It requires both differentiation and integration among the parts. 
It requires some functional division of labour, so that some parts do 
work that others cannot do as well. And it requires some relational 
interdependence, so that a change in one component will bring about 
changes in some others. A deliberative system is one that encompasses 
a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem-solving—
through arguing, demonstrating, expressing, and persuading. In a good 
deliberative system, persuasion that raises relevant considerations 
should replace suppression, oppression, and thoughtless neglect. 
Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be 
judged as a whole in addition to the parts being judged independently. 
We need to ask not only what good deliberation would be both in 
general and in particular settings, but also what a good deliberative 
system would entail.”  
(Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012, pp. 4-5)   
 
System involves various parts which are interrelated and collectively 
constitute the deliberative process. Such a concept of ‘system’ can also 
be found in Habermas’ ‘two-track model’ of deliberative democracy. 
Habermas relates political deliberation with both democratic opinion 
and will formation. Opinion formation takes place in the ‘informal 
public sphere’ whereas will formation is the outcome of deliberation in 
the ‘formal representative institutions’ (Habermas, 2005, p. 388). 
Habermas emphasizes on the transmission mechanisms between these 
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two spheres. Informal public sphere is made up of various discursive 
practices which generates communication in order to influence 
decision-making processes in the formal representative institutions 
such as legislature. For Habermas, “deliberative politics depends on a 
complex system with a nucleus that needs to be open to the peripheries 
of discursive production. The wild communicative ﬂows of the broad 
public sphere may be ﬁltered so as to constitute a communicative 
power, which can be translated through laws into administrative 
power”36. Mansbridge’s concept of ‘deliberative system’ is more 
inclusive than the Habermasian model because it also attempts to 
reconcile the normative controversies in philosophical literature on 
deliberative democracy. She extends the classical concept of 
deliberative democracy by broadening the various “forms of 
communication that fall under our conception of ‘deliberation’; 
including the wide variety of forms of ‘everyday talk’ addressing 
matters that should be discussed by the public (including societal 
norms) within the conception of a deliberative system; and, in so doing, 
moving the ﬁeld of deliberative democracy beyond its perceived 
obsession with formal political forums and processes” (David Owen 
and Graham Smith, 2015, p. 3). For Mansbridge, ‘deliberative system’ 
in its totality should exhibit values like ‘mutual respect’, 
‘inclusiveness’, ‘rational consistency’ etc. Mansbridge et al. argue that 
there are several advantages of thinking about deliberative democracy 
in systemic terms: 
 
(i)- It enables us to conceive deliberative democracy in a larger socio-
political context. The systemic approach goes beyond isolated fixed 
                                                          
36 Quoted in (Stephen Elstub, Selen Ercan, and Ricardo Fabrino Mendonça, 2016, p. 
143). 
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locations and analyzes deliberative practices in multiple sites. It “does 
not dictate that we take a nation or large polity as our object of study. 
Schools and universities, hospitals, media, and other organizations can 
be understood along the lines offered by a deliberative system 
approach” (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012, p. 2). 
(ii)- It enables us to analyze division of labour within different parts of 
a system. Every part has its own deliberative strength or weakness and 
“a single part, which in itself may have low or even negative 
deliberative quality with respect to one of several deliberative ideals, 
may nevertheless make an important contribution to an overall 
deliberative system” (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012, p. 3).   
(iii)- Systemic approach helps us shape effective deliberation by 
excavating gaps and inadequacies in individual sites. We can enhance 
deliberative quality of a system if we are aware of the issues which 
impede the deliberative process: “a systemic approach allows us to see 
more clearly where a system might be improved, and recommend 
institutions or other innovations that could supplement the system in 
areas of weakness” (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012, p. 4).       
 
These three advantages help us understand the development of 
deliberative theory. Deliberative system is not construed in mechanistic 
terms. There are ‘deliberative ecologies’ in the ‘system’ which help us 
understand various contexts and avenues for deliberation within the 
‘system’. That is to say, the burden of both decision-making and 
legitimacy is distributed among the various components of a ‘system’. 
If one part fails to perform its proper function then other parts 
compensate its shortcomings. ‘Deliberative system’ is dynamic in 
nature and includes both micro and macro level practices of deliberation 
in the polity. For Mansbridge et al, there is a division of labour in the 
‘system’ because of the complexity of political judgments: “political 
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judgments involve so many factual contingencies and competing 
normative requirements, and because politics involves the alignments 
of will, both in concert and in opposition, among large numbers of 
citizens, it is virtually impossible to conceive of a political system that 
does not divide the labours of judgment and then recombine them in 
various ways” (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012, p. 5). Robert Goodin 
develops an idea of sequencing in order to spell out the distribution of 
deliberation in a ‘political system’. He offers the idea of ‘distributed 
deliberation’ (also delegated deliberation) as an alternative to the 
dominant concept of ‘unitary deliberation’. He writes:  
“I offer a model of ‘distributed’ (or ‘delegated’) deliberation—with 
different agents playing different deliberative roles—as an alternative 
to the ‘unitary actor’ model of deliberation. It might be ‘good enough’, 
deliberatively, for the component deliberative virtues to be on display 
sequentially, over the course of this staged deliberation involving 
various component parts, rather than continuously and simultaneously 
present as they would be in the case of a unitary deliberating actor.” 
(Goodin R. E., 2005, p. 182) 
 
According to Goodin, the distribution of deliberative task in terms of 
‘deliberative moments’ helps us to understand deliberation in its 
totality. He further argues that various institutions of representative 
democracy, such as, caucus room, election campaigns, parliaments and 
post-election bargaining, may exhibit low quality deliberation if 
analyzed individually, but they can still contribute to overall good 
quality deliberation if analyzed together in totality. Parkinson also 
claims that public deliberation is the outcome of multiples sites and 
moments. He emphasizes on informal, formal and intermediate 
discursive networks in the practice of political deliberation (Parkinson, 
2006, p. 168). He argues in favor of a sequence of institutions which 
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play different role in the process of deliberation. For Parkinson, 
“activist networks, experts, bureaucracy, micro-techniques, media, 
elected assembly, direct techniques—play different roles” (David 
Owen and Graham Smith, 2015, p. 4) in the various institutions of a 
political system. It is quite possible, Parkinson argues, that some 
elements are not truly deliberative but still they may foster deliberation 
in the system as a whole. Similarly, in the context of interpretive 
research, some theorists suggest that ‘deliberative system’ is constituted 
by sites, agents and discursive elements (Selen A Ercan; Carolyn M 
Hendriks; John Boswell, 2017, p. 199). In her integrated model of 
public deliberation, Carolyn Hendriks argues that a ‘deliberative 
system’ hosts multiple sites including informal macro, formal micro 
and hybrid mini-publics. She further suggests that an integrated model 
of deliberation diffuses all three dimensions in the ‘political system’ 
(Hendriks, 2006, pp. 487-8). In his systemic approach, Dryzek 
advocates public contestation of discourses as an important aspect of 
deliberative democracy. His approach is not merely confined to 
individuals but contestation of various discourses in the public sphere 
and its influence on the decision-making process. On a mass scale, 
Dryzek contends that normative conditions for the quality of 
deliberation pertain to the system, therefore, ‘deliberative system’ 
should be evaluated in its entirety (Dryzek J. S., 2011, pp. 226-7). 
Mansbridge et al. describe three basic functions of ‘deliberative system’ 
which they think are relatively less controversial among theorists: 
 
(i)- Epistemic or Truth Seeking:  
The epistemic function produces preferences and opinions on the basis 
of facts, logic and mutual justification. In a healthy ‘deliberative 
system’ participants bring about relevant considerations in order to 
justify their respective positions. Since, “the topics of these 
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deliberations are issues of common concern”, therefore, “epistemically 
well-grounded preferences, opinions, and decisions must be informed 
by, and take into consideration, the preferences and opinions of fellow 
citizens” (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012, p. 11). 
(ii)- Ethical or Mutual Respect:  
Ethical function attempts to promote mutual respect among participants 
in the ‘deliberative system’. It is necessary for effective communication 
and it “helps keep the deliberative system running”  (Jane Mansbridge 
et al. , 2012, p. 11) . The principle of mutual respect also leads to the 
realization of other goods such as non-domination.  
 
 
(iii)- Democratic or Inclusive Egalitarian:  
The democratic function makes deliberation inclusive by incorporating 
various voices, perspectives, and interests in the political process. It 
creates opportunities of equal participation in the ‘deliberative system’. 
A healthy “deliberative system must not systematically exclude any 
citizens from the process without strong justification that could be 
reasonably accepted by all citizens, including the excluded” (Jane 
Mansbridge et al. , 2012, p. 12).       
 
The realization of these three functions does not merely consolidate the 
ideal of deliberative democracy but it also determines the terms of 
social cooperation among participants in the political process. These 
functions are distributed in various parts of the ‘deliberative system’ 
and they also provide legitimacy to the decision-making process. In 
short, the systemic turn in deliberative theory seeks to accommodate 
various normative controversies through the expansion of locations that 
host deliberative practices.   
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2- Systemic Approach and Deliberative Practices in non-
Western Contexts 
 
The ideal of deliberative democracy has been criticized for being 
Eurocentric in its scope. Indeed, the early formulation of the ideal of 
deliberative democracy is embedded in the Western model of liberal 
state and rules out the various deliberative practices which are not 
compatible with the basic tenets of European Enlightenment. In her 
article, Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy, Maeve Cooke 
describes the ideal of deliberative democracy as the political 
culmination of the project of Western modernity. She argues that the 
deliberative model “posits the ideal of democracy as a fundamental 
principle that is in a sense uncircumventable for inhabitants of modern 
Western modernity and deliberative democracy as the elucidation of 
this ideal that is most congruent with ‘whom we are’ ” (Cooke, 2000, 
p. 954). Here ‘we’ is confined to people who have gone through the 
experience of European enlightenment, which emphasizes on 
normative values like autonomy, equality and rational discussion. Such 
a formulation of the deliberative ideal can also be found in the works of 
Habermas, Rawls, Benhabib, Cohen, Rorty and Dworkin37. According 
to Cooke, the deliberative model of democracy is essentially an 
embodiment of the normative concepts of knowledge, self and good life 
stemming from Western modernity. These normative concepts are not 
a matter of choice as they constitute the very essence of European self-
understanding, thereby, they can’t be disregarded in the political 
process. She gives the following examples for the indispensability of 
                                                          
37 For details see, (Habermas, 1996); (Rawls, 1980); (Rawls, 2005 ); (Rorty, 1996); 
(Benhabib, 1996); (Cohen J. , 1997); and (Dworkin, 1986).   
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normative concepts of knowledge, self and autonomy for the 
justification of deliberative democracy. 
 
(i)- There is no authority outside history and culture, which can 
determine the epistemic validity of claims in areas like science, law, 
politics and morality. Moreover, these spheres of knowledge are 
epistemologically fallible. 
(ii)- Human agency is capable of autonomous reasoning that must be 
valued in ordinary life. 
(iii)- Publicity is an important aspect of both law and politics. 
(iv)- By virtue of being autonomous moral agents, human beings 
deserve equal respect with their distinct point of view.  
 
Cooke claims that the ideal of deliberative democracy is compatible 
with the above-mentioned normative concepts, which are integral to the 
political development of the Western world. This formulation of 
deliberative model is Eurocentric in its core because it confines 
deliberation to the Western secular societies. As she writes: 
 
“If there are no authoritative standards of scientific, legal, political or 
moral validity independent of history and cultural context, and if 
knowledge is still deemed possible in these areas, then some alternative 
means for deciding between rival justifications has to be found. If, in 
addition, knowledge in these areas is construed fallibilistically, that is, 
if it is seen as never final and conclusive but always open to challenge 
and revision in light of new evidence and arguments, unconstrained 
rational argumentation seems the most appropriate forum for 
adjudicating rival claims. This ‘desacralized’ view of knowledge, 
which goes hand in hand with a secularization of authority and which 
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is acknowledged to be one of the defining characteristics of Western 
modernity.” 
(Cooke, 2000, p. 955)                     
 
It means Western societies, which have experienced the European 
enlightenment, are more conducive to the ideal of deliberative 
democracy than the non-Western societies. Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action, which provides the basic theoretical framework 
to deliberative theorists, is also based upon the fundamental 
assumptions of enlightenment. Delanty criticizes Habermas’ theory for 
being Eurocentric and occidental in its core. He argues that 
Habermasian philosophy is a kind of eurocentrism and his concept of 
morality “an evolutionary theory culminating in the discourse of 
occidental rationalism and thus fails to see that universal morality can 
be articulated in more than one cultural form and in more than one logic 
of development” (Delanty, 1997, p. 42). For Delanty, Habermas holds 
onto a radical distinction between discourse and cultural attachments. 
On the basis of such a radical distinction, Habermas believes that people 
can get rid of identity and cultural peculiarities when they enter public 
communication. Gambetta’s distinction between analytical and 
indexical knowledge also reveals the Eurocentric presumptions of 
deliberative model of democracy. Gambetta claims that the norms of 
deliberation are not universal in their scope. He writes: 
 
“Attitudes toward conversation do not originate from democratic 
arrangements even though they can be shaped and controlled by them. 
They are likely to be by-products of a preexisting culture and may well 
be antithetical to deliberation.” 
(Gambetta, 1998, p. 20) 
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Gambetta construes Anglo-Saxon culture as analytical culture because 
it promotes rational discussion and good reasoning, thereby, is 
conducive to deliberative democracy. Whereas, in indexical culture, 
where knowledge is taken in holistic terms, people don’t raise their 
voice on political/social issues, thus, such cultures don’t provide 
conditions for deliberative politics (Gambetta, 1998, pp. 25-6). 
According to Gunaratne, Habermas’ concepts of public sphere and 
deliberation are also ingrained the Western liberal modernity. 
Habermasian notions like communicative action, speech acts, 
truthfulness and rightfulness, which are key concepts in the deliberative 
model of democracy, presume a Western-style modernization 
(Gunaratne, 2006). Benhabib also says that thinkers like Habermas and 
Rawls (at least in his book Theory of Justice) “share strong beliefs in 
the normative content of human reason—that is, in the validity of 
procedures of inquiry, evidence, and questioning that have been 
considered the cognitive legacy of Western philosophy since the 
Enlightenment” (Benhabib S. , 2002, p. 27). This normative content 
(impartiality, argumentation, self-reflexivity) lies at the heart of early 
formulations of deliberative democracy, which limits its application in 
the non-Western contexts. In the same vein, Rosenberg also argues that 
deliberative theory is based upon certain assumptions about the 
cognitive capabilities of the citizens (Rosenberg, 2006, p. 87). 
Specifically, deliberative model presumes that: 
 
(i)- Individuals are capable of engaging in rational dialogue with each 
other that leads to logical inferences in the discussion. 
(ii)- Individuals are equal in exercising this rational capacity. 
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He claims that such a concept of cognitive capabilities is not merely 
philosophically incorrect38 but it also confines deliberative democracy 
to the Western liberal states. Rosenberg further argues that this strictly 
rational understanding of deliberative model has marginalized the role 
of emotions in our political thinking. He writes: 
 
“Deliberative democratic theory has focused on the individual’s 
cognitive attributes and, in so doing, remains largely silent on the issues 
of affect or emotion. At most, it provides a further rationale for ignoring 
these concerns by either relegating them to the domain of variable 
personal preferences or by subordinating them to a reason that is 
capable of denying, ordering, and reconstructing them. However, with 
its emphasis on constructive communication, deliberative democracy 
may require not only certain cognitive capacities, but also a certain 
positive emotional engagement to foster the kind of consideration that 
democratic deliberation demands. It seems unrealistic to assume that a 
commitment to consider fairly another’s concerns could be based 
simply on the recognition that another person is a thinking, sentient 
being that is formally equivalent to oneself and, therefore, equally 
deserving of attention and consideration. Similarly, it seems unrealistic 
to assume that a commitment to the common good will emerge solely 
on the basis of reflections upon what is ethical and reasonable. Not only 
does this raise the issue of the practicality of institutions constructed 
with such assumptions in mind, but it also raises issues about the 
adequacy of a theoretical construction which only explicates human 
sociality on cognitive grounds.”                                
(Rosenberg, 2006, p. 92) 
                                                          
38 On the basis of social psychological and the developmental psychological research, 
Rosenberg considers such a view of cognitive capabilities, which is presumed in the 
deliberative model of democracy, as philosophically inadequate.    
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The above passage clearly indicates the limitations of the deliberative 
model in non-Western contexts, where people are not always motivated 
by purely rational concerns in political matters. By prioritizing logical 
reasoning over emotions, deliberative model relegates other forms of 
communication, which are necessary if we want to understand the 
deliberative mechanisms in non-Western contexts. The following 
points summarize the Eurocentric presumptions of the deliberative 
model: 
 
(i)- Philosophically, deliberative model is embedded in Western 
modernity and enlightenment thinking. 
(ii)- Norms like reasoning, autonomy, equality and publicity are 
peculiarly Western virtues, which are essential in the practice of 
deliberation. 
(iii)- The institution of liberal state is necessary in order to concretize 
deliberative politics. 
(iv)- Indexical cultures39, which are constitutive of the non-Western 
world, are not conducive to the deliberative model of democracy. 
(v)- The deliberative model presumes certain concepts of the self, 
knowledge and good life that are compatible with those societies which 
have gone through the process of Western-style modernization. Thus, 
societies which have taken different paths to modernization lack 
social/political conditions that are necessary for the practice of 
deliberative politics. 
                                                          
39 Gambetta does not claim that the indexical cultures constitute the non-Western 
world. Indexical cultures can also be found in the Western world. However, his 
representation of analytical culture, which is essential for the deliberative model of 
democracy, is merely confined to the Anglo-Saxon world. By implication, we can 
interpret that the non-Western world is primarily based on indexical cultures.    
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Now, I turn to explain how the systemic approach in deliberative model 
of democracy helps us to overcome the Eurocentric presumption of 
deliberative democracy. In this thesis, I further argue for the need of 
expansion of this approach to be more inclusive in order to incorporate 
the non-Western contexts in its theoretical framework. This interest in 
the practices of deliberation in the non-Western contexts can be 
understood in the nexus of comparative political philosophy. The 
systemic turn is significant in order to understand the nature of 
deliberation in non-Western contexts in general, and Pakistan in 
particular. Specifically, I claim that two points are important in this 
regard: 
 
(i)- Systemic turn rectifies the critique of deliberative democracy for 
being Eurocentric and opens up the space to find deliberative practices 
in the non-Western contexts.  
(ii)- It also helps us to understand the democratic potential in 
authoritarian contexts through its macro concerns. In systemic 
approach, the unit of analysis is the ‘political system’ which is not 
necessarily a liberal democratic setup. A vast majority of other political 
systems like authoritarianism can also be investigated through this 
approach. Studies on democratization process in authoritarian contexts, 
which is an important aspect of this thesis, can also be strengthened 
through this dynamic approach.   
Systemic approach opens up the space of various deliberative practices 
which are not tied to the basic ideals of enlightenment thinking. It 
makes possible to study deliberation in a large scale political context: 
This expansion is helpful: 
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(i)- To study deliberative mechanisms in the absence of liberal 
democratic setup. 
(ii)- It also goes beyond the Eurocentric presumptions of deliberative 
theory by incorporating the various forms deliberation can take in 
various historical contexts. The role of culture, protests, and social 
movements in shaping deliberative practices becomes more prominent 
in this approach.  
 
In the history of political theory in the West, democracy has mainly 
been understood in relation to the institution of state. As Dryzek says: 
 
“According to standard and long-established ways of political thinking 
in the West, democracy was first and foremost an attribute of the state 
because the state claims final political authority over the citizens of a 
particular territory.” 
(Dryzek J. S., 2006, p. 23) 
 
The theory of deliberative democracy broadens our understanding of 
democracy by excavating various deliberative practices which lie 
outside the institution of the state. Specifically, I will argue in this 
section, the systemic approach expands the horizons of deliberative 
democracy more comprehensively, which helps us to understand 
deliberative practices in the non-democratic and the non-Western 
contexts.  For example, Mansbridge et al. recognize the fact that a 
‘deliberative system’ is not necessarily democratic and authoritarian 
regimes can also have practices of deliberations: “it is of course possible 
to think about a deliberative system independently of democracy. 
Authoritarian regimes have deliberation. Much deliberation goes on 
within the Catholic Church. Scientific communities could perhaps be 
said to have deliberative systems” (Jane Mansbridge; James Bohman; 
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Simone Chambers; Thomas Christiano; Archon Fung; John Parkinson; 
Dennis F. Thompson & Mark E. Warren, 2012, p. 8). Similarly, in his 
recent publication, John Parkinson argues for the applicability of 
systemic approach in various contexts. Parkinson argues that systemic 
approach focuses “on ‘deliberative’ as an adjectival quality of 
democratic systems, whether small-scale or large, rather than on 
‘deliberation’ as a noun” (Parkinson, 2018, p. 1). Systemic approach 
opens up the possibility to understand the emergence of democracy 
from a complex of a multitude of human practices which are not in 
themselves necessarily deliberative if analyzed in isolation: “as life 
emerges from the complex interplay of nonliving units, or as a song is 
made up of elements which are not themselves ‘song’, so deliberative 
democracy is a complex and dynamic pattern of human practices which 
are not themselves deliberative democracy” (Parkinson, 2018, p. 1). 
Parkinson’s approach emphasizes on the main functions of the 
deliberative system, which can help us understand deliberative 
mechanisms in the non-democratic and the non-Western contexts. For 
Parkinson, a deliberative system fulfills the following three tasks: 
 
(i)- It connects claims on the matters of public concerns with 
justifications, which can be of several forms, for example, narratives, 
pure syllogistic reasoning, story-telling etc.   
(ii)- It involves individuals and institutions, which reflect upon those 
claims by listening to each other’s positions. Agents involved in the 
process of political deliberation weigh those claims against the 
competing ones. 
(iii)- It induces systematic reflection in individuals’ mind who make 
claims and provide justification for their respective positions in the 
process of deliberation.           
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The above characterization of the deliberative system is abstract in 
nature. For Parkinson, this abstraction is useful if we want to apply 
deliberative theory “to a wide variety of contexts and not just the 
familiar institutions of one or other Western state. It is meant to be 
applicable to both state-focused, substate, and trans-national settings 
and to highly-institutionalized as well as ad hoc, transient, issue-based 
systems” (Parkinson, 2018, p. 3). Parkinson further argues that the 
meaning of deliberation is not fixed and it primarily depends on the 
peculiar context in which we understand deliberative mechanisms. The 
early theoretical models of deliberative democracy were criticized 
because of their limited approach to the meaning of deliberation. Both 
Sanders and Mouffe criticized deliberative theorists for privileging 
rational discussion over other forms of communication like protests, 
story-telling etc. They argue that such a strict concept of rational 
discussion is oppressive because it marginalizes those who are at 
powerless positions40. In order to combat such a critique, deliberative 
theorists attempted to extend the concept of deliberation. For example, 
Mansbridge in her famous essay, Everyday Talk and Deliberative 
System, discusses the importance of ‘everyday-talk’ in the deliberative 
encounter. She writes: 
 
“What I will call ‘everyday talk’ does not meet all of the criteria implicit 
in the ordinary use of the word ‘deliberation’. It is not always self-
conscious, reflective, or considered. But everyday talk, if not always 
deliberative, is nevertheless a crucial part of the full deliberative system 
that democracies need if citizens are, in any sense, to rule themselves. 
Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated 
public forums, talk back and forth between constituents and elected 
                                                          
4040 For details see, (Sanders, 1997) and (Mouffe, 1999). 
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representatives or other representatives in politically oriented 
organizations, talk in the media, talk among political activists, and 
everyday talk in formally private spaces about things the public ought 
to discuss—all adding up to what I call the deliberative system—people 
come to understand better what they want and need, individually as well 
as collectively. The full deliberative system encompasses all these 
strands.” 
(Mansbridge, 1999)   
 
We can see how deliberative theory has extended the concept of 
deliberation by incorporating various forms of communication. This 
expansion makes deliberative theory more inclusive in its reach and 
opens up the space to study deliberative practices that take place in the 
non-Western social/political settings. It also allows us to understand the 
local idiom that shapes deliberative mechanisms in different historical 
contexts. In expanding the reach of deliberative theory, systemic 
approach creates new opportunities for the empirical researcher on 
making sense of various communicative practices, which can induce re-
election in individuals’ minds. Everyday small talk can also bring about 
change in the mind of citizens about their political preferences. 
Mansbridge’s emphasis on the ‘everyday-talk’ also highlights the fact 
that deliberation should not be confined to designated forums. It means, 
human activities, which take place in the multitude of discursive 
networks also matter in the political process. The political system in its 
totality should be judged for its conduciveness to deliberation. 
Individual practices, which can be non-deliberative in isolation, may 
contribute in the deliberativeness of the totality of the political system.  
 
John Dryzek also argues that deliberation should not be confined to 
institution of the state. Specifically, he suggests that if we want to 
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understand deliberative mechanisms outside the Western contexts then 
we need to locate various places for the deliberative practices. In his 
article Deliberative Democracy in Different Places, which he wrote for 
the book The Search of Deliberative Democracy in China, Dryzek 
suggests that deliberative democracy can exist and flourish at three 
different locations: 
 
(i)- Institutions of the State: For Dryzek, the most traditional approach 
to organize deliberation is through state institutions. For example, 
legislatures and courts are thought be formal institutions for 
deliberation. That’s why, John Rawls considered U.S. Supreme Court 
as an exemplary deliberative institution (Rawls, 2005 , p. 231). Rawls 
believes that judges exercise ‘public reason’ in making their judgments. 
The content of their argument is framed in such a manner that it exhibits 
public reason. Legislature is another state institution where deliberation 
takes place. Unlike courts, legislatures are democratic institutions 
because representatives are elected here. In this institution deliberation 
takes place on behalf of the citizens. Ideally, the selection of 
representatives in legislatures should be a deliberative procedure. But 
the way political campaigns run these days obviously undermine the 
deliberative side of legislatures. Administration being an institution of 
the state also makes deliberation possible through different means. It 
means, there are various institutions which help us determine the 
deliberative capacity of the state. There is no universal model for the 
organization of the deliberative practices within state institutions. Bell’s 
proposal of Confucian democracy in China also exemplifies this point. 
He gives the concept of ‘meritocratic upper house’, which is a state 
institution, for a high quality public deliberation in the Chinese context 
(Bell, 2006, p. 153). He visions its political role similar to the role 
Supreme Court plays in the U.S.      
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(ii)- Designed forums: In order to bring about citizens’ opinion in the 
political domain, various discursive designs have been developed. 
These institutions foster deliberation among ordinary citizens. There 
are mainly two types of such discursive designs: 
(a)- Lay Citizen Deliberation: Lay citizens are neutral public who raise 
their voice on matters of public concerns. They do not have any 
expertise nor are they partisan towards any issue. Being neutral 
members of the general public they can approach an issue with open 
mindedness. Institutions designed for lay citizens cannot involve all 
public but they can involve a representative sample from a population 
who are affected by a particular decision. These forums provide a space 
for deliberation on a specific issue that is relevant to the public. Citizens 
receive information on the issue, they raise questions to various experts, 
and openly discuss the matter with each other. This whole process helps 
citizens to reflect upon their preferences. Consensus conferences, 
planning cells, citizens’ juries and deliberative polling are all examples 
of lay citizen deliberation. According to Dryzek, deliberative theorists 
can learn two main lessons from these institutions designed to facilitate 
lay citizen deliberation. First, ordinary citizens are able to deliberate on 
complex issues if they are given right forums to reflect upon 
social/political issues. This point is useful to understand the deliberative 
practices in the authoritarian context of China. Indeed, the Chinese case 
“strengthens deliberative theory’s confidence in citizens’ capacity, 
proving that participants are capable of certain skills, even without 
substantial access to education and information” (He, 2006, p. 194). 
Second, citizens in the designed forums change their preferences during 
the process of deliberation. This point consolidates deliberative 
theory’s basic contention that deliberation induces reflection upon 
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preferences, which brings about change in the perspective of citizens 
who are involved in the process of deliberation.    
(b)- Partisan Deliberation: In the partisan deliberation, those who 
deliberate already have a position on a policy issue. It involves 
“advocates of different positions in a policy dispute with the idea of 
building an agreement on a policy recommendation sensitive to the 
interests of all sides” (Dryzek J. S., 2006, p. 28). Designed forums that 
facilitate partisan deliberation attempt to provide an environment where 
advocates of different positions come into a dialogue. The whole 
purpose of such forums is to take out advocates from their adversarial 
confrontation (where they only fight for their respective positions) and 
make deliberation (dialogue) possible on a disputed policy issue.      
     
(iii)- The Public Sphere: Designed forums are primarily micro 
institutions that provide protected environment for deliberation. Public 
sphere, on the other hand, is a macro level analysis of the deliberative 
encounter. At a macro level, deliberation can be located in a larger 
communicative flow within the informal public sphere. Although 
public sphere involves political associations and the communicative 
flow is primarily oriented towards public affairs, but actors do not 
necessarily represent state power. Public sphere includes various kinds 
of actors such as political activists, people from the academia, social 
movements, advocacy groups, ordinary citizens, and the media. Ideally, 
public sphere facilitates critical discussion on social/political issues. 
But sometimes, discourses in public sphere are manipulated by the 
media and political organizations. Public sphere is more conducive to 
the process of deliberation than the institutions of the state. Over the 
last four decades, Dryzek argues, social issues and political alternatives 
mainly originated from the public sphere rather than the institutions of 
the state. Civil rights movements in the U.S, feminist discourse, 
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environmental politics, and anti-globalization movements all began in 
the informal public sphere. The notion of public sphere is a historical 
concept. For Habermas, that first public sphere arose in Europe in 
opposition to monarchy and theocracy (Habermas, 1989). Indeed, there 
is a consensus among political philosophers that deliberative 
democracy cannot be imagined without the public sphere. It also raises 
the questions about the application of deliberative model in the non-
Western contexts. Non-Western contexts may not necessarily have 
critical public spheres that facilitate deliberative politics. However, 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement (see chapter five) was successful because 
the informal public sphere facilitated its agenda. It means non-Western 
contexts may also facilitate political/social activism in the informal 
public sphere. 
Deliberative democracy can flourish on these three locations. And these 
locations are not mutually exclusive in nature. According to Dryzek, no 
location has priority in the political system (Dryzek J. S., 2006, p. 34). 
If we want to search deliberation in the non-Western contexts then we 
should not limit our analysis to the institutions of state. In authoritarian 
regimes, where we don’t have liberal state institutions, we should look 
more closely into the informal public sphere in order to understand 
deliberative mechanisms. This is especially true for the Pakistani case; 
the lawyers’ movement is an exemplification of deliberative moments 
in the informal public sphere of the country, which ultimately ousted an 
authoritarian regime and brought democracy in the country.  
 
In his book, Foundations and Frontiers of Global Governance, John 
Dryzek provides the concept of deliberative system, which I believe is 
more useful to understand deliberative practices in the authoritarian 
contexts. Although, Mansbridge and Parkinson acknowledge the 
importance of the systemic approach in understanding deliberative 
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practices in the authoritarian contexts, their specific analysis of 
deliberative systems, like Goodin and Hendriks, is “tied to the 
institutional details of developed liberal democracies” (Dryzek J. S., 
2010, p. 10). Similarly, Habermas’ two track model of deliberation is 
also confined to liberal constitutional states. The nature of deliberation 
in the absence of liberal political order is a complex phenomenon and 
requires further conceptualization. Dryzek’s approach to deliberative 
theory is not tied to the liberal constitutional model of democratic state. 
He takes ‘system’ as the unit of analysis in order to evaluate deliberative 
potential in any political setting. He emphasizes on the deliberative 
capacity of a system in order to determine its democratic potential41. 
For Dryzek, “a system can be said to possess deliberative capacity to 
the degree it has structures to accommodate deliberation that is 
authentic, inclusive, and consequential” (Dryzek J. S., 2010, p. 10). 
Dryzek offers a general idea of ‘deliberative system’ which is not tied 
to the institutional structures of developed liberal constitutional states. 
It can be applied to a variety of political settings including those that do 
not even contain elections, legislatures, different political parties. One 
such political setting is the autocratic context where we don’t have free 
and fair elections, free speech, etc. For Dryzek, a ‘political system’ is 
made up of the following elements: 
(i)- Public Space: It hosts a wide variety of communicative practices. It 
consists of various actors such as the media, political activists, social 
movements, and ordinary citizens. 
                                                          
41 In the chapter on Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement, I will use Dryzek’s concepts of 
‘deliberative capacity’ and ‘deliberative system’ in order to analyze the process of 
democratization in the Pakistani context. Therefore, in this section, I have not given a 
detailed explanation of these two concepts. I will briefly explain their significance to 
understand deliberative practices in the non-Western contexts.     
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(ii)- Empowered Space: Institutions that can produce collective 
decisions. In this space, deliberation takes place among actors who 
make collective decision within the institution possible. Legislatures, 
constitutional courts, policy-making bodies are some of the examples 
of empowered space. 
(iii)- Transmission: It is a process in which public space influences the 
empowered space. Different deliberative practices in the public space 
need to be connected with the empowered space. There are various 
types of mechanisms that can transmit deliberation from the public 
space to the empowered one. Most notably, political/social campaigns, 
social movements, and the use of rhetoric and new ideas for social 
causes are important ways to influence deliberation in the empowered 
space. Transmission can take various forms like “advocacy, or 
criticism, or questioning, or support, or some combination of all four” 
(Dryzek J. S., 2010, p. 11). 
(iv)- Accountability: It is a process in which empowered space provides 
answers to the public space. It helps to secure legitimacy of the 
collective decisions. Election campaigns can be one of the examples of 
this process. It may also involve simple justifications for collective 
outcomes. 
(v)- Meta-deliberation: It is deliberation about the deliberative system 
itself.  Meta-deliberation is a kind of deliberative capacity in which 
deliberative system can examine itself.  
(vi)- Decisiveness: The degree to which above five elements (in 
combination) influence collective outcomes. Decisiveness shows to 
what extent “ﬁve elements together determine the content of collective 
decisions” (Dryzek J. S., 2010, p. 11). 
 
Dryzek’s characterization of deliberative system does not presume any 
liberal state for its function. It does not require any specific institutional 
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arrangement and this approach is useful to determine deliberative 
mechanisms in various political and historical contexts. It means, 
Dryzek’s account opens up the space to understand deliberation in the 
non-western contexts; first, it is not confined to liberal constitutional 
states, and second, it also allows us to imagine various types of 
deliberative systems with different components. As he writes: 
 
“A deliberative system and its component elements do not require any 
speciﬁc institutions, be they competitive elections or a constitutional 
separation of powers. Many different sorts of deliberative system are 
possible, with many different kinds of components. So the sorts found, 
for example, in a transnational network will be different from those that 
might exist in the European Union (EU), which in turn will differ from 
those available in an adversarial Anglo-American liberal democracy, 
which will not resemble those feasible in a consensual Confucian state.” 
(Dryzek J. S., 2010, p. 13) 
       
This also shows that deliberative theory lacks any specific normative 
framework for the identification of deliberative system. The 
specification of any political setting in terms of deliberative system is 
ineluctably connected with interpretive approach. That is to say, we 
need to define and interpret political phenomena in terms of deliberative 
system. Any particular system can be interpreted as deliberative if its 
parts, whole and their interaction meet some deliberative standards. 
 
Mostly, deliberative research has restricted its scope to the Western 
world. Deliberative mechanisms in the non-Western contexts can 
enrich the normative theory of deliberative democracy. The following 
passage from Sass’ article, Deliberative Ideals across Diverse Cultures, 
echoes the same shortcoming of deliberative research: 
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 “In the scheme of history, most political deliberation has taken place 
outside the modern West. But the study of deliberation, however 
extensive it has become, has largely ignored this wider world. 
Examining how deliberation manifests across different societies has 
considerable promise for both explanatory and normative political 
theory.” 
(Sass, Deliberative Ideals Across Diverse Cultures , 2018, p. 1)    
 
For Saas, the question “why people deliberate?” is inseparable from the 
question “how people deliberate?” The second question contextualizes 
the practice of deliberation. Different comparative and historical 
contexts provide various answers to the second question. This way, he 
argues, we can learn about social/political ideals that shape deliberative 
practices. Indeed, in our global predicament, we ought to understand 
diverse ways of deliberating through which people come into a 
discourse. It means, a comprehensive view of political deliberation 
requires us to investigate its meaning in a wide variety of historical and 
particular contexts. Sass suggests that there are many advantages of 
studying deliberative practices outside the Western contexts for the 
development of political theory as an academic field (Sass, Deliberative 
Ideals Across Diverse Cultures , 2018, p. 2): 
     
(i)- It helps us to specify the meaning of deliberation in historical 
contexts. The present study of deliberation is narrow in the sense that it 
has merely focused on deliberative practices in the Western, developed, 
democratic and liberal states. It ultimately limits the scope of normative 
theory and its application in the real world political affairs. 
(ii)- Our current political predicament is global and transnational in 
nature. We need to foster cross-cultural political discourse by making 
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sense of diverse societies and states. Such a cross-cultural political 
discourse can be enriched by studying deliberative ideals in the non-
Western contexts.    
(iii)- The historical, comparative and contextual study of deliberation is 
not merely one of the topics in the academic world, “Rather, it can be 
conceived as an explanatory and practical exercise, one aimed at 
uncovering the most basic causes of deliberation with an eye to 
reinterpreting and reforming our own imperfect institutions and 
practices” (Sass, Deliberative Ideals Across Diverse Cultures , 2018, p. 
2). 
 
Deliberative democracy being a normative project is always in need of 
new empirical findings. This way, the non-Western practices of 
deliberation provide an impetus to the normative theory of deliberative 
democracy. The crucial role of culture is also an important aspect that 
helps us contextualize deliberative practices in particular contexts. 
Local practices of deliberation can be understood in cultural terms. 
Cross-cultural learning, which is now an important aspect of the 
systemic approach, broaden the scope of deliberative theory. Systemic 
approach attempts to overcome the Eurocentric presumptions of 
classical model of deliberative theory by expanding its scope. The role 
of culture, protests, social movements, rhetoric, greeting, and language 
expand the horizons of deliberative research. The case analyzed in this 
thesis (Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement) further consolidates systemic 
turn in deliberative theory and helps us to understand the role of 
deliberation in the process of democratization in the Pakistani 
authoritarian context (non-Western). Deliberative theory, in its 
systemic formulation, provides us new tools to analyze democratic 
potential in different political systems, which are not necessarily tied to 
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the institutional arrangements of Western liberal democracies. As Saas 
and Dryzek write: 
 
“Rather than take Western practices as a yardstick of democratic 
performance, we should examine democratic potential wherever it 
appears, even (perhaps especially) in seemingly unpromising contexts.” 
(Jensen Sass and John S. Dryzek, 2014, p. 20) 
 
This opening of deliberative theory towards non-Western contexts is an 
important theoretical development in the history of political 
philosophy. In chapter five, I use the theory of deliberative democracy 
to understand deliberative practices in a non-Western, authoritarian 
context. This case study in the authoritarian context not only 
strengthens the normative claims of deliberative model, but it also 
extends the current scholarship on comparative political philosophy. 
The impact of empirical studies on the development of deliberative 
theory is self-evident now. The case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement 
(chapters four and five) contributes to such a burgeoning field of 
deliberative theory and consolidates its global reach.   
 
 
                 
 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
   
118 
 
        
Chapter Five 
 
The Case of Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement 
 
This chapter introduces the case of Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement in a 
systematic way. In order to understand the role of Pakistan Lawyers’ 
Movement in the democratization process, this chapter situates it in its 
historical context. The role of courts in the democratization process has 
remained problematic in the political history of Pakistan. Historically, 
courts have always provided judicial cover and legitimized the military 
rule in Pakistan. The Lawyers’ Movement gave an opportunity to the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan to assert its deliberative capacity. Not only 
did the movement mobilize the judicial system from its lower echelons, 
it also paved the way for superior judiciary to contribute to the 
democratization process in Pakistan. Although some scholars recognize 
the role of courts and lawyers in the democratization process in 
authoritarian contexts, these studies just focus on the institutional 
conditions which lead to the democratization process. I argue that courts 
and lawyers cannot play a pro-democracy role if they merely struggle 
within formal institutional structures. They need support from the 
informal public sphere in order to develop and assert their deliberative 
capacity which is essential to the process of democratization. The 
lawyers’ movement was not merely confined to lawyers as it also 
included various civil society actors such as political parties, students, 
religious groups, women rights activists, and citizen groups. I argue that 
the success of lawyers’ movement can only be understood if we also 
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recognize the role of these other civil society actors. Civil society actors 
broadened the scope of lawyers’ movement by framing its agenda in the 
larger informal public sphere. Courts that have historically supported 
military coups were also able to assert their deliberative capacity 
because of the transmission process between informal public sphere and 
formal institutions (Supreme Court). In the next chapter, I will analyze 
deliberative capacity of the political system under authoritarian rule and 
how it led to transition to democracy in Pakistan. The existing 
scholarship on lawyers’ movement ignores the role of this movement 
in the process of democratization and merely limits itself to the 
restoration of judiciary.   
Historical Background 
The problem of the independence of judiciary should be understood 
against the backdrop of political and legal history of Pakistan. In the 
history of Pakistan, various military coups have toppled different 
governments. Since its independence in August 1947, Pakistan has been 
under military rule for more than three decades. There have been three 
military coups42 and martial law43 has been imposed on the country four 
times: “until March 2013, a civilian government had never completed a 
full term in office” ( Reema Omer and Sheila Varadan, 2013, p. 31). 
The Supreme Court has been instrumental in justifying and legitimizing 
                                                          
42 (a) From 1958 to 1971. In 1958 Major General Iskander Mirza dissolved the 
Assembly of Pakistan. General Ayub Khan, the army chief, later deposed General 
Iskander Mirza and appointed himself as the president of the country. (b) From 1977 
to 1988. In July 1977 General Zia-ul-Haq ordered the arrest of Prime Minister Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto and suspended the Constitution. He dissolved both national and provincial 
assemblies of Pakistan and imposed martial law on the country. (c) From 1999 to 
2008. In October 1999, Army General Pervez Musharraf suspended the Constitution 
and arrested Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.   
43 The martial law has been imposed four times in Pakistan. (1) October 1958; (2) 
March 1969; (3) July 1977; (4) October 1999. Every time the martial law was legally 
challenged, the Supreme Court was called upon to justify it. 
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military coups on grounds such as ‘state necessity’ or ‘revolutionary 
legality’44. Such an historical role has rendered apex court a weaker 
institution, thereby undermining the independence of judiciary. The 
principle of the separation of powers which lies at the heart of modern 
democracies could not be effective in the country. After coups, military 
rulers frequently changed the oath of office of the judges in order to 
achieve greater compliance from courts. New oaths required judges to 
swear to the military regime rather than the Constitution and those who 
refused to take new oaths were removed from their offices.  
Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement should be understood in this 
authoritarian context of military power. From 1999 to 2008 Pakistan 
was under military rule. In October 1999 General Pervez Musharraf, 
the Chief of Army Staff, suspended the Constitution and overthrew the 
government of Nawaz Sharif in a military coup. He declared the state 
of emergency45 in the country and issued the Provisional Constitutional 
Order (PCO)46. Through PCO, he suspended the federal and provincial 
assemblies and appointed himself as Chief Executive of the country. 
Moreover, all courts were disallowed to raise questions about the 
legality of military regime. After three months, General Musharraf 
issued an order which asked all judges to swear upon new oaths to the 
military regime47. A majority of judges of the Supreme Court and High 
                                                          
44 . IBAHRI report, A Long March to Justice: A report on judicial independence and 
integrity in Pakistan. For details see ( Martin Lau, Justice Aly Mokhtar, Siobhan 
Mullally, Phillip Tahmindjis, 2009, p. 5) 
45 On 14th October, 1999 General Pervez Musharraf issued the ‘Proclamation of 
Emergency’ which held the Constitution in abeyance.  
46 Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999, 15 October 1999, accessed at: 
http://www. 
supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/JR_Constitution_Petition_No._15_17-
24_and_512_ of_2002.pdf 
47 This practice was not new in Pakistan. In 1981 General Zia issued a similar order 
in which all judges were required to take new oaths and be loyal to the military regime 
rather than the Constitution.   
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Courts took new oaths and swore their loyalty to the military regime48. 
A few judges49 who refused to pledge their loyalty to the military rule 
were immediately dismissed from their offices. In 2000, the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan legitimated the military regime on grounds of the 
‘doctrine of necessity’50. As ICJ report states that “the Court’s ruling 
relied on its interpretation of the ‘doctrine of necessity,’ which it held 
permitted the Constitution to be suspended when it is deemed 
‘necessary’ in the interest of the State and for the welfare of the 
people”51. This way General Musharraf managed to validate his 
unconstitutional acts and authoritarian rule in Pakistan. At the cost of 
judicial independence, favors extended to military rulers by the apex 
court over the last five decades resulted in the weak legal system in 
Pakistan. Moreover, it has also rendered military as the most powerful 
institution in the country which also overwhelmingly intervened in the 
periods of civilian rule. As Anil Kalhan states:     
“Pakistan’s military, which has seized power in several coups, has 
engaged in a recurring, iterative process of transformative 
preservation, by which its own power and that of its affiliated interests 
have been extended and entrenched into periods of civilian rule. 
Historically, law and courts have been central to this process. When the 
military has seized power, the judiciary has validated those 
interventions, enabling constitutional shifts that preserve the military’s 
                                                          
48 The prominent judges who took new oaths included Justice Rana Bhagwandas, 
Justice Falak Sher, Justice Khalil-ur-Rehman Ramday, Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja, 
Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry.   
49 Judges who refused to take new oaths included the then Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid, Justice Mamoon Kazi, 
Justice Wajeehuddin Ahmed, Justice Kamal Mansoor Alam and Justice Khalilur 
Rehman.   
50 For details, see Zafar Ali Shah v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2000 SC 869). 
51 See ICJ report, “Authority without accountability: The search for justice in 
Pakistan” at page 32.  
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dominance. But even when civilian rule has formally returned, the 
judiciary has played a comparable role in facilitating the military’s 
continued political influence. The result has been a persistent 
institutional disequilibrium: a politicized judiciary periodically has 
been empowered to assert its autonomy from weak representative 
institutions, but simultaneously has remained largely vulnerable to 
constraints by a dominant military and its affiliated interests.” 
(Kalhan, 2013, pp. 10-1) 
Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement arose in this backdrop of authoritarian 
dominance when the Supreme Court started to challenge the military 
rule in the country.  
 
Phase-1: Supreme Court Prior to March 2007  
The lawyers’ movement started when General Musharraf, the Army 
Chief, suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on 
charges of misconduct. General Pervez Musharraf appointed Iftikhar 
Muhammad Chaudhry as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan on 30th June 2005. It is “ironic that the ultimate challenge that 
Musharraf faced, which eventually led to his resignation, came from 
none other than the Chief Justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, who 
as a judge of the Supreme Court between 2000–2005, sat on the four 
pivotal benches that actually validated military takeover by General 
Musharraf, his referendum, his Legal Framework Order and the 17th 
Constitutional Amendment: that gave General Musharraf additional 
powers as President, and allowed him to continue as the army chief. 
Justice Chaudhry voted with the majority on each bench” (Azmat 
Abbas and Saima Jasam, 2009, p. 149). During Chaudhry’s tenure, the 
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Supreme Court began to assert its independence and created problems 
for General Musharraf’s military rule. It came as a surprise when the 
Chief Justice, who legitimated Musharraf’s unconstitutional acts, used 
judicial power to confront the military regime. According to Ghias, 
Musharraf’s model of economic liberalization created the space for 
‘public interest litigation’ in areas such as urban development, 
deregulation, and privatization, which for the first time threatened the 
authoritarian rule of military in Pakistan (Ghias, 2012, p. 346). The 
Supreme Court’s expansion of judicial power by means of ‘public 
interest litigation’ involved Court’s original jurisdiction, suo motu 
powers, under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan. According 
to Article 184(3), “the Supreme Court may assume original jurisdiction 
of any matter of public importance relating to the enforcement of 
Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Constitution”52. The practice of 
‘public interest litigation’ was not new in Pakistan but the way it was 
executed during the tenure of Chaudhry began to expose the 
unconstitutional acts of Musharraf, thereby threatening the military 
rule. Suo motu actions prior to 2007, which attempted to delegitimize 
the military regime were related to the following issues53:             
(1) Urban planning and construction  
(2) Deregulation of commodity pricing mechanism  
(3) Privatization of state enterprises  
(4) Illegal detention by security agencies  
                                                          
52 See ICJ report, “Authority without accountability: The search for justice in 
Pakistan” at page 32. 
53 For a detailed analysis of suo motu cases between 2005 and 2007 which challenged 
the legitimacy of authoritarian rule and provided impetus to the lawyers’ movement, 
see (Ghias, 2012, pp. 345-50) 
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(5) Constitutional questions concerning the forthcoming presidential 
elections. 
The Supreme Court’s use of judicial power was a challenge to the 
authoritarian rule because it “nullified the actions of the government 
and caused it some embarrassment at a time when the military regime 
was gearing up to manage yet another phase of transitional elections” 
(Cheema, 2016). These factors led to General Musharraf’s dislike for 
both the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice.  
Phase-2: Suspension of the Chief Justice: Mobilization of 
Lawyers for the Independence of Judiciary 
Supreme Court’s use of ‘public interest litigation’ and its assertiveness 
concerning the independence of judiciary became a challenge to the 
authoritarian rule in Pakistan. On 9th March, 2007, General Musharraf 
called the Chief Justice of Pakistan to his official residence. He charged 
the Chief Justice of misconduct and misuse of authority and forced him 
to resign from his post54. The military wanted to install a superior 
judiciary which could legitimize its extra-constitutional activities. Chief 
Justice Chaudhry did not accept General Musharraf’s allegations and 
declined to resign from his post because such a demand was not a legal 
course of action. When the Chief Justice left the Army House, his 
protocol was taken away and he was detained with his family members 
in his house. General Musharraf suspended the Chief Justice and started 
disciplinary proceedings against him: “this was not the first time that a 
Chief Justice had been removed from the office by a military dictator. 
The same had occurred on three earlier occasions: Chief Justice of 
                                                          
54 According to the Constitution of Pakistan, the President cannot dismiss the Chief 
Justice of Pakistan. President can only file a reference in the Supreme Judicial Council 
against the Chief justice which has authority to decide on the suspension.  
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Pakistan Muhammad Yaqub Ali Khan was removed in 1977 by General 
Zia-ul-Haq; Chief Justice Sheikh Anwarul Haq was removed from the 
office in 1981, while in the year 2000, Chief Justice Saeeduz Zaman 
Siddiqui was removed from office by General Pervez Musharraf” 
(Azmat Abbas and Saima Jasam, 2009, p. 154). Unlike past judges, 
Chaudhry Iftikhar retaliated against the authoritarian rule and 
challenged his dismissal in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. While he 
was fighting a legal battle with the military rule “the Chief Justice 
Chaudhry was denied access to legal counsel and his communications 
were closely monitored. The Supreme Judicial Council issued a public 
statement ‘ordering’ Chief Justice Chaudhry to cease functioning in his 
role as Chief Justice and a judge of the Supreme Court until the 
allegations of misconduct against him could be investigated”55. 
Chaudhry’s refusal to resign was a shudder for a General of the country 
where the army has enjoyed a high degree of discretion from judiciary 
and legislative. It was a radical break in the political history of Pakistan.  
Soon after the forced dismissal of Chaudhry Iftikhar from the post of 
Chief Justice, the public reaction was negative and the lawyers began 
to protest immediately after this event against the illegal and 
unconstitutional dismissal of judges from their positions. Within a very 
short span of time, Chaudhry Iftikhar, from being just a jurist, 
transformed into a folk hero and a torchbearer for the people of 
Pakistan. His principled stance got him popularity among various civil 
society actors and Pakistani lawyers started to mobilize against military 
rule. Pakistani lawyers announced a three day protest and complete 
country-wide strike of the courts in order to condemn the attack on the 
independence of judiciary. Rallies were organized all over the country 
                                                          
55 See ICJ report, “Authority without accountability: The search for justice in 
Pakistan” at page 34. 
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to reinstate the Chief Justice. On 13th March 2007, when Chaudhry tried 
to reach the office of the Supreme Judicial Council to fight his 
unconstitutional suspension, a large community of Pakistani lawyers 
gathered at the Constitutional Avenue in his support. Musharraf did not 
want this to happen and “the police tried to stop the Chief Justice from 
moving towards the Supreme Court and blocked his way, manhandling 
him, pulling him by his hair and forcing him in a car. The images were 
broadcast live on the television channels, and the next day every 
newspaper carried the picture of an official of Islamabad police pulling 
the Chief Justice by his hair, on the front page. The live coverage of 
events drew the annoyance of the government, and the backlash came 
within days: the police entered the office of a television channel in 
Islamabad on March 16, 2007, causing huge losses to the infrastructure 
and injuries to the staff, effectively disrupting the live coverage of the 
police action on a protest rally” (Azmat Abbas and Saima Jasam, 2009, 
pp. 154-5). These acts of the military regime brought Chief Justice’s 
suspension to the public attention. Lawyers decided to organize 
seminars and rallies in order to influence public opinion about the 
illegitimacy of authoritarian rule. While a legal team was representing 
Chaudhry Iftikhar in the Supreme Court in order to challenge 
Musharraf’s reference, various bar councils invited Chaudhry to give 
talks on topics such as the rule of law, supremacy of the constitution, 
separation of powers, importance of democracy and the independence 
of judiciary. The military regime was against such a development 
within the legal community because it was politicizing a legal issue. 
The Supreme Court56 also accepted Chaudhry Iftikhar’s petition “due 
to the pressure of events that occurred between 6 March and July 2007 
                                                          
56 A full bench of thirteen members of the Supreme Court accepted Chaudhry’s 
petition.  
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through the highly popular Lawyer’s Movement” (Azeem, 2017, p. 
243). After getting momentum, the lawyers mobilized for the 
independence of judiciary in street protests. Although at this time 
lawyers’ mobilization had become a kind of social movement but still 
it was mainly confined to the lawyers. However, through constant 
media coverage it also got sympathy from the general public. Due to 
lawyers’ movement and huge public support, on 20th July, 2007, 
Chaudhry Iftikhar was reinstated by a 13-member bench of the Supreme 
Court to his post of the Chief Justice of Pakistan57. This step was a 
radical departure from Pakistan’s judicial history in which a Chief 
Justice was restored after getting dismissed by a military dictator. The 
restoration of the Chief Justice was celebrated in terms of the 
independence of judiciary and the rule of law in the country: 
“It was the first time ever in Pakistan’s judicial history that a judge 
removed by a military dictator was back in office, and that too at a time 
when the dictator who threw him out of office was still in ‘command’. 
The restoration of the Chief Justice was celebrated jubilantly 
throughout the country and what pleased people the most was the 
manner in which the Supreme Court had asserted its independence.” 
(Azmat Abbas and Saima Jasam, 2009, p. 157) 
 
Phase-3: The State of Emergency 
The Chief Justice Chaudhry Iftikhar resumed his duties from 21st July, 
2007. The agenda of lawyers’ movement was not merely to restore the 
                                                          
57  For details see, Chaudhry Iftikhar v. President of Pakistan, Const. Pet. 21 of 2007 
(Pak. July 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/events/cjp_ref_2007/sc_ref_order.ht
ml. 
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Chief Justice of Pakistan but also to promote political liberalization in 
the country. It stressed on both independence of judiciary and limits on 
powers of the executive. That is why, after reinstatement, the Chief 
Justice “could not abandon the movement that had rescued him and 
enabled him to stand up to Musharraf. The lawyers and the media were 
now demanding the Supreme Court’s intervention in the forthcoming 
presidential election in October 2007” (Ghias, 2012, p. 365).  The 
Supreme Court of Pakistan began a phase of ‘judicial activism’ and it 
was largely seen as a positive development. According to the 
Constitution of Pakistan, there are limits on military personnel on 
holding the public office. Since 2002, General Musharraf held both 
offices, that is, he was the Chief of Army Staff and the President of the 
country at the same time. The former is a military post while the latter 
is a civil post. Previously, General Musharraf managed to amend the 
Constitution in order to hold these positions. Pakistani Supreme Court 
had also helped him to make these changes when he became president 
for the first time. Now, his tenure was going to end in October 2007 and 
he still wanted another five years to hold both positions. Various civil 
society actors, opposition political parties and lawyers had already filed 
petition against General Musharraf concerning the issue of holding dual 
offices. Out of fear of an unfavorable verdict, General Musharraf 
imposed emergency on 3rd November, 200758. He sacked all judges of 
the higher judiciary and issued a Provisional Constitutional Order59. 
According to Provisional Constitutional Order, basic rights were 
suspended and judges were required to take fresh oath. The judiciary 
launched a revolt against this PCO and refused to take new oaths. All 
                                                          
58 The Emergency was a kind of martial law because it suspended the Constitution of 
Pakistan. See (Ghias, 2012, p. 369) . 
59 (Proclamation of Emergency Act, 2008, Federal Statutes 108); and (Provisional 
Constitutional Order 1 of 2007, PLD 2008 Federal Statutes 110). 
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those judges who refused to take new oaths were dismissed from their 
positions. It is interesting to note how Musharraf made the point that 
the judiciary was creating problems for the transition to democracy, 
which is why PCO was necessary. As Azeem states: 
“The Proclamation of Emergency by General Musharraf on 3 
November was against the judiciary disturbing law and order in itself, 
interfering with government policy, affecting economic growth, 
ordering the release of terrorists and hence outstepping the limits of 
judicial authority. General Musharraf claimed the judiciary was 
eroding the trichotomy of power and disturbing his so-called ‘third 
phase of transition to full democracy’.”   
(Azeem, 2017, p. 244) 
Moreover, the judges who refused to take fresh oaths were placed under 
house arrest60. Through proclamation of Emergency, the military 
regime did not merely target judiciary but also lawyers, journalists, and 
civil society actors who were exposing the oppressive apparatus of the 
authoritarian rule. Around five thousands lawyers and activists were 
sent to the prison; the regime also restrained the freedom of media and 
closed down a number of television channels61. Such a crackdown of 
the military regime paved the way for a broader mobilization of 
                                                          
60 43 judges refused to take fresh oaths. It is an important fact that over the last four 
decades the dissent by the judiciary is on increase: “For instance in 1977, only one 
judge was removed from the office under the martial law, compared to sixteen judges 
that were removed under the Provisional Constitution Order 1981. In the year 2000, 
the military government removed thirteen judges under the PCO 2000, and when a 
state of Emergency was imposed on November 3, 2007, and judges were required to 
take a fresh oath under the PCO 2007, as many as 43 judges of the High Courts and 
Supreme Court declined” (Azmat Abbas and Saima Jasam, 2009, p. 161).  
61 For example, see (National Lawyers Guild and LUMS Rule of Law Project 2008); 
(Human Rights Watch 2007); (Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority 
Ordinance 2007); Press, Newspapers, News Agencies and Books Registration 
Ordinance 2007).  
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lawyers, journalists, human rights activists, political parties, students, 
and several other civil society actors. By this time, the lawyers’ 
movement was not merely confined to lawyers and it had become a kind 
of social movement with the following agendas: 
(a) Independence of judiciary  
(b) Rule of law  
(c) Restoration of democracy  
(d) Social justice (The phenomenon of ‘public interest litigation’ 
facilitated this narrative) 
Some segments of the society criticized this movement for being 
partisan. In this phase, the lawyers’ movement was a “political struggle 
to the core” and it was not engaged in any kind of partisan politics62. 
Moreover, the Bar Associations are primarily professional 
organizations “with diverse political opinions and it was argued their 
unity meant that no political party was backing any of them… Chief 
Justice Munir stated that the lawyer’s movement did not invite political 
parties but parties joined for their own agendas” (Azeem, 2017, p. 247). 
Ultimately, pressure built on General Musharraf not only from the 
lawyers’ movement but also from other high officials within the 
military and US. He was forced to step down from the post of the Chief 
of Army Staff so that he could remain President of the country. 
Musharraf’s resignation from the post of Army Chief was considered a 
success of the movement. He subsequently lifted the state of Emergency 
in December 2007 and assured that general elections will be held as per 
schedule in 2008.                 
                                                          
62 Munir A Malik in “Not Motivated by Politics”, Dawn (11 May 2007). Munir rejects 
the allegations of the politicization of judiciary.  
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Phase-4: Lawyers’ Movement during Civilian Rule         
On 18th February 2008, general elections were held in Pakistan. 
Pakistan People’s Party won the election and came into power. Before 
election, Asif Zardari, the Co-Chairman of Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP), made an agreement with another major political party, Pakistan 
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), to restore judiciary within a month 
after the formation of a new government63. However, after the 
formation of federal government in March 2008, Zardari was hesitant 
to restore the judges because “he was interested in seeing the criminal 
charges against him removed and to get rid of the condition of 
graduation for his election to the national assembly” (Azeem, 2017, p. 
249). Irrespective of the fact that public sympathy was with Chaudhry 
Iftikhar, Asif Zardari did not bother to reinstate the judges. Perhaps the 
fear that after re-joining his office, Chaudhry would declare the NRO64 
—which had actually immunized him from all corruption charges— 
unconstitutional, prevented him from restoring the judges. Both 
Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) 
supported the lawyers’ movement for the independence of judiciary. 
Moreover, this factor helped them in winning seats in the general 
election but “time proved that it was not only the military but also the 
                                                          
63 Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) were the two main 
political parties contesting General Elections 2008. The leadership of both political 
parties was in exile during Musharraf’s military rule. This agreement is called Murree 
Declaration and it was made on 3rd November, 2007. For detail, see (Azeem, 2017, p. 
249); (Cheema, 2016, pp. 450-7). 
64 National Reconciliation Order (NRO) was a controversial deal between Benazir 
Bhutto and Musharraf in October, 2007. In this deal, Musharraf granted amnesty to 
Pakistan People’s Party leaders on corruption charges. This document also facilitated 
Musharraf’s presidential election. NRO was a controversial document and was 
challenged in the courts. Imran Khan, leader of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) 
considered it as a betrayal to judiciary. For details, see “The News, ‘Democracy 
Betraying Judiciary for NRO: Imran” 
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political governments that were not comfortable with the idea of a 
judiciary independent of executive control. And hence, the struggle for 
a true democratic set up was far from over” (Azmat Abbas and Saima 
Jasam, 2009, p. 163). Due to reluctance of the new government to 
restore the deposed judges, lawyers decided to continue with their 
movement and struggle for the independence of judiciary. In June 2008, 
leaders of the lawyers’ movement decided to protest in the capital city 
Islamabad against the democratic government for the restoration of 
judges. Around 100,000 demonstrators came to Islamabad in order to 
protest against the government for not fulfilling its promises. At this 
time, some cracks also began to appear within the lawyers’ movement. 
The leadership of the movement was divided and its main leaders called 
off the protests on grounds of security: “this proved to be a highly 
unpopular and controversial decision, and it destabilized the movement 
by taking the wind out of its sails. The leadership insisted that it had the 
safety of the protesters in mind, but movement activists had taken the 
call of a dharna (sit-in) till restoration seriously, and were angry at 
having to go back home empty-handed” (Shafqat, 2017, pp. 8-9). Due 
to heavy pressure, Musharraf also resigned from his post of President 
and the Co-Chairman of Pakistan People’s Party, Asif Zardari, became 
new President of the country. After presidential election, the PPP-led 
government tried to dismantle lawyers’ movement. Like Musharraf, it 
also attempted to constrain judiciary by various tactics. It convinced 
several judges to take new oaths, thereby dividing the movement for its 
own benefits. Asif Zardari said that the new democratic government 
was formed to provide basic necessities to the public and not to restore 
the judges. Azeem describes Zardari’s reluctance to restore the 
judiciary in the following way: 
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“Zardari made it clear that the mandate was given to the PPP for Roti, 
Kapra aur Makan (food, clothes and houses), and not to restore the 
judges. He called the Murree Declaration a political statement and 
made clear that he had been in jail for eight years, a victim of the 
judiciary. He said the Supreme Court reverted back a case against him 
to the accountability court, though he had already served the sentence. 
He even denied the fact that the change that took place in the country 
was due to the historic ‘no’ of the deposed Supreme Court Chief Justice 
and the subsequent lawyers’ movement, which resulted in lawyers 
having their legs broken. He even noted that international powers were 
behind the return of democracy in Pakistan. He reminded the public 
that Benazir Bhutto was not in favour of restoring the judiciary” 
(Azeem, 2017, p. 250) 
The government adopted a pragmatic policy by redefining the limits of 
judicial independence. Rather than reinstating ousted judges to their 
previous positions, it started their reappointment under new oaths, 
which curtailed power of the higher judiciary in a significant manner. 
Although this strategy gave advantages to the democratic government 
but it still undermined independence of the judiciary under civilian rule. 
The PPP-led government also offered a package for some constitutional 
amendments, which would have restored ousted judges but also 
constrained judicial independence. Such an attitude of the government 
created a divide between Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim 
League-Nawaz. The latter65 aligned with the lawyers’ movement and 
started to protest against government for its refusal to restore the judges. 
Lawyers decided to hold a Long March with other opposition political 
parties and civil society actors to protest against the government until 
                                                          
65 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was in opposition.  
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Chaudhry Iftikhar and other judges were completely restored. Asif 
Zardari used the same authoritarian tactics to sabotage the lawyers’ 
movement by using higher judiciary to curtail democratic forces. As 
Zahid Shahab Ahmed states: 
“President Zardari soon began to engage in the same authoritarian 
tendencies that he had earlier condemned. In early 2009, as the lawyers 
planned another march to Islamabad which this time was promised to 
end with a mass sit-in in the city centre, Zardari attacked his rival. On 
25 February, the Supreme Court, now led by Chief Justice Abdul 
Hameed Dogar, a Zardari-appointee, issued a ruling that disqualiﬁed 
Nawaz Sharif and his brother, Shahbaz Sharif (Chief Minister of 
Punjab), from holding or contesting public ofﬁce on the grounds that 
they had been earlier convicted of crimes. Zardari, seeking to curtail 
PML-N control over the powerful Punjab province, imposed the 
Governor Rule in Punjab, bringing the formerly autonomous province 
under federal control”. 
(Ahmed, 2010 , p. 501)           
On 12th March 2009, lawyers with other political parties and civil 
society actors began a Long March to Islamabad. Around 200,000 
demonstrators were expected to sit-in until the restoration of all ousted 
judges. This time, government was put under huge pressure from the 
army, USA and senior leadership within its own party to accept the 
demands of the lawyers’ movement. The government had no choice but 
to restore all sacked judges to their previous positions. It was considered 
the greatest victory of the movement which rendered judiciary an 
independent institution with its power to implement rule of law in the 
country.  
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From the outset, the lawyers’ movement was not about the restoration 
of democracy but about the protection of legal community’s 
professional and institutional interests (Zaidi, 2008). However, the 
progression of this movement in phase three made the lawyers realize 
that independence of judiciary was not possible without the democratic 
form of government. The principle of the separation of powers, which 
lawyers wanted to protect, is integral to democracy. Moreover, lawyers 
alone were not able to establish the rule of law and they needed support 
from the informal public sphere in which people could reflect upon 
political issues. In the next chapter, I will analyze the role of lawyers’ 
movement in the process of democratization in Pakistan. The case of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement presented in this chapter will be utilized 
in order to understand deliberative practices in the autocratic Pakistani 
context.              
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Chapter Six 
 
Deliberation and Democratization in the Non-
Western Context: An Analysis of Pakistan 
Lawyers’ Movement 
 
Most democratization studies focus on democratization from above and 
social movements within established democracies in the West. Contrary 
to this trend, I focus on democratization from below in a non-Western 
and non-democratic context. The lawyers’ movement helps us to 
understand the process of democratization in an authoritarian context. 
It makes transition to democracy possible in the Pakistani context. In 
what follows, I will first discuss the gap in the literature on 
democratization studies, which mainly focuses on free and fair 
elections, structural preconditions and elites’ role. The mainstream 
research on democratization ignores the role of both deliberation and 
social movements in authoritarian contexts, which I argue merits 
academic attention. The role of social movements and deliberative 
practices in authoritarian regimes is an important aspect in order to 
understand the process of democratization in the Pakistani non-
democratic context. This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 
one deals with the mainstream literature on different theories of 
democratization. In this section, I also discuss how the main theories of 
democratization ignore the role of deliberative practices in their 
approach. Section two analyzes Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement in the 
context of recent developments in deliberative theory. Specifically, I 
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discuss the importance of the systemic approach in understanding the 
process of democratization in Pakistan. The Pakistani context presents 
a case study to understand the reach and application of deliberative 
theory in the non-Western context.    
     
1- Theories of Democratization 
The meaning of democratization was presumed in the initial studies of 
1970s and 1980s. In these early studies, democratization was 
understood “simply a transformation of the political system from non-
democracy towards accountable and representative government” 
(Grugel, 2002, p. 3). Moreover, these studies relied on a process-
oriented approach in order to explain the mechanisms and conditions 
that make democratization possible in the political system. They also 
distinguished between transition and consolidation. Transition marks 
the beginning of a democratic process in which political activities are 
fluid and democracy is not fully assured, whereas consolidation is the 
success of democratic politics in which democracy becomes “the only 
game in town” (Linz, J. and A. Stepan, 1996, p. 5). The process-oriented 
approach does not clearly convey the meaning of ‘democratization’. 
Indeed, the literature on democratization suggests that there is no 
consensus on its definition and it is, like democracy, an essentially 
contested concept. Grugel, in elucidating the complex and fluid nature 
of the concept of democratization, states: 
“Democratization has been conceptualized as a discourse, a demand, a 
set of institutional changes, a form of elite domination, a political 
system dependent on popular control, an exercise in power politics and 
a demand for global solidarity—and this is by no means an exhaustive 
list. It has been analyzed from the perspective of political theory, 
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comparative politics, international relations, sociology, cultural studies 
and political economy. It has been thought of as a discrete set of 
sequential changes achieved in a few years, as a series of open-ended 
struggles and a transformation of deep structures or as an unobtainable 
utopia.” 
(Grugel, 2002, p. 4)             
Many political scientists construe democratization as a continuum from 
the lowest level to the highest level. They determine the quality of 
democratization by positioning the regime on different points on the 
continuum. According to its minimal concept, democratization is 
understood as the regular holding of ‘free and fair elections’. 
Normatively, until the end of 20th century, political theorists assumed 
democracy in terms of liberal democratic order in the comparative 
studies on democratization.  
 
(i)- The Wave Theory 
Wave theory explains the process of democratization in its historical 
perspective. Democracy unfolded gradually in different countries 
across the globe. The process of democratization was non-linear and 
multiple causes gave rise to this phenomenon. For example, the driving 
force of democratization in the 19th century was class, whereas, social 
conflict and state-building were the main factors in the 1980s. Wave 
theory categorizes group experiences in terms of distinct waves over 
the last two hundred years. There are some common causes in which 
various countries can be linked together in the process of their 
democratization. Historically, democratization was a complex 
phenomenon and various factors contributed to its success and failure. 
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According to Huntington, in some countries, where democratic 
consolidation failed or collapsed, waves of democratization were 
followed by authoritarian rule. The following passage delineates 
Huntington’s concept of wave theory: 
“A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a speciﬁed 
period of time and that signiﬁcantly outnumber transitions in the 
opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also involves 
liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not 
become fully democratic. Each of the ﬁrst two waves of 
democratization was followed by a reverse wave in which some but not 
all of the countries that had previously made the transition to democracy 
reverted to nondemocratic rule.” 
(Huntington S. P., 1991, pp. 15-6)        
From the beginning of 19th century to the 1930s, the long wave to 
democratization began and democratic states gradually grew across the 
globe. Although liberal democracy was a dominant form of democracy 
during this time, nevertheless, it was challenged by socialist democracy 
in which popular rule was linked with socialist economy. The major 
challenge to both liberal democracy and communism was fascism. 
Indeed, the first wave of democratization ended because of the rise of 
fascism in Europe. Specifically, “Fascist seizures of power in Italy and 
Germany brought the ﬁrst wave to a close” (Grugel, 2002, p. 33). 
Huntington argues that from late 1920s to early 1940s, a reverse wave 
spread in which new democracies returned “to traditional forms of 
authoritarian rule or the introduction of new mass-based, more brutal 
and pervasive forms of totalitarianism” (Huntington S. , 1991, p. 17). 
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For Huntington, communist, fascist and militaristic ideologies were 
responsible for such regime changes across the globe.  
A second shorter wave of democratization began during World War II. 
Allied occupation powers started the democratization process by 
introducing various democratic institutions in Germany, Italy, Austria, 
Japan, and Korea66. After World War II, Turkey and Greece also moved 
towards democracy and some countries in Latin America, such as Brazil 
and Costa Rica, also began to consolidate democratic institutions. 
Moreover, the end of Western colonial rule gave rise to new states, 
which also became part of the second wave of democratization. For 
Huntington, the process of “decolonization after the Second World War 
further enlarged the number of democracies” (Grugel, 2002, p. 33). The 
second wave was a shorter period of democratization because it was 
followed by a second reverse wave in the early 1960s. For example, in 
Pakistan67, after ten years of independence, military took over the 
control and democratic institutions began to decline. In the late 1950s, 
political upheavals led to authoritarian rule. Huntington argues that the 
regime transition towards authoritarianism “was most dramatic in Latin 
America” (Huntington S. , 1991, p. 19). In countries like Peru, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, various military coups took 
place which ultimately weakened the pro-democracy forces and 
strengthened authoritarian rule. Similar events of military coups also 
took place in Asia. The second reverse wave did not merely give rise to 
authoritarian rule across the globe, but it also challenged the 
applicability of democracy in the developing world.  
                                                          
66 After the defeat of Axis powers in 1945, American, British and French allied powers 
initiated this democratization process in occupied territories.   
67 In 1958, ten years after its independence (1947), a first military coup took place in 
Pakistan which threatened the development of democratic institutions. For details, see 
chapter five on lawyers’ movement.  
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The third wave of democratization began with the end of dictatorship 
in Portugal in 1974. Authoritarian regimes were replaced by democratic 
rule in almost thirty countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. And 
in various other authoritarian regimes liberalization took place. 
Different movements for the promotion of democracy were also 
strengthened across the globe during the third wave of democratization. 
For Huntington, the third wave to democratization was a global 
movement in its scope. Wave theory helps us to understand the causes 
of both democratization and its reversal. This is not to say that there 
was one global cause behind democratization, rather, the metaphor of 
wave delineates global trends and factors which make democratic 
consolidation possible. Huntington outlines five important factors in the 
third wave of democratization: 
1- The political problem of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes. 
Authoritarian systems were heavily depended on performance 
legitimacy. Poor economic performances undermined 
authoritarian rule in various regimes. Apart from economic 
performances, military defeat was also another factor which 
delegitimized various authoritarian rule in countries such as 
Portugal, Greece and Argentina.     
2- Global economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, specifically in 
the developing countries68, raised standards of living and 
                                                          
68 The economic boom of the 1960s made transition to democracy possible, especially 
in developing countries. Huntington states: “The 1950s and 1960s were years of 
impressive global economic growth, particularly among less developed countries. 
Between 1950 and 1975 per capita GNP of the developing countries grew at an 
average rate of 3.4 percent per year, a rate that ‘exceeded both official goals and 
private expectations’. This rate was historically unprecedented for both the developing 
countries and for the developed countries. In the 1960s, the ‘decade of development’, 
the annual GNP growth rates of the developing countries averaged well over 5 percent, 
generally more than twice the rates of European countries during their comparable 
phases of economic development.” (Huntington S. P., 1991, p. 61) 
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education. It also paved the way for industrialization which 
contributed positively in the process of democratization. The 
supporters of democratization during the third wave were 
mainly from the middle classes which benefited from the 
economic boom of the 1960s.    
3- Liberalization of the Catholic Church also challenged 
authoritarianism. After the second Vatican Council (1963–
1965), national churches and church leaders acted as advocates 
of reform.  
4- New policies of the European Union and US also endorsed 
democratization and human rights. The advocacy of democracy 
became their main agenda, which ultimately strengthened the 
third wave of democratization. 
5- Demonstration effects, or snowballing also contributed in the 
democratization process. Due to the growth of communication 
networks across the globe, successful democratization of 
various countries encouraged others to promote democracy to 
reach similar benefits, or to address the same political problems 
in similar manner. 
The wave theory situates the process of democratization in the global 
context and attempts to delineate various factors for its consolidation 
and reversal. It is a useful way to understand the historical development 
of both democracy and democratization over the last two hundred years.  
 
(ii)- Modernization Theory  
Modernization theory, like other theories of democratization, primarily 
deals with the identification and explanation of causes and factors, 
which lead to the emergence of democratic states. According to 
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Giddens, modernity is essentially a globalizing phenomenon, which 
creates one uniform culture (Giddens, 1990). Modernization theory 
attempts to spell out the intrinsic relationship between democratization 
and globalization. The spread of democracy across the globe is 
unfolding of the universal ideal of progress stemming from modernity 
and enlightenment. Modernity brought about socio-economic changes 
in Western societies, which paved the way for democratization of 
polities. In his article, Some Social Requisites of Democracy, Lipset 
emphasizes on the intrinsic relationship between socio-economic 
development and democracy. On the basis of sociological and 
behavioral standpoint, Lipset’s modernization theory attempts to spell 
out determinants and requisites for democracy. He argues that the 
positive relationship between democracy and economic conditions goes 
back to Aristotle. He writes: 
“The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy. From Aristotle down to the present, men have 
argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens 
lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the 
population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop 
the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of 
irresponsible demagogues.” 
(Lipset S. M., 1959, p. 75) 
According to modernization theory, democracy is essentially an 
outcome of capitalism. Modernity, for Lipset, was a universal 
experience that would lead to similar societies and states across the 
globe. In modernization theory, economic growth stands in a causal 
relation to progress and “all countries will eventually follow the 
Western itinerary towards prosperity and democracy” (Jørgen Møller 
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and Svend-Erik Skaaning, 2013, p. 97). There are a number of social 
conditions leading from economic growth to democracy: 
1- Level of education increases with prosperity. Higher level of 
education in society increases social norms, such as tolerance 
and rational discussion. 
2- Economic development does not merely give rise to middle 
class but it also strengthens the civil society. 
3- The process of modernization, with its global aim for progress, 
also consolidates secularism and weakens the traditional 
ideological identities, which are impediments to democracy.  
4- Lipset also assumes that capitalism aims to diminish class 
conflict. 
5- Industrialization and urbanization are integral to economic 
development, which in turn help transform traditional societies 
into modern ones. 
Modernization theory regards above social conditions essential to the 
democratization process. For Lipset, such conditions do not just lead to 
the emergence of new democracies but they also help sustain existing 
democratic states. These conditions also help masses to mobilize for 
collective actions in modern societies, which in turn sustains the 
democratic process. Walt Rostow’s (Rostow, 1960) work on 
development economics further strengthens Lipset’s modernization 
theory. He also construes economic development as an essential factor 
which made transition from traditional society to modern possible. He 
identifies “a lineal path for economic development along deﬁned 
‘stages’, as they were termed, until capitalism was achieved. These 
‘stages’ were: the traditional society; the pre-take-off society; take-off; 
the road to maturity; and the mass consumption society (Grugel, 2002, 
p. 48)”. In 1960s, scholars working on the relationship between political 
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culture and democratization also strengthened Lipset’s argument by 
relating economic growth and democracy with that of modernity69. 
These thinkers relate the development of democracy with a certain kind 
of political culture, which emerges because of the process of 
modernization. In short, modernization theory considers economic 
development decisive to the democratization of a regime.  
 
(iii)- Historical Sociology     
Historical sociology, also called structuralism, is another approach to 
understand the process of democratization. It explains how the 
institution of state shapes the political system in contemporary regimes. 
Here state is understood in the Weberian context, as a “human 
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory” 
( H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Translated and edited), 1946). For 
structuralists, democracies do not emerge overnight, rather, they are the 
product of “transformation of the state through class conﬂict over time” 
(Grugel, 2002, p. 52). Moreover, political economy also plays a 
significant role in the democratization process, because it helps us 
understand how the forces of production lead to social and class 
conflicts in society. However, economic forces alone cannot determine 
political outcomes, and various other factors are instrumental in 
bringing about the political change70. In his book, Social Origins of 
Democracy and Dictatorship, Barrington Moore comparatively 
analyzes eight countries in order to study political change responsible 
                                                          
69 For details, see (Almond, G. A. and S. Verba, 1963) and (Pye, L. and S. Verba , 
1965). 
70 Unlike wave and modernization theories, structuralism attempts to spell out factors 
and social conditions, which are distinctive to particular cases.   
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for the process of democratization71. Specifically, he expounds on the 
various historical trajectories that led to modernity in each country. 
According to Moore, the transformation, from agrarian societies to 
modern industrial ones, depends on the interaction among three classes, 
namely, the peasantry, the landed upper class and the bourgeoisie 
(Moore, 1966, p. xi). He argues that the occurrence of a democratic 
political order was possible because of the gradual eradication of 
peasant agriculture, which transformed the peasantry into workers 
through urbanization and industrialization. Another factor which 
brought democracy was the defeat of the landed class and the 
emergence of the bourgeoisie as the most powerful economic and 
political actor. In his scholarship, Moore is mainly interested in the 
emergence of first democracies. Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens 
extend Moore’s work by synthesizing the classical sociological 
tradition with that of Marxist philosophy. Their approach is called ‘new 
comparative political economy’ which explains the rise of 
parliamentary and stable democracies in different countries across the 
globe. They argue that the political system of any regime should be 
understood in relation to social power. For them, there are three 
important power structures: 
1- The relative class power 
2- The role of the state 
3- The impact of transnational power structures 
Drawing from the Marxist tradition, Rueschmeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens emphasize on social class and class conflict in order to analyze 
the relationship between state and social power. They extend Moore’s 
scheme of three classes (the peasantry, the landed upper class and the 
                                                          
71 The eight countries Moore analyzes are Britain, France, the US, Germany, Russia, 
Japan, China and India.   
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bourgeoisie) by adding further urban working classes which are 
essential to the process of democratization. They write: 
“The organized working class appeared everywhere as a key actor in 
the development of full democracy … In most cases, organized workers 
played an important role in the development of restricted democracy as 
well. The Latin American working class played a lesser role in the 
historical events there: the relative weakness of the working class 
certainly has contributed to the infrequence of full democracy in the 
region and to the instability of democracy where it did emerge. … In all 
regions, however, pressure from the organized working class alone was 
insufﬁcient to bring about the introduction of democracy; the working 
class needed allies. … Democracy could only be established if (1) 
landlords were an insigniﬁcant force, or (2) they were not dependent on 
a large supply of cheap labor, or (3) they did not control the state.” 
 (Rueschemeyer, D., E. Stephens and J. Stephens, 1992, p. 270)                   
They contend that the emergence of democracy is not an outcome of 
the capitalist relations of production, rather, it is a kind of reform bring 
about by working class organizations. They further argue, capitalist 
states will remain authoritarian if subordinate and urban classes do not 
impose reformist policies. In addition to this, they hold, transnational 
political setting is also an important factor in democratization, 
especially for developing countries. It means, geo-political factors 
should also be taken into consideration in the study of democratization. 
However, depending on the case, it remains problematic if transnational 
factors promote or impede the democratization process (Grugel, 2002, 
p. 55).       
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(iv)- Transition Perspective                       
Transition perspective or transitology is an agency-centric approach, 
which emphasizes on the role of political actors rather than socio-
economic conditions in the study of democratization. In his article, 
Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, Rustow breaks 
with structuralist and modernization theories of democratization for 
being too limited in their scope. He argues both structuralist and 
modernization accounts merely focus on the structural conditions and 
ignore the process of transition that leads to the democratization of 
regime. Both approaches, Rustow holds, mistake causes for the 
functioning of a democracy with causes which make transition to 
democracy possible. That is to say the factors which sustain a mature 
democracy are different from the factors which lead to the emergence 
of a democracy from a non-democratic setting. Moreover, Rustow 
argues, socio-economic prerequisites for democracy cannot be 
identified (Rustow, 1970, p. 342 and 252). For Rustow, the only 
condition for democracy is a national state: “the vast majority of 
citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental 
reservations as to which political community they belong to” (Rustow, 
1970, p. 350). Democracy comes into being through a continued 
political struggle, and it has three stages: 
1- Preparatory phase 
2- Decision phase: In this phase negotiations among a small circle 
of leaders play an important role to bring about democratic 
change.   
3- Habituation phase: In this phase, both leaders and ordinary 
citizens adopt the new system.               
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Above three phases, latter termed as liberalization, transition and 
consolidation, are crucial in the emergence of a new democracy. In their 
four volume edited work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 
Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead develop a transitologist’s 
perspective of democratization (O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe 
Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead (eds.), 1986). Like Rustow, they also 
claim that political action rather than structural conditions are 
instrumental in the process of democratization. They analyze “the 
processes of democratization by examining the interactions, pacts and 
bargains struck between authoritarian leaders and the democratic 
opposition” (Grugel, 2002, p. 57). Successful transitions are dependent 
upon the agreements between elites and various other political actors. 
Strategic choices and skillful leadership also influence the final 
outcomes in the political process. Transition can be understood as an 
“interval between one political regime and another. In this phase, the 
old political rules of the game no longer apply, while the new rules have 
yet to be decided” (Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, 2013, p. 
129). Political outcomes are uncertain and contingent because actors 
are free to make choices that can produce unintended consequences. It 
means, transitions do not necessarily lead to democracy and political 
outcomes remain open-ended. Transitions which lead to 
democratization have the following important phases: 
1- Liberalization of the authoritarian regime 
2- Actual democratization 
In the first phase, political liberties are given and extended to people, 
and in the second phase, actual democratic procedures such as universal 
suffrage, multi-party system, and free and fair elections are 
implemented through various institutions. In contrast to other theories 
of democratization, transitology emphasizes on the micro-political 
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aspects of regime change that initiate the transition and lead to 
democratic construction and consolidation. Moreover, because of its 
negation of structural conditions, transition perspective helps us to 
understand the process of democratization outside the Western world 
and its global reception. 
 
(v)- The Neglect of Deliberation in Democratization and Social 
Movements Studies 
The political upheavals responsible for the collapse of authoritarian rule 
in Pakistan are important in order to explain democratic transition in the 
country. The transition in Pakistan from authoritarian rule to democratic 
government can be understood from both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
perspectives. For Flynn and Curtao, transition is a dynamic 
phenomenon and it does not merely entail change “from one form of 
government to another” and it also includes “broader social processes 
and trajectories” (Ian O'Flynn & Nicole Curato, 2015, p. 299). 
Democracy understood in deliberative terms focuses on the 
‘deliberative capacity’ of the regime under the process of transition. 
This approach is different from the dominant approaches in the 
transition literature which mainly focus on ‘free election’ and 
‘structural pre-conditions’ as the only criteria for transition. Elklit and 
Reynolds argue that “at the heart of democratization attempts lie 
competitive elections, which are often held during times of societal 
stress and under imperfect logistical conditions characterized by 
administrative unreadiness” (J. Elklit & A. Reynolds, 2002, p. 86). 
They believe that democratization process in the developing world can 
be strengthened by the proper administration of the elections. 
Comparative scholars like Adam Przeworski also believe that 
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‘contested elections’ is the only requirement for the transition from 
authoritarian rule to democratic one: “a regime in which governmental 
ofﬁces are ﬁlled as a consequence of contested elections. Only if the 
opposition is allowed to compete, win and assume ofﬁce is a regime 
democratic” (Przeworski et al., 1996, p. 50). I do not deny the 
importance of election in a democratic process but rather argue that 
deliberation is a more telling measure for the understanding of 
transition in Pakistan. In certain respects, deliberation is an essential 
element to determine democratic quality. Contested elections cannot 
produce democratic results in the absence of deliberation.  
With respect to social movements, there are two issues which I discuss 
here. First, the role of deliberation is ignored in social movement 
studies, and second, the role of social movements is also being 
neglected in democratization studies. As Nancy Bermeo argues that 
democratization literature mainly focuses on the elites rather than social 
movements (Porta, 2013, p. 126). A few thinkers, however, for 
example, Charles Tilly has emphasized on ‘a broad correspondence 
between democratization and social movements’ (Tilly, 2004, p. 131). 
There is a need to address the impact of social movements on the 
process of democratization. The literature on democratization mostly 
deals with socio-economic conditions and elite behavior and neglects 
the role of judiciary, deliberation, and social movements. In the same 
vein, literature on social movements, until recently, mainly focuses on 
established democracies where conditions for social mobilization are 
conducive and tends to neglect the impact of social movements on the 
process of democratization in authoritarian regimes72. As Donatella 
                                                          
72 After the Arab Spring, there are few studies on social movements in authoritarian 
contexts, which attempt to explain the role of social movements in the process of 
democratization. For example, see (Porta, 2013, pp. 124-49); (Ricardo Fabrino 
Mendonça and Selen A. Ercan, 2015).  
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Della Porta puts it: “even in established democracies, the relations 
between movements and democracy have mainly been looked at in 
terms of institutional opportunities for protest, rather than of the 
attitudes towards and practices of democracy by activists and their 
organizations” (Porta, 2013, p. 132). However, some scholars working 
on the global justice movement have also emphasized on the 
convergence between social movements and democratization. In the 
last decade, there are also a few studies on social movements in 
authoritarian contexts73. As discussed above, within the classical 
formulation of mainstream theories of democratization, a very limited 
role is being assigned to social movements and protests. Similarly, the 
role of social movements in deliberative democracy is also a much 
neglected area of research. Protests have been understood as antithetical 
to the ideal of deliberative politics. Conventionally, scholars argue that 
since protests are adversarial in nature, therefore, they hinder the 
prospects of deliberative democracy. Some political theorists, for 
example Chantal Mouffe, associate protests with agonistic view of 
democracy (Mouffe, 2000). However, the global justice movements 
provide a pioneering work on this neglected issue of deliberative 
aspects of social movements74. In my analysis of Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement, I extend this scholarship by Dryzek’s concept of 
deliberative capacity.               
 
 
                                                          
73 For social movements in the Middle Eastern context, see (Gunning, 2007); (Hafez, 
2003) and (Wiktorowicz, 2004). And, for the Asian and former Soviet Union contexts, 
see (Boudreau, 2004) and (Beissinger, 2002) respectively.  
74 For details, see (Porta, 2005a); (Porta, 2005b); and (C. Haug and S. Teune, 2008).  
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2- Political Deliberation and Pakistan Lawyers’ 
Movement 
In this section, I interpret Pakistan lawyers’ movement by using 
deliberative theory. Specifically, I will use systemic strand of 
deliberative theory to understand deliberative practices and 
mechanisms in Pakistani context. There are many advantages of using 
the systemic approach to understand this case:  
1- Systemic approach is a macro level analysis of deliberative 
practices. However, it is not just confined to macro locations of 
deliberative mechanisms, and it attempts to look into the whole 
‘political system’. This way, one can combine micro, mezzo and 
macro levels to understand the deliberative quality and potential 
of a political system. In the case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement 
all three locations (micro, mezzo and macro) are important. I 
also believe a more holistic approach towards deliberation, 
which is an essential aspect of the systemic strand, should 
combine these three venues of deliberation.   
2- The systemic approach does not consider protests and social 
movements as antithetical to the deliberative model of 
democracy75. Pakistan lawyers’ movement involves both 
protests and disruptive politics, therefore, systemic approach is 
preferred for its interpretation. 
3- The comparative studies of democratization, which have 
ignored until recently the importance of deliberation, can 
benefit more from the systemic approach. Democratization 
understood in terms of broader social processes and trajectories 
                                                          
75 There are many studies on social movements and disruptive politics in the nexus of 
systemic approach. For example, see (Smith, 2016). 
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(Ian O'Flynn & Nicole Curato, 2015) is a multilayered complex 
phenomenon, and it requires critical analysis of the regime 
under consideration. Pakistan lawyers’ movement was 
instrumental in bringing about democracy in the country. The 
role of this movement in the process of democratization is an 
essential aspect that made it successful.  
4- As described in four, the systemic approach is not confined to 
liberal democracies in the West. It is also helpful in determining 
deliberative mechanisms in various historical contexts, such as 
non-Western, authoritarian, transnational, and global contexts. 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement arose in the authoritarian context. 
After two years it successfully ousted authoritarian rule and 
brought democracy back in the country (after ten years of 
military rule). 
5- The systemic approach also recognizes the importance of 
culture and religion in shaping deliberative practices. For its 
broader success, Pakistan lawyers’ movement used all types of 
narrative like “Martyred”, “Motherhood” (for patriotic love), 
and “Duty”. The Islamic political party (Jamaat-e-Islami 
Pakistan) also joined this movement for the cause of 
democratization and rule of law in the country. Pakistan 
lawyers’ movement relied on all possible venues (civil society, 
academia, political parties, media and international actors) to 
increase its strength and momentum for the success. 
Democratization of societies at large has always been at the core of 
deliberative theory. From the outset, the concept of deliberation has 
been employed for the “democratic deepening” (Nicole Curato and Jürg 
Steiner , 2018). Initially, deliberative democracy was envisaged to 
overcome the shortcomings of electoral and representative 
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democracies. The following passage expresses the disenchantment with 
the traditional form of democracy: 
“Democracy is under siege. Approval ratings for democratic 
institutions in most countries around the world are at near-record lows. 
The number of recognized democratic countries in the world is no 
longer expanding after the so-called Third Wave of democratic 
transitions. Indeed, there is something of a “democratic recession”. 
Further, some apparently democratic countries with competitive 
elections are undermining elements of liberal democracy: the rights and 
liberties that ensure freedom of thought and expression, protection of 
the rule of law, and all the protections for the substructure of civil 
society that may be as important for making democracy work as the 
electoral process itself. The model of party competition-based 
democracy—the principal model of democracy in the modern era—
seems under threat.”  
(James S. Fishkin & Jane Mansbridge, 2017) 
Deliberative democracy is an antidote to the problems of electoral-
representative democracy. It attempts to rehabilitate the political project 
of democracy by reinvigorating normative concepts, such as legitimacy, 
participation, equality, mutual respect, and common good. Its basic goal 
is to empower citizens to achieve legitimacy in the collective outcomes. 
The prospects of deliberative democracy, however, are not confined to 
already developed democracies. The deliberative model can also help 
us to critically evaluate fragile political contexts, such as authoritarian, 
hybrid and non-democratic regimes. In this section, I attempt to analyze 
the process of democratization in Pakistani authoritarian context, 
specifically the role of Pakistan lawyers’ movement in the 
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democratization process. In order to do so, I interpret Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement through the lens of deliberative theory. 
 
(i)- Democratization and Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement 
As discussed above, the literature on transition has ignored deliberative 
dimensions in the process of democratization. Democracy understood 
in deliberative terms provides a unique perspective to study the 
transition from authoritarian rule to the democratic. The concept of 
deliberative capacity, which Dryzek introduced in the larger context of 
systemic approach, can help us understand the role of Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement in the process of democratization.   
The deliberative turn in the theory of democracy also helps us to 
understand democratic potential in authoritarian contexts. That is to say, 
deliberation in terms of deliberative capacity may exist in non-
democratic settings. The study of democratic transitions is one of the 
important aspects of current academic discourse on politics. The social 
and political upheavals that delegitimize authoritarian regimes need to 
be explained in order to understand democratic transitions. The 
conditions which pave the way for democratic transitions are also 
significant in comparative studies of the process of democratization. 
The process of democratization can also be understood in terms of 
deliberative capacity-building in a political system. As Dryzek states: 
“Deliberative capacity proves to be an important determinant of 
democratic transition and consolidation, such that the concept has 
substantial analytical and evaluative purchase. The ambit claim is that 
all democratization studies need to be recalled and reframed in a 
deliberative light, but even if this claim is resisted by traditional 
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democratization scholars, the deliberative aspect merits attention. 
Countries such as China that resist democracy conceptualized in terms 
of competitive elections, constitutions, and human rights recognized by 
the state might nonetheless prove susceptible to a deliberative path of 
democratization.”  
(Dryzek J. S., 2010, p. 16) 
The aforementioned passage indicates the potential of the concept of 
deliberative capacity to understand the process of democratization in 
the non-Western context. Dryzek introduces the concept of deliberative 
capacity in extending the Habermasian critical theory tradition of 
deliberative democracy. Specifically, it is an extension of the two most 
important concepts of critical theory, namely, public sphere and 
discursive democracy. According to John Dryzek:  
 
“Deliberative capacity may be defined as the extent to which a political 
system possesses structures to host deliberation that is authentic, 
inclusive, and consequential.” 
(Dryzek J. S., 2009, p. 1382)     
 
It means, the concept of deliberative capacity is defined in the context 
of political system. In Dryzek’s account, there is no institutional 
requirement for this capacity to exist in the political system. And a wide 
variety of political systems (liberal, electoral, authoritarian) can be 
explained through this perspective of deliberative capacity. 
Deliberative capacity points out at the capability of a particular political 
system to be deliberative and democratic. It is instrumental in 
democratic transition because it can be applied to any political setting. 
Furthermore, the three elements in the concept of deliberative capacity 
are:   
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(1) Authenticity: It means the act of deliberation induces reflection 
in a noncoercive fashion. It also connects individual claims with 
general principle and brings about reciprocity in the political 
process.     
(2) Inclusiveness: It makes political system inclusive by 
accommodating various interests and discourses that are 
politically significant in the system. The inclusion of different 
points of view is an important aspect that makes deliberative 
democracy a viable project in the global world. 
(3) Consequential: It means the process of deliberation should 
directly or indirectly influence the collective outcomes 
(collective decisions).  
 
For Dryzek, these three elements combined together help us in 
determining the deliberativeness of a political system: “a polity with a 
high degree of authentic, inclusive, and consequential deliberation will 
have an effective deliberative system” (Dryzek J. S., 2009, p. 1382). 
The process of democratization can be understood in terms of 
deliberative capacity-building. According to Dryzek, the deliberative 
system is made up of the following elements76: 
 
1- Public Space: It hosts a wide variety of communicative 
practices. It consists of various actors such as media, political 
activists, social movements, and ordinary citizens. 
2- Empowered Space: Institutions that can produce collective 
decisions. In this space, deliberation takes place among actors 
who make collective decision within the institution possible. 
                                                          
76 These six elements are also discussed in the chapter on systemic approach. In this 
section, their role in the process of democratization is discussed in the context of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement.   
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Legislatures, constitutional courts, policy-making bodies are 
some of the examples of empowered space. 
3- Transmission: It is a process in which public space influences 
the empowered space. Different deliberative practices in the 
public space need to be connected with the empowered space. 
There are various types of mechanisms that can transmit 
deliberation from the public space to the empowered one. Most 
notably, political/social campaigns, social movements, and the 
use of rhetoric and new ideas for social causes are important 
ways to influence deliberation in the empowered space. 
Transmission can take various forms like “advocacy, or 
criticism, or questioning, or support, or some combination of all 
four” (Dryzek J. S., 2010, p. 11). 
4- Accountability: It is a process in which empowered space 
provides answers to the public space. It helps to secure 
legitimacy of the collective decisions. Election campaigns can 
be one of the examples of this process. It may also involve 
simple justifications for the collective outcomes. 
5- Meta-deliberation: It is deliberation about the deliberative 
system itself.  Meta-deliberation is a kind of deliberative 
capacity in which deliberative system can examine itself.  
6- Decisiveness: The degree to which [the first] five elements (in 
combination) influence collective outcomes. Decisiveness 
shows to what extent “ﬁve elements together determine the 
content of collective decisions” (Dryzek J. S., 2010, p. 11) 
 
As described earlier in the chapter on systemic approach, Dryzek’s 
approach is not confined to developed liberal democracies in the West. 
Indeed, one can use his account for a wide variety of political systems 
including authoritarian regimes, in case of Pakistan lawyers’ 
160 
 
movement. The concept of deliberative capacity is distributed among 
all the six elements of deliberative system. Specifically, a system is said 
to have deliberative capacity if: 
 
1- It demonstrates authentic deliberation in the public space, 
empowered space, transmission, accountability, and meta-
deliberation.  
2- It demonstrates inclusiveness in the public space and 
empowered space. 
3- It shows decisiveness in terms of the whole political system—
the collective outcomes produced during the process of 
deliberation.    
 
Depending on the context, in real world politics, a deliberative system 
may fall short on certain elements. These six elements, however, 
provide a theoretical framework to analyze the distribution of 
deliberative capacity in any political setting. This way, we can evaluate 
deliberative systems in real world politics. It is precisely in this 
evaluative context77 that “deliberative capacity-building provides the 
basis for a comprehensive approach to the study of democratization” 
(Dryzek J. S., 2009, p. 1387; Dryzek J. S., 2010, pp. 138-40). The 
process of democratizion can be more rigorous if the six elements are 
present in the political system. Their presence is not tied to any 
instiutiional specifications and they can be develped during the process 
of democratization itself, as the Pakistani case demonstrates. The 
shortcomings of deliberation in one location can be compenstaed 
through the presence of higher deliberation in other locations. That is 
                                                          
77 Dryzek’s concepts of deliberative capacity and deliberative system provide a certain 
criteria for the evaluation of the democratic potential in any regime.  
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to say, one should pay attention to the whole political system to 
understand the deiberative practices, which lead to the democratization 
of a regime.  
 
(ii)- The Emergence of Deliberative Capacity under 
Authoritarian Rule     
 
As explained in the case study chapter, the authoritarian regime of 
Musharraf was the result of a military coup. In the political history of 
Pakistan, this was the third military coup. Unlike previous military 
coups, Musharraf’s takeover faced great challenges, not merely from 
the superior judiciary but also from the various social segments in the 
informal public sphere. These challenges were surprising for academic 
scholars because the legal community, specifically superior judiciary, 
have always legitimized military dictatorships in Pakistan78. The 
authoritarian regime under Musharraf’s rule was different from the 
previous military takeovers. In this section, I discuss the emergence of 
deliberative capacity under Musharraf’s autocratic rule. I will argue 
how the emergence of deliberative capacity paved the way for the 
process of democratization in Pakistan. The success of Pakistan 
lawyers’ movement should be understood in relation to the concept of 
deliberative capacity. 
 
According to Dryzek, transition to democratic rule is more likely to 
occur if deliberative capacity already exists in the old regime. He 
writes: 
 
                                                          
78 For example, see (Oldenburg, 2016). 
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“Breakdown of an authoritarian regime is more likely to yield a 
democratic replacement when deliberative capacity is present under the 
old regime, because such capacity affects the background and 
capabilities that key actors bring to the political crisis. If opponents of 
the old regime come from a deliberative public space—as opposed to, 
for example, a militarized resistance movement or a network of exiles 
involved in strategic machinations—then they can bring to the crisis 
some clear democratic commitments that stem from abiding by 
deliberative precepts.” 
(Dryzek J. S., 2009, p. 1388)    
        
Dryzek’s account merely presumes the presence of deliberative 
capacity and how it leads to the process of democratization. This thesis 
argues that the emergence of deliberative capacity in a political system 
is another important aspect, which helps us to understand the process of 
democratization in a more comprehensive manner. The authoritarian 
regime under Musharraf’s rule functioned under certain concepts that 
helped the deliberative capacity to emerge. Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement played a double role in this context: first, it was instrumental 
in the development of deliberative capacity in the political system; 
second, it made transition to democratic rule possible. Before going into 
the details of this double role of lawyers’ movement, I first explain 
important concepts that distinguish Musharraf’s autocratic rule from 
previous military takeovers. These concepts are the preceding events 
that created a context in which deliberative capacity was likely to 
emerge in the authoritarian context of Pakistan.  
 
1- Liberalization of the Authoritarian Regime:  
As discussed in the preceding section on major theories of 
democratization, the transition perspective divides democratization into 
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two phases, namely, liberalization of the authoritarian regime and actual 
democratization. In the former phase, political liberties are given and 
extended to people, and in the latter phase, actual democratic 
procedures such as universal suffrage, multi-party system, and free and 
fair elections are implemented through various institutions. Unlike 
previous military coups, Musharraf’s regime was celebrated by liberals, 
or what Akbar Zaidi calls “lifestyle liberals”. Akbar Zaidi writes: 
 
“When Musharraf overthrew an elected prime minister and made 
himself president in 1999, his most vocal supporters came 
disproportionately from the socially and culturally Westernized 
segments of the Pakistani elite—the “lifestyle liberals”. They embraced 
Musharraf as one of their own, which he very much was. Prominent 
activists from various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also 
found themselves drawn to the General by his liberal, Westernized air. 
Some of them—including noted opponents of previous military 
governments and campaigners for greater democracy during the 1988–
99 civilian era—even accepted posts in his cabinet. Employers’ 
associations, certain labor unions, women’s groups, and other such 
entities welcomed Musharraf as a figure whom they felt was intent on 
modernizing Pakistan. A number of intellectuals and peace and anti-
nuclear activists wrote articles arguing that the key project lying before 
Pakistan had more to do with “liberalism” than democracy, and that 
here Musharraf could help.” 
(Zaidi, 2008, pp. 38-9) 
 
By any standards of political theory, Musharraf was not a liberal but a 
dictator who came into power after throwing an elected government. 
There were certain Western values that he promoted, which earned him 
acceptance among liberals in Pakistan. Due to the liberalization policies 
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of Musharraf’s regime, different social forces, such as lawyers, 
judiciary, civil society actors, and media acquired considerable 
autonomy that led to the emergence of deliberative capacity in which 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement was able to bring about democracy in the 
country. Indeed, during his rule, Musharraf tried to promote the project 
of “enlightened moderation” through various means, including media. 
After 9/11, Musharraf introduced the political-social project of 
modernization in Pakistan due to Western pressure, especially as a 
result of U.S. policy towards War on Terror. Musharraf portrayed 
himself as Kemal Ataturk and launched policies to combat Islamic 
fundamentalism in the country (Nasr, 2004). He wanted to reform the 
country to legitimize his rule both at the national and international level. 
He also started granting civil liberties within the framework of 
authoritarian rule in order to liberalize the regime79. Pakistan’s civil 
society was instrumental in promoting Musharraf’s agenda of 
modernization (Zaidi, 2008). In his article A Plea for Enlightened 
Moderation, which Musharraf wrote for The Washington Post, he 
argued that Muslims must fight extremism in order to progress in the 
global world. As he writes: 
 
“I say to my brother Muslims: The time for renaissance has come. The 
way forward is through enlightenment. We must concentrate on human 
resource development through the alleviation of poverty and through 
education, health care and social justice. If this is our direction, it cannot 
be achieved through confrontation. We must adopt a path of moderation 
and a conciliatory approach to fight the common belief that Islam is a 
                                                          
79 Political liberalization is distinct from democratization. Authoritarian regimes can 
grant civil liberties in order to get legitimacy. For example, see (O’Donnell, 
Guillermo, Philippe Schmitter & Laurence Whitehead (eds.), 1986) and (Stepan, 
1988). 
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religion of militancy in conflict with modernization, democracy and 
secularism.” 
(Musharraf, 2004) 
 
The above passage summarizes Musharraf’s concept of enlightened 
moderation, which got him legitimacy at both national and international 
level. As is evident, Musharraf sought to reform Islam to modernize his 
regime and he took a number of prominent steps in this direction, such 
as:  
1- Crackdown on radical militant jihadi groups was initiated 
and substantive educational reforms were implemented in 
Madrasas (institutions for Islamic education). A significant 
number of these institutions had become the source of 
militant Islam, which Musharraf wanted to eradicate80. 
2- The Hudood Ordinance81 was also being debated. A bill to 
amend Hudood Ordinance was moved “to limit the scope of 
Islamic laws that had made it virtually impossible for 
women to accuse men of rape” (Anthony, 2007). When 
Musharraf tried to amend the Hudood Ordinance, various 
Islamic forces protested against him. But he insisted that it 
was a man-made law and one can change it if it is in conflict 
with equal justice.  
                                                          
80 For details, see (Ali, 2004) and (Nasr, 2004). 
81 Hudood Ordinances were controversial laws, introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq, 
which rendered it almost impossible for women to charge men of rape. According to 
the law, a rape allegation required a woman to produce four male witnesses in her 
favor who had ‘witnessed’ the crime. In the eventuality that she failed to produce these 
witnesses, the law permitted the courts to charge her guilty for qazf, a punishable 
offence for a false accusation of rape against an innocent man. 
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3- Musharraf also initiated economic liberalization through the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises82.  
4- Musharraf changed the policies to promote electronic 
media. The new policies gave rise to a number of private 
channels that were relatively free to discuss political issues. 
The liberalization of media was one the major policies of 
Musharraf’s authoritarian regime. This is a surprising act 
because the role of media was primordial in the success of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement that ousted his autocratic rule 
and brought democracy in the country.  
 
Musharraf’s liberalization project softened his image as a dictator 
among liberals in Pakistan and provided some legitimacy, perhaps 
perceived, to his regime. People also started to contrast his dictatorship 
with previous military takeovers. Specifically, they contrasted 
Musharraf’s rule with General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization policies. They 
thought Musharraf’s regime was truly committed to modern liberal 
values and he would rectify the political crisis very soon by giving 
space to democratic forces. Indeed, Musharraf promised that his rule 
was for a certain period of time and soon (December, 2007) election 
would be held. From the outset, Musharraf called his authoritarian rule 
as a form of democratic governance, which would lead to a full-fledged 
liberal style democracy in a few years. Such a stance was radically 
different from previous military dictatorships in Pakistan. Although, it 
helped Musharraf to legitimize his rule for a certain period of time but 
as soon as the superior judiciary began to assert its power, he unleashed 
his dictatorial prowess to undermine this judicial activism. his true 
dictator’s colors. The project of ‘enlightened moderation’ was not only 
                                                          
82 For details, see (Bashir Ahmed Khan and Faisal Bari, 2004). 
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conceived to soften Pakistan’s image in the international community, 
but to also combat Islamic militancy at home. The path to 
enlightenment, modernization and liberalization created a space in 
Pakistan where it was difficult for authoritarian powers to theoretically 
resist values like democracy, rule of law, and equality. It is precisely in 
this context that Pakistan’s Supreme Court achieved considerable 
autonomy and started creating legal issues for the authoritarian rule, 
eventually paving the way to mobilize legal community for the 
supremacy of law. The liberalization of the authoritarian regime 
ultimately gave rise to the phenomenon of judicialization of politics in 
Pakistan.  The Supreme Court’s intervention through “public interest 
litigation” in various areas of governance started to undermine the 
legitimacy of the military regime. The policies that the military regime 
designed to bring about reforms, specifically, “economic liberalization 
under Musharraf opened the space for public interest litigation in urban 
development, deregulation, and privatization” (Ghias, 2012, p. 346). 
Other areas where considerable judicial activism was seen included 
deregulation of commodity pricing mechanism, illegal detention by 
security agencies, and constitutional questions concerning the 
forthcoming presidential elections. Suo motu actions prior to the 
lawyers’ movement were undermining the legitimacy of military 
regime83: 
 
The judicialization of politics through “public interest litigation” 
changed the Supreme Court’s role in the regime. Rather than providing 
legitimacy to the military dictatorship, the Supreme Court started to 
challenge the legality of authoritarian rule. The doctrine of the 
separation of powers, which lies at the heart of modern democracies, 
                                                          
83 For details, see chapter number five on Pakistan lawyers’ movement.  
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ultimately began to appear in the political debates in Pakistan. This way, 
the liberalization of regime under authoritarian rule helped the 
deliberative capacity to emerge, which I argue, provided the impetus 
for the success of Pakistan lawyers’ movement. 
 
2- Civil Society and the Public Sphere:  
In deliberative theory, the importance of public sphere cannot be 
ignored in any context. Right from Habermasian philosophy to current 
debates on systemic approach, public sphere remains one of the main 
locations of deliberative practices. Civil society is also another 
significant aspect of public sphere. A vital civil society is considered an 
indispensable element for the constitution of the public sphere that hosts 
deliberative practices and transmits them to the formal state institutions 
such as legislatures and courts. In Habermas’ two track model of 
deliberation, public sphere is an essential part of deliberative 
democracy. According to Habermas, “Civil society is composed of 
those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, 
and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the 
private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form 
to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of 
associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on 
questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public 
spheres. These ‘discursive designs’ have an egalitarian, open form of 
organization that mirrors essential features of the kind of 
communication around which they crystallize and to which they lend 
continuity and permanence” (Habermas, 1996, p. 367). It means, in the 
deliberative model of democracy, both civil society and the public 
sphere are instrumental in democratic government. In the same vein, 
other deliberative theorists, such as Dryzek, Mansbridge, Parkinson and 
Goodin, also believe in the primordiality of public sphere in the 
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deliberative model of democracy84.  Contrary to this trend, the case of 
civil society in the Pakistani context has been quite different from the 
developed liberal democracies in the West. As Akbar Zaidi writes: 
 
“The classic, overwhelmingly Western literature on civil society 
suggests that by virtue of being “against” the state (by which is often 
implicitly meant the state at its most autocratic and undemocratic) civil 
society must necessarily favor some form of democratic disposition. 
Such was not the case in Pakistan for most of Musharraf’s reign, 
however, when what constitutes “civil society” by most definitions of 
the term laid aside aggressive support for democracy in favor of support 
for liberalism (or at least its image) in the person of the seemingly 
forward-looking General, with his dogs, his golf shirts, and his crisply 
efficient manner. For Pakistani civil society, whether Westernized or 
Islamized, the issue in short was not democracy versus non-democracy, 
but rather liberalism versus some variously interpreted set of Islamic 
symbols and values.”  
(Zaidi, 2008, p. 39) 
 
It means, the public sphere, during the authoritarian rule of Musharraf, 
was not conducive to democracy. The main forces in the public sphere 
accepted the autocratic rule due to the regime’s liberalization policies. 
During the authoritarian rule, the main discourse in the public sphere 
was not framed in terms of democracy vs. non-democracy. Rather, it 
was framed in terms of liberalism vs. Islamic fundamentalism. 
Pakistani civil society supported the undemocratic regime because of 
its liberal tendencies. Since, the concepts of civil society and public 
sphere are historical concepts stemming from the Western political 
                                                          
84 For details, see chapter number three and four. 
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theory, therefore, they change their meaning in the non-Western 
contexts. Moreover, when it comes to Muslim countries the situation 
becomes more complicated. Indigenous culture and Islamic beliefs 
influence the fundamental basis of civil society in the non-Western 
world in general and the Muslim world in particular. The concept of 
rational public sphere understood in the context of European 
Enlightenment is no longer helpful to understand the function of civil 
society and how it impacts the political project of democracy. Although, 
Muslim countries like Pakistan have embraced the project of 
modernization at various levels, for example education, politics, the use 
of science and technology, still local narratives, religious affiliations 
and indigenous beliefs lie at the heart of everyday life, which are 
constitutive (at least partially) of the civil society. In the philosophical 
literature, the concept of civil society is a contested notion and the 
various meanings of civil society depend on the historical context85. 
However, there is a minimal concept of civil society, which one can 
point out in order to explain its role in contemporary social-political 
order. According to Zaidi, “Civil society is necessarily supposed to be 
outside, and perhaps preferably in opposition to, or in contradiction 
with, the state. In order to define civil society, it is a requirement that 
the organisations and actors of civil society not be controlled by the 
institutions or actors of the state. This ‘autonomous’ requirement is a 
necessary condition to distinguish civil society from the state…civil 
society must necessarily be a democratizing force” (Zaidi, 2008 , p. 14). 
With Musharraf’s authoritarian rule, the role of civil society turns out 
to be surprising for many political theorists. It also reveals the unsettled 
contradictory nature of civil society in Pakistani politics. The military 
                                                          
85 For the various meanings of the concept of civil society, see (Sudipta Kaviraj and 
Sunil Khilnani (eds), 2001) 
171 
 
coup of 1999, which created an autocratic regime in Pakistan, was 
legitimized and supported by civil society. Due to this undemocratic 
disposition of Pakistan’s civil society, it was not possible to contest 
autocratic rule in public discourse. Indeed civil society changed (or 
manipulated) the public discourse through framing political issues in 
terms of liberalism vs. Islamic fundamentalism, rather than democracy 
vs. authoritarianism. Moreover, the deliberative practices in the 
Pakistani public sphere were supporting the authoritarian regime. Since, 
the public discourse was not directed towards democratic ideals, 
empowered spaces like the Supreme Court had always consolidated 
military coups in the political history of Pakistan. The status of civil 
society as an autonomous institution has always been problematic in 
Pakistan. Different segments of civil society have been partners with 
the state. For example, “development groups which have emerged as a 
result of government failure in Pakistan and have become contractors 
in the form of NGOs in their own right, are often co-opted by 
institutions of the state to become the latter’s ‘advisors’ winning 
lucrative contracts and getting the publicity they need to further their 
credentials. Human rights activists and advocacy groups too become 
‘partners’ with other ‘stakeholders’, particularly government, and try to 
redress problems created by the very institutions of the state that they 
now are partnering” (Zaidi, 2008 , p. 15). Such an uncivil role of civil 
society should be understood in the peculiar historical context of 
Pakistani politics. The persistence of authoritarian rule for more than 
three decades in Pakistan had ushered us in a condition where the 
discourse on democracy was almost absent in the public sphere. The 
depoliticization of the public sphere is one of the outcomes of this 
historical development of civil society, which has, for the most part, 
helped authoritarian rule to sustain in the country. In short, Musharraf’s 
autocratic regime survived because of the legitimacy it received from 
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the undemocratic, so called liberal civil society and the depoliticized 
public sphere in which contestation of political discourses was not 
possible.  
 
According to deliberative theorists, public sphere is the most 
fundamental location that hosts deliberative practices, and it should be 
conducive rather than an impediment to the democratic process. The 
preceding events prior to lawyers’ movement, which I call 
judicialization of politics during the authoritarian rule, initiated various 
discourses such as separation of powers and rule of law in the public 
sphere. The suspension of Chief Justice questioned the legality of the 
autocratic rule and gave rise to public discourse concerning the powers 
of military and its role in politics. As discussed in the case study chapter 
on Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement, there are broadly two parts of the 
movement. In its first phase, the lawyers’ movement was merely 
confined to lawyers and its agenda was to restore the Chief Justice. 
From the outset, this movement was not for the restoration of 
democracy but for the protection of legal community’s own 
professional interests (Zaidi, 2008, p. 41). After the restoration of Chief 
Justice in July 2007, the judicial activism of the Supreme Court did not 
merely start delegitimizing the military regime but it also created 
support of the supremacy of law in the public realm. In the second 
phase, after the “State of Emergency”86, the lawyers’ movement got its 
real momentum. In its second phase, the movement became a broader 
social mobilization in which opposition political parties, media, 
journalists, students, and other civil society actors participated. As Zaidi 
writes: 
 
                                                          
86 It is a kind of martial law by another name.  
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“The lawyers’ movement has been without question one of the 
broadest-based and longest-sustained in Pakistan’s history. In the press 
and the popular imagination, it has been heralded as civil society’s long-
awaited ‘coming of age’. Whatever can be said for this view, it should 
not deter us from considering the interesting challenges and questions 
that the movement has raised for those who wish to understand what 
civil society is and how it might work—or not work—on behalf of the 
rise and consolidation of democracy.” 
(Zaidi, 2008, p. 40) 
 
The lawyers’ movement produced a kind of deliberative culture that 
was missing in the public sphere. The legal community also realized 
that the supremacy of law and the prospects of political liberalization 
of the regime would not be possible without the support from public 
sphere. For this reason, they were compelled to expand the main 
agendas of the movement to get public support. In its second phase, the 
main agenda of the movement included: 
 
(a) Independence of judiciary 
(b) Rule of law 
(c) Restoration of democracy  
(d) Social justice (the phenomenon of ‘public interest litigation’ 
facilitated this narrative) 
  
Pakistan lawyers’ movement politicized the public sphere that paved 
the way for the democratization process in the country. Through 
lawyers’ movement civil society actors started to contest discourses on 
military dictatorship, democracy, rule of law, separation of powers etc. 
The emergence of deliberative capacity that led to the democratization 
process was not possible if the lawyers’ movement was merely confined 
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to the legal community with their professional institutional interests. 
The motivation of civil society actors was different from that of 
lawyers. The mobilization of different civil society actors for the 
broader cause of democratization created an environment in which 
Musharraf was not able to sustain his authoritarian rule. Despite “huge 
diversity of ideological interests, including those of women activists, 
labor unions, students, Islamist groups, professional associations 
including those of doctors, leftist groups, and others” (Shafqat, 2017, 
pp. 16-7) civil society was able to organize around a single agenda, that 
is, breakdown of authoritarian rule for the restoration of democracy. 
Indeed, the restoration of judiciary, for civil society actors, was a means 
to bring about democracy in the country. Leadership within the legal 
community also accepted that their success was not possible without 
support from other civil society actors, which created a public discourse 
about the political alternatives in Pakistan during the authoritarian rule.  
 
The liberalization of regime and the politicization of public sphere were 
both instrumental in the emergence of deliberative capacity in Pakistan. 
These events occurred due to the diverse policies (often contradictory) 
of Musharraf’s autocratic rule. The first event, liberalization of the 
regime, helped authoritarian regime to get legitimacy, and the second 
event, politicization of the public sphere, created an environment in 
which military rule began to delegitimize itself. The emergence of 
deliberative capacity can be attributed to these two notions that 
appeared during the authoritarian rule of Musharraf. The success of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement lies in its ability to initiate discourses on 
autocratic rule, democracy, supremacy of law, and separation of 
powers, although it was not possible without a pro-democracy civil 
society and public sphere. 
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(iii)- Institutional Liberalism, Local Culture and Deliberation 
 
Now, I turn to explain the dichotomy of state liberal institutions and the 
public sphere. Specifically, I discuss how this dichotomous framework 
shapes the deliberative practices in Pakistan. The role of local culture, 
narratives, indigenous beliefs and religious attachments are important 
in spelling out this relationship between state liberal institutions, local 
languages and deliberation. Pakistan lawyers’ movement did not just 
work for the restoration of judiciary and democracy but also for the 
institutionalization of political liberalism. In other words, in order to 
restore judiciary and democracy, the project of political liberalization 
of the state institutions was inevitable. This political liberalization of 
the state institutions should not be confused with Musharraf’s project 
of liberalization of the authoritarian regime. The former concerns with 
the principle of the separation of powers, rule of law and supremacy of 
constitution, whereas the latter deals with Musharraf’s project of 
enlightened moderation that merely embraces modern values like 
autonomy, secularism, gender equality etc. without any reference to 
democracy and the rule of law. In the previous section on the 
“Emergence of Deliberative Capacity”, I have argued about the role of 
civil society and public sphere in the process of democratization. Here, 
I extend the notion of public sphere and its relationship with 
institutional liberalism. In doing so, I discuss the various factors, such 
as culture, language, indigenous beliefs, and religious attachments, 
which shape the deliberative practices in Pakistan.  
As discussed earlier, Dryzek’s concept of deliberative system is not tied 
to any specification of institutional arrangements and one can use it to 
understand the democratic potential in the non-Western contexts, which 
also includes authoritarian regimes. Democratization understood in the 
context of deliberative capacity-building attempts to search the 
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democratic potential in the political system. In order to locate 
democratic potential in the Pakistani authoritarian context, we need to 
understand the distribution of deliberative capacity in the system. 
Deliberative system of states and societies consist of the following 
elements (Dryzek J. S., 2010, pp. 137-8): 
 
1- Public space  
2- Empowered space  
3- Transmission  
4- Accountability 
5- Meta-Deliberation  
6- Decisiveness     
   
Pakistan lawyers’ movement was instrumental in connecting these six 
elements of the deliberative system. Although lawyers’ movement 
originated in the institution of judiciary but it became successful when 
it was carried out in the public sphere (Zaidi, 2008; Shafqat, 2017). In 
the political history of Pakistan, empowered spaces like courts have 
always legitimized autocratic rule. Moreover, before Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement, there were no effective social mobilizations for the 
politicization of the public space during both democratic and 
authoritarian rules. It is due to the persistence of authoritarian rule for 
more than three decades in the history of Pakistan that the military has 
successfully managed to keep empowered spaces and public space at a 
considerable distance. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain the 
history of democracy in Pakistan, which is also a history of the 
country’s military and its failures, to a larger extent. The case of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement shows that if public space is conducive to 
various deliberative practices then empowered space is compelled to 
bring about change in the regime. In deliberative theory, thinkers 
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normally argue that the informal public sphere causes deliberation in 
the empowered spaces such as courts and legislatures87. The case of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement shows that the transmission mechanisms 
between the empowered space and public sphere are mutually 
connected and the cause of deliberation is not confined to one location. 
Specifically, the growing phenomenon of the judicialization of 
politics88 is quite helpful to understand the influence of courts on public 
sphere. Although the function of superior judiciary is always 
structurally political89 but the Pakistani case suggests that in order to 
assert its deliberative capacity, the Supreme Court needs legitimation in 
the public sphere. The following figure shows how different elements 
of the deliberative system are connected:             
    
 
                                                          
87 For example, see (Habermas, 1996); (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012) and (Dryzek J. 
S., 2009). 
88 To understand the phenomenon of the judicialization of politics in the Asian 
context, see (Dressel, 2012). 
89 According to Cheema, “The Supreme Court’s role, like that of any apex court with 
constitutional and administrative law jurisdiction, has always been deeply and 
structurally political and will continue to be so in the future” in (Cheema, 2016, p. 
447). 
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.
 
Deliberative System90  
Pakistan lawyers’ movement enabled empowered space to connect with 
the public space. This very connection between the two spaces 
produced deliberation in the overall political system, which paved the 
way for the democratization of the regime. This missing connection was 
one of the main causes of the persistence of authoritarian rule in 
Pakistan. Moreover, the emergence of deliberative capacity during the 
autocratic rule of Musharraf strengthened the deliberation of the overall 
political system. The success of Pakistan lawyers’ movement lies in its 
ability to distribute the newly emerged deliberative capacity in the 
                                                          
90 This figure is taken from (Ian O'Flynn & Nicole Curato, 2015). 
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whole political system. Despite the fact that this movement was not for 
the restoration of democracy but for the protection of legal 
community’s professional interests, it made transition to democracy 
possible because of the development of deliberative capacity in the 
overall political system. Lawyers’ demand for institutional liberalism 
that could sustain the principle of the separation of powers91 was not 
possible without the support from the public sphere. The politicization 
of the public sphere is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of 
institutional liberalism. Lawyers’ movement is an empirical case that 
helps us to understand the tradeoff between deliberative capacity in the 
public space and the empowered space. The transition to democracy is 
likely to occur if the political system is disposed to democratic 
legitimacy.  
According to Dryzek, the following factors are important in the 
development of the deliberative capacity in the political system (Dryzek 
J. S., 2009, pp. 1394-6): 
1- Literacy and education  
2- Shared language  
3- Voting system design  
4- State structures and institutions  
5- Political culture       
 
This thesis argues that the above factors that facilitate prospects of 
deliberative capacity in the political system also contextualize the 
practice of deliberation. That is to say, these factors do not merely 
contribute in the development of deliberative capacity but they also help 
                                                          
91 The principle of the separation powers is necessary if judiciary wants to protect 
their independence.  
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us to understand the nature of political deliberation in different 
historical contexts. Literacy and education are necessary in order to 
develop “the communicative competence of political actors and 
ordinary citizens” (Dryzek J. S., 2009, p. 1394). The low level of 
literacy in Pakistan has undermined the communicative competence of 
citizens. Different types of education (government vs. private) also 
impede the development of argumentative skills that are required to 
persuade in the process of political deliberation. In Pakistan, people 
speak a number of languages that shape their everyday life. Although, 
Urdu is the national language, the elite use English language to express 
their opinions. The separation of Bangladesh in 1971 indicates the 
complex and politically problematic nature of shared language in 
Pakistan. Various political conflicts are due to the feelings of 
marginalization pervasive among the linguistic groups in the country. 
During the lawyers’ movement, different groups of Pakistani society 
were able to express themselves in a single language. Voting system 
design also shapes the nature of deliberation before, during and after 
the elections. In Pakistan, many people deliberately don’t vote because 
of their disenchantment with the voting system of the country. The 
nature of state institutions also impact the deliberative practices in the 
country. Judicialization of politics during the autocratic rule of 
Musharraf made the Supreme Court an exemplary deliberative 
institution in Pakistan. However, the low level of deliberation in most 
of the state institutions has been a major obstruction in the consolidation 
of democracy in Pakistan. The case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement 
suggests that authentic, inclusive and consequential deliberation in state 
institutions may increase the deliberative capacity of the whole political 
system. The actual practice of deliberation is intimately connected with 
the political culture of the country: “Deliberation may play out quite 
differently in different kinds of political cultures” (Dryzek J. S., 2009, 
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p. 1396). The cultural context is an important factor if we want to 
understand deliberative practices in different historical contexts. In 
Asian societies like Pakistan, due to hierarchical order in the society 
people tend to avoid raising their voice in the public realm. It means 
respect for authority is an integral aspect in the public domain, which 
can give rise to certain non-deliberative practices in the system. 
However, one should look into the various sites to determine the overall 
deliberativeness of the political system. The low deliberation in one site 
can be compensated through the high deliberation in other locations. In 
our global age people use innumerable ways to express their opinions.  
The case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement shows that the deliberative 
capacity is instrumental in democratic transition. It can be applied to all 
kinds of political settings, such as liberal states, authoritarian regimes, 
and new and old democratic states. While looking for the democratic 
potential in authoritarian contexts, deliberative theorists ought to pay 
attention to deliberative capacity and deliberative system.              
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusions 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to investigate the nature of 
political deliberation in Pakistan. The Pakistani context provides a 
unique case to study deliberative mechanisms in an authoritarian non-
Western context. Deliberation is not merely another form of political 
participation. Since Aristotle deliberation has been a longstanding 
element of democratic theory and played an important role in its 
development. Dryzek’s characterization of deliberative turn in 
democratic theory indicates the significance of deliberation in our 
current understanding of democracy (in contrast to other features like 
voting, majority rule, and free and fair elections)92. In the last decade of 
twentieth century, deliberative democracy emerged as one of the strong 
paradigms in normative political philosophy. Although the idea was 
coined by Josepth Bessete to criticize the elitist and aristocratic 
interpretation of the American constitution93, historically it goes back 
to John Dewey and Hannah Arendt and then further back to Aristotle. 
In their political writings these thinkers have always emphasized on 
inclusive political participation that fosters public discussion, reasoning 
and judgments. Pakistan lawyers’ movement throws new light on the 
normative aspects of deliberative democracy and also helps us to 
understand the nature of deliberation in an autocratic and non-Western 
context. In this thesis, I did not start with some taken for granted 
philosophical premise to understand the deliberative aspects of Pakistan 
                                                          
92 For Dryzek’s characterization of deliberative turn in the theory of democracy, see 
(Dryzek J. S., 2000) and (Dryzek J. S., 1994). 
93 For details, see (Bessete, 1980) 
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lawyers’ movement but proceeded with pragmatic reflections on what 
this case may mean for the role of political deliberation in an autocratic 
context. Moreover, given the dearth of empirical research in 
deliberative theory94, this research attempted to provoke reflections on 
the normative principles of deliberative theory and its further 
development.  
Most academic writings on Pakistan Lawyers’ movement has focused 
on its legal and constitutional aspects. There are considerably fewer 
studies, however, on its relation to the process of democratization and 
the rule of law (in the form of institutional liberalism) in the country. In 
this research, I have not merely analyzed how this movement 
contributed to the process of democratization but also its role to 
strengthen and consolidate deliberative politics in Pakistan. Normally, 
deliberation is associated with democracy but they are two distinct 
notions (Lafont, 2006). In order to spell out the deliberative aspects of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement I have decoupled the term deliberation 
from democracy and concentrated on the former. This distinction was 
also helpful in order to understand the peculiar non-Western contexts 
of deliberation. Although in this research, I have focused on Pakistani 
case but my analysis should be understood in relation to comparative 
political philosophy, a style of political theorizing that elaborates 
significant concepts that are attentive to contexts, specifically non-
Western. This style of political theorizing holds the potential to make 
comparisons across different cultures and traditions. In what follows, I 
will discuss main conclusions one can draw from this thesis:  
                                                          
94 The role of empirical research in deliberative theory has been instrumental in 
recasting its concept over the last two decades. However, there are only few 
studies in which thinkers have analyzed the normative dimensions of deliberative 
theory on the basis of social movements. See (Porta, 2013)   
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1- Internal Skepticism of Deliberative Theorists: 
Ignorance of non-Western Contexts 
Due to the Eurocentric biased in delibearive theory, theorists have 
ignored the non-Western contexts and limited the scope of deliberation 
to advanced liberal democracies in the West. Such an attitude was an 
impediment in the development of deliberative theory both at normative 
and explanatory level. As Saas writes:  
“In the scheme of history, most political deliberation has taken place 
outside the modern West. But the study of deliberation, however 
extensive it has become, has largely ignored this wider world. 
Examining how deliberation manifests across different societies has 
considerable promise for both explanatory and normative political 
theory” 
(Sass, 2018, p. 1)     
This passage shows the persistence of internal skepticism among 
deliberative theorists about the ignorance of non-Western contexts. 
However, there are few studies on the prospects of deliberation in the 
non-Western contexts95, internal skepticism among deliberative 
theorists about the ignorance of non-Western contexts still persists. This 
is because these studies do not expose the Eurocentric presumptions of 
normative concepts in deliberative theory which guide the actual 
                                                          
95 For the East Asian context, see (He, 2006); (He & Warren, 2011); (Beibei Tang, 
Tetsuki Tamura, and Baogang He, 2018). For the Indian context, see (V. Rao and P. 
Sanyal, 2010); (Ramya Parthasarathy and Vijayendra Rao, 2018). Moreover, these 
studies of deliberation in the non-Western contexts are relatively new in 
deliberative research, and they need further refinement at both normative and 
empirical level. This thesis, in a larger context, contributes to this new trend in 
deliberative research.  
 
185 
 
practice of deliberation in the real world politics. In other words, rather 
than applying deliberative theory to non-Western contexts and 
verify/falsify its claims, which is the case in most of the studies outside 
the West96, I have insisted on studying concrete cases in which 
deliberation takes place at a local level and then evaluate the normative 
ideals of deliberative theory in light of those non-Western contexts. In 
this thesis, I have discussed various reasons which impede the further 
development of deliberative theory. The ideal of deliberation presumes 
certain core values - such as rational discussion, critical judgements, 
open discussion – values embedded in the Western style modernity, it 
considerably limits the scope and application of deliberative theory. 
According to Cooke, the deliberative model of democracy is essentially 
an embodiment of the normative concepts of knowledge, self and good 
life stemming from the Western modernity. These normative concepts 
are not a matter of choice as they constitute the very essence of 
European self-understanding, thereby, can’t be disregarded in the 
political process97. Similarly, Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action, which provides the basic theoretical framework to deliberative 
theorists, is also based upon the fundamental assumptions of 
Enlightenment. Delanty criticizes Habermas’ theory for being 
Eurocentric and occidental in its core. He argues that Habermasian 
                                                          
96 For example, Fishkin’s concept of deliberative Polling has been used in many 
non-Western countries to evaluate preference change in the deliberative process. 
But such a technique to study deliberation in the non-Western countries merely 
consolidates already existing normative dimensions of deliberative theory and does 
not help us to rethink the normative ideals in the light of different historical 
contexts. For the limitation of ‘deliberative polling’, see (Gleason, 2011) and (V. 
Price, J. Cappella and L. Nir, 2002).      
97 For details, see the last section of Cooke’s article “Five Arguments for 
Deliberative Democracy”. She claims that the strongest justification for the 
deliberative model of democracy springs from its commitment to modern values 
like rationality, autonomy, self-determination - values which constitute self-
understanding in the West. See (Cooke, 2000)   
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philosophy is a kind of eurocentrism and his concept of morality “an 
evolutionary theory culminating in the discourse of occidental 
rationalism and thus fails to see that universal morality can be 
articulated in more than one cultural form and in more than one logic 
of development” (Delanty, 1997, p. 42). For Delanty, Habermas holds 
onto a radical distinction between discourse and cultural attachments. 
On the basis of such a radical distinction, Habermas believes that people 
can get rid of identity and cultural peculiarities when they enter public 
communication. In the same vein, Gambetta’s distinction between 
analytical and indexical knowledge also reveals the Eurocentric 
presumptions of deliberative model of democracy. Gambetta claims 
that the norms of deliberation are not universal in their scope: “Attitudes 
toward conversation do not originate from democratic arrangements 
even though they can be shaped and controlled by them. They are likely 
to be by-products of a preexisting culture and may well be antithetical 
to deliberation” (Gambetta, 1998, p. 20).  
In order to avoid such Eurocentric biased in deliberative research, I 
have argued that we need to evaluate the ideals of deliberation in 
various context. The presence of multiple varieties of political discourse 
across different traditions enables us to examine the causes which 
motivate people to deliberate. The diversity of social-political 
conditions also changes the nature, goal, and consequences of 
deliberation. In some contexts, for example in east Asian, it helps 
autocratic rule to sustain, and in some other contexts, like the case of 
Pakistan lawyers’ movement suggests, it paves the way to the process 
of democratization. Another recommendation that I propose in this 
conclusion is that deliberative theorists should continue to deliberate, 
not only on the purpose, goals and effects of deliberation, but also on 
the normative assumptions of deliberation. Since the project of 
deliberative democracy is deeply rooted in the critical theory tradition, 
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that’s why, it should be a transformative project directed towards 
emancipation, even from its own Eurocentric axioms. The critical 
theory aspect of deliberative theory, I believe, would help it to expand 
its scope and reach at a global level.   
        
 
2- Deliberation, Lawyers’ Movement and Politicization of 
Public Sphere 
In deliberative theory, the importance of public sphere cannot be 
ignored in any context. Right from Habermasian philosophy to current 
debates on systemic approach, public sphere remains one of the main 
locations of deliberative practices. Civil society is also another 
significant aspect of public sphere. A vital civil society is considered an 
indispensable element for the constitution of the public sphere that hosts 
deliberative practices and transmit them to the formal state institutions 
such as legislatures and courts. In Habermas’ two track model of 
deliberation, public sphere is an essential part of deliberative 
democracy because it provides the political space for the formation of 
collective will, which influences decision-making process in the formal 
structures of the state. In the Western political philosophy, both civil 
society and public sphere are instrumental in the democratic 
government. However, if we look at the political history of Pakistan, 
specifically its role during the military regime of Musharraf, it 
legitimized the autocratic setup. The public sphere in Pakistan was not 
conducive to the democracy98. Since, the concepts of civil society and 
public sphere are historical concepts stemming from the Western 
political philosophy, therefore, they change their meaning in the non-
                                                          
98 For detail arguments, see chapter number six of this thesis.   
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Western contexts. Moreover, when it comes to Muslim countries the 
situation becomes more complicated. Indigenous culture and Islamic 
beliefs influence the fundamental basis of civil society in the non-
Western world in general and the Muslim world in particular.  
Deliberative theorists argue that public sphere is one of major locations 
for deliberation, which means, the possibility of contestation of political 
discourse is always integral to the public sphere. In contrast, I have 
argued that the politicization of public sphere creates the environment 
in which citizens are able to contest political discourses and 
alternatives. A deliberative reading of Pakistan lawyers’ movement 
suggests that, the one I have proposed in this thesis, this social 
mobilization was able to bring about democracy99 because it totally 
changed the historical role of Pakistani civil society. Indeed, this 
movement politicized the public sphere of Pakistan by the help of 
judicial activism. The phenomenon of judicialization of politics is 
another neglected area in the political philosophy of deliberative 
democracy. In countries like Pakistan and India, courts have been 
instrumental in politicizing the public sphere through various means, 
for example PIL100 and judicial review. This research suggests that the 
idea of public sphere is a historical concept101 and it is an assumption 
to think its conduciveness to democracy, which is at least true in a 
variety of non-Western contexts102. The contestation of political 
                                                          
99 I have also pointed out that Pakistan lawyers’ movement was not about 
democracy in its initial phase, rather, it was about the protection of legal 
community’s interests. For a detail argument, see chapter six of this thesis, 
specifically the section entitled “Civil Society and Public Sphere”. Also see (Zaidi, 
2008).     
100 Public Interest Litigation. See, chapter five and six of this thesis. Also see, 
(Mendes, 2013) and (Dressel, 2012).  
101  
102 It is in this context, some theorists argue for the new conceptual categories to 
understand the role of deliberation in the non-Western contexts. For example, He 
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discourses in the public sphere can also be understood in cultural terms. 
In Asian contexts, specifically Pakistan, people avoid open discussion 
because of the hierarchical nature of social order. Open contestation of 
political discourse is more likely to occur in those contexts in which 
public sphere is politicized. Deliberative theorists, despite knowing the 
essential role of public sphere in the act of deliberation, have ignored 
this aspect. It means, deliberation and protests (moments of contentious 
and disruptive politics) are not antithetical as some scholars believe103. 
The standard literature, which considers protests as an impediment to 
deliberative democracy, limits human communication to rational 
discussion, persuasion, mutual justification, thereby ignores the other 
mechanisms that can induce reflection, such as rhetoric, greeting, 
protests, demonstrations, social movements etc. Lawyers’ movement 
produced a kind of deliberative culture that was missing in the public 
sphere. The legal community also realized that the supremacy of law 
and the prospects of the political liberalization of the regime would not 
be possible without the support from public sphere. This research 
suggests that if we expand the concept of communicative action then 
we can realize the significance of the other forms of speech acts in the 
deliberative process. Moreover, when searching the deliberative 
potential in the non-Western contexts, deliberative theorists should not 
assume the democratic nature of the public sphere. Communicative acts 
(movements, protests, demonstrations, even religious argumentations) 
which politicized the public sphere are constitutive of various practices 
of deliberation.       
                                                          
talks about “authoritarian deliberation” in the Chinese context. For details, see (He 
& Warren, 2011) and (He, 2006). 
103 Protests in Brazil and Turkey (Gezi Park; Jornadas de Junho) in 2013 also 
consolidate this point. For example, see (Ricardo Fabrino Mendonçaa and Selen A. 
Ercanb, 2015). 
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3- Deliberative Capacity, Deliberative System and 
Democratization 
The political upheavals responsible for the collapse of authoritarian rule 
in Pakistan are important in order to explain democratic transition in the 
country. The transition in Pakistan from authoritarian rule to democratic 
government can be understood form both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
perspective. Most democratization studies focus on the elites and social 
movements within the established democracies in the West. Contrary to 
this trend, this thesis has focused on democratization from below in a 
non-Western and non-democratic context. Lawyers’ movement helps 
us to understand the process of democratization in an authoritarian 
context. The mainstream research on democratization has ignored the  
role of both deliberation and social movements, which I have argued 
merits academic attention. The role of social movements and 
deliberative practices in authoritarian contexts was an important aspect 
in order to understand the process of democratization in the Pakistani 
non-democratic context.  Democracy understood in deliberative terms 
provides a unique perspective to study the transition from authoritarian 
rule to the democratic. In this thesis, I have stressed on the concept of 
deliberative capacity, which Dryzek introduced in the larger context of 
systemic approach, to understand the role of Pakistan lawyers’ 
movement in the process of democratization. The concept of 
deliberative capacity is defined in the context of political system. In 
Dryzek’s account, there is no institutional requirement for this capacity 
to exist in the political system. And a wide variety of political systems 
(liberal, electoral, authoritarian) can be explained through this 
perspective of deliberative capacity. Moreover, I have also discussed 
the significance of systemic approach to understand the democratic 
potential in an authoritarian non-western context. Since, this strand is 
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not tied to any institutional arrangements of liberal states, that’s why, 
one can use it to understand the process of democratization in a wide 
variety of historical contexts. However, Dryzek does not discuss the 
factors which lead to the emergence of deliberative capacity in the 
political system. I have argued that the emergence of this capacity can 
occur in different context. Liberalization policies under autocratic rule 
helped this capacity to emerge in the Pakistani context. Deliberative 
theorists should also consider the factors which help deliberative 
capacity to emerge in the first place, especially if they want to 
understand the process of democratization in the non-Western contexts. 
The case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement shows that if public space is 
conducive to various deliberative practices than empowered space is 
compelled to bring about change in the regime. In deliberative theory, 
thinkers normally argue that the informal public sphere causes 
deliberation in the empowered spaces such as courts and legislatures 
104. The case of Pakistan lawyers’ movement shows that the 
transmission mechanisms between the empowered space and public 
sphere are mutually connected and the cause of deliberation is not 
confined to one location. The success of Pakistan lawyers’ movement 
lies in its ability to effectively distribute the newly emerged deliberative 
capacity in the whole political system. Despite the fact that this 
movement was not for the restoration of democracy but for the 
protection of legal community’s professional interests, it made 
transition to democracy possible because of the development of 
deliberative capacity in the overall political system. This thesis argues 
that deliberative capacity is instrumental in the democratic transition. It 
can be applied to all kinds of political setting, such as liberal states, 
                                                          
104 For example, see (Habermas, 1996); (Jane Mansbridge et al. , 2012) and (Dryzek 
J. S., 2009) 
192 
 
authoritarian regimes, and new and old democratic states. While 
looking for the democratic potential in authoritarian contexts, 
deliberative theorists ought to pay attention to deliberative capacity and 
deliberative system.            
 
4- Comparative Political Philosophy and Deliberative 
Theory  
The recent developments in the deliberative theory, more specifically 
the systemic turn, provide an opportunity to debunk Eurocentrism 
presumed in the normative  framework of deliberative theory. 
Comparative political philosophy, by its very essence, is a deliberative 
exercise in which thinkers develop a dialogical approach to understand 
the non-Western world beyond the confines of ‘Eurocentric 
Orientalism’ and ‘anti- European Occidentalism’. Such advancements 
in deliberative theory are similar to  some of the claims made by 
comparative political philosophers. Therefore, the neglect of 
comparative political philosophy among deliberative theorists comes at 
the cost of inhibiting further development of deliberative theory. On the 
other hand, comparative political philosophers can also learn from the 
recent advancements in deliberative theory to understand the role of 
culture, indigenous beliefs, religion, narratives, and rhetoric in the 
formation of political practices (or peculiar types of political 
deliberation) in the non-Western contexts. Both strands, deliberative 
theory105 and comparative political philosophy, are stemming from the 
Western academia to engage with the non-Western world. However, 
what is still missing, is the internal dialogue between the deliberative 
                                                          
105 Here I am referring to the recent advancements after the systemic turn. See 
chapter four of this thesis.  
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theorists and comparative political philosophy. And, it is precisely in 
this context, this thesis attempted to bridge that missing link. The 
importance of such an intellectual task is unavoidable in our global 
political predicament. As Jensen Saas writes:  
“To date, deliberative democrats have seldom engaged with the 
burgeoning field of comparative political theory. But the need to do so, 
in a globalizing world, could hardly be more clear. Meaningful 
exchange across cultural traditions is predicated on deliberation, so 
identifying forms that are widely desirable and effective is a pressing 
desideratum for normative theory”. 
(Sass, 2018, p. 5) 
 
All in all, the major purpose of deliberation is to induce reflection. If 
we want to enhance the reach and application of deliberative theory at 
the global level, I believe the internal dialogue between these two fields 
is indispensable. It is precisely in this context, this thesis has attempted 
to interpret Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement through the lens of 
deliberative theory. Such an intellectual endeavor holds a possibility for 
us to comprehend our global political predicament in a more plausible 
manner.   
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